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Abstract...... 
Increasing accident rates and system losses in different industrial sectors endanger 
safety, threaten economic growth and cause pollution damages. A major cause for these 
accidents and losses in the chemical process industry is the human error which 
contributes with a range of 60-90% in the development of these accidents. Conventional 
safety and risk analysis methods focus mainly on describing technological malfunctions 
and lack a systematic consideration of the human impact, i.e., the human error, on the 
process under consideration. These methods lack also a systematic utilisation of existing 
supporting and enabling technologies, e.g. virtual reality. 
In this thesis, an integrated method for improving risk analysis is introduced. This 
method is developed by utilising human factors knowledge for a better inclusion of 
human impact in the risk analysis. It also utilises virtual reality as enabling technology 
that can be used as a medium for running relevant safety scenarios. The utilisation of 
human factors methods and virtual reality is based on an end user oriented approach of 
data collection, review and validation from the selected industrial domain (Chemical 
Process Industry). 
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Zusammenfassung 
Steigende Unfallzahlen und Ausfälle von technischen Systemen in verschiedenen 
Industriebranchen gefährden die Sicherheit, bedrohen das Wirtschaftswachstum und 
tragen zur Umweltverschmutzung bei. Eine wesentliche Ursache für diese Unfälle und 
Verluste in der chemischen Prozessindustrie ist menschliches Versagen, das mit einem 
Anteil von 60-90% zu Entwicklung dieser Unfälle beiträgt. Konventionelle Methoden 
der Sicherheits- und Risikoanalyse fokussieren hauptsächlich auf die Beschreibung 
technischer Störungen und Abweichungen und ihnen fehlt eine systematische 
Berücksichtigung der menschlichen Einflüsse (d. h., der menschliche Fehler) im 
betrachteten Prozess. Des Weiteren fehlt diesen Methoden  eine gezielte Nutzung 
vorhandener unterstützender Technologien, z. B., Virtual Reality. 
In dieser Dissertation wird eine integrierte Methode zur Verbesserung der Risikoanalyse 
eingeführt. Diese Methode basiert auf eine Nutzung der Erkenntnisse der menschlichen 
Faktoren (Human Factors) zur verbesserten Einbeziehung der menschlichen Einflüsse in 
der Risikoanalyse. Die Methode nutzt auch die virtuelle Realität als technologische 
Umgebung zur Durchführung und Erprobung relevanter Sicherheitsszenarien. Die 
Nutzung der menschlichen Faktoren und die virtuelle Realität basieren auf einem 
Endnutzer-orientierten Verfahren zur Datenerhebung, Revision und Validierung aus der 
ausgewählten Industriebranche (chemische Prozessindustrie). 
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1  
Introduction 
2 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the underlying research by describing the 
motivation behind it (based on the current situation), goal definition and scope of the 
work, research domain and the reasons for selecting this particular domain. The chapter 
concludes by providing an overview of the contents of this thesis.  
1.1 Motivation and current situation 
After many years of continuous improvements in system design and safety methods and 
techniques, the technical and safety communities have realised that accident rates and 
system losses have reached limits which can be hardly reduced by improvements in 
system design or introducing new technical features to these systems. Even in 
organisations with good general safety records and risks awareness, occasional disasters 
do occur and shake public confidence in modern technological systems. The terrible 
explosion of ammonium nitrate which occurred in Toulouse on 21
st
 September 2001 in 
AZF plant belonging to Grande Paroisse Company, TotalFinaElf Group represents an 
example of such disasters and major accidents. The accident led to the death of 30 
people, 242 were injured (officially), 27,000 homes and 1,300 companies were damaged 
and the financial losses were in the range of 1,500 million Euros. This disaster has upset 
the public, traumatised an industrial city and led the politicians to close down the AZF 
plant which lead to cutting 450 direct jobs and the SNPE phosgene related activities 
which had the impact of cutting 492 direct jobs and 600 sub-contracting jobs (Dechy et 
al. 2004). 
The common factor in both of these areas, i.e., system design and safety methods is the 
human error, which – according to recent studies on risk and safety analyses – 
contributes with a range of 60-90% in the development of accidents and losses in high 
risk production processes such as chemical and petrochemical industries (Hollnagel 
1993; Rankin/Kirchbaum 1998). CCPS (2004) examined the magnitude of the human 
error problem and provided results of studies on the contribution of human error in 
chemical process industry (CPI). Below are some facts and figures according to (CCPS 
2004): 
 Human error accounted for 73% and 67% of total damage for boiler start-up and on-
line explosions in oil industries; 
 58% of fire accidents in refineries are caused by human errors; 
 The most common human errors include: improper repair, improper inspection, 
inadequate procedures, using improper material and misoperation. 
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In addition to that, a recent extraction from the MARS database (Major Accidents 
Reporting System) which classifies accidents into equipment caused, human caused and 
environment caused was also performed. The result is illustrated in Fig. ‎1.1 below. 
Knowing that some “equipment caused” accidents and the “other causes” accidents are 
highly probable to be originally caused by erroneous human actions, the aforementioned 
ranges of human contribution to accidents can be confirmed here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source
1
 of data: JRC (2006) 
 Fig. ‎1.1: Causes of accidents reported in the MARS database until November 2006 
As consequences of these human failures, 7.6 million accidents were recorded at work 
in 2001 in EU-15 countries where 4.9 million of these accidents resulted in more than 
three days absence from work and a total of 4,900 fatal accidents. The cost of accidents 
at work and occupational diseases in EU-15 for most countries ranges from 2.6 to 3.8% 
of Gross National Product (European Communities 2004).  
According to (Cacciabue 2000) there are two reasons for this trend of higher human 
contribution in erroneous actions: 
1. The very high reliability and refinement of mechanical and electronic components 
which enabled a reduction in the mechanical faults and also to manage all plant 
critical processes, even in the presence of system faults and malfunctions. This high 
reliability of hardware components has a direct impact on the statistical contribution 
                                                 
1
 No data entries were found for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008. Date: August 2008. 
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to accident of human errors, which become more and more visible in numerical 
importance. 
2. The complexity of the system (automated systems) and the shift in the role assigned 
to human operator from the “pure manual operator” into the “supervisor” of plant 
operations, that are performed by computerised systems. Thus, the working 
environments are much more demanding in terms of cognitive-reasoning abilities 
rather than sensory-motor skills. These systems behave and respond via the 
automation and interfaces, which follow the rules and principles provided by their 
designers. These rules and principles are not always totally known or familiar to 
operators. 
Risks and safety analysis methods have been (and are still being) traditionally 
conducted in a static and paper-based way based on a sequential accident model that 
describes accidents as the outcome of a chain of events that may even be assumed to 
occur in some fixed and imaginable order. In other words, these methods are based on 
domain experts‟ imaginations and their capability of defining as many risky situations 
as possible and then identifying the possible consequences of these risks. 
An accident is thereby described as a series of linked cause-effect pairs, where the 
analysis begins from the last effect – the “accident” – and proceeds backwards until it 
finds the first – or “root” – cause. This procedure of analysing possible risk causes (also 
called root-cause analysis) and consequences is used in most common safety and risk 
analysis methods which include (among others): 
 HAZOP (Hazards and Operability Study) (Cacciabue 2001; Shell 1995d) 
 FMEA (Failure Modes and Effect Analysis) (Stamatis 2003; McDermott et al. 2008) 
 FT (Fault Tree), ET (Event Tree) (Dhilon 2004; Shell 1995a) 
 PHA (Preliminary Hazards Analysis) (Banerjee 2003; Vincoli 2006) 
A closer examination of conventional risk and safety analysis methods identifies four 
major disadvantages of these methods: 
1. They predominantly describe technological (mal)functions, which makes it difficult 
to adequately account for the impact of human – and organisational – factors. In 
other words, these methods do not incorporate models of human performance (e.g., 
CREAM: Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (Hollnagel 1998), 
ATHEANA: a Technique for Human Error Analysis (USNRC 2000), etc.) which can 
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be used to analyse the causes of the aforementioned accidents and risks as previously 
indicated, i.e., the “human error”. 
2. They cannot represent the outcome of events that have not already been included in 
the formal representation, i.e., unexpected conjunctions or confluences are excluded 
from analysis. 
3. Risks are associated with identifiable components or functions (events), but not with 
coincidences and functional dependencies. 
4. Their high dependency on experts‟ imagination which has its limitation apart from 
experience and skills. 
In an attempt to overcome the first difficulty (which is the focus of the underlying 
thesis), some risk and safety analysis methods have rather straightforwardly added the 
human factor (HF)2 – typically in the form of “human error” – hoping that this would 
make the analysis complete. Including the human error in risks and safety analyses is 
necessary for providing comprehensive analyses, but it is not sufficient for an integrated 
inclusion of human factors due to the following facts: 
 Firstly, this solution of representing the human‟s impact on a process in the form of 
“error” has an embedded implication that humans can be treated as machines which 
is not true, since humans are not manipulable and disposable components of a system 
who can be adjusted and modified whenever needed; 
 Secondly it ignores the concept of integrated human factors, i.e., modelling 
operator's behaviour, including performance conditions, considering the dynamic 
interaction between work context and human behaviour, including a recovery model 
for error detection and correction, etc. It is clear that the concept of integrated human 
factors comprises more than a minor individual element in an analysis, i.e., they 
should not be limited only to one component called “human error”; 
 Thirdly, this solution disregards the fact that human and organisational performances 
are not just possible sources of failures but are also an essential resource for system 
safety.  
Based on that, it is evident now that sensible human actions and reactions provide the 
basic foundation for a system‟s stability throughout its life-cycle. Rather than simply 
                                                 
2
 Human Factors (simple definition): the study of how humans behave physically and psychologically 
in relation to particular environments, products, or services. A more contextual definition is provided 
in Chapter 2.  
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adding a human factors component to existing methods, e. g., “human error”, human 
factors must therefore become an integral part of the foundations of risk and safety 
analysis methods. Today, to perform real integrated risk analyses3, i.e., those including 
HF and provide sensible human actions and reactions, it is needed to have (Colombo 
2006): 
 Mock-ups of physical space in which operators work and 
 Perform detailed on-job simulation and experimentation of the process: reactions, 
flows, process upsets, delays, etc.  
Despite the fact that both of these pre-requisites are expensive and not feasible for long 
term planning, the former one is not flexible at all since every time the layout changes a 
new mock-up has to be built and the latter is time and effort consuming (and to some 
extent might be dangerous, if the experiment need to be performed using real 
interactions with risky situations). Even with the availability of these pre-requisites, 
they do not offer the possibility of visualising the consequences of an operational risk or 
an accident which limits the positive impact on operators‟ mind. Finally it is a further 
challenge to communicate and understand human factor issues due to their complex 
nature as they mostly deal with covert aspects of human behaviour, e.g., problem 
diagnosis, response and decision making, which is difficult to imagine or analyse in 
advance. 
The illustrated difficulties stress the need to change from static and linear to more 
dynamic and systematic risk and accident analysis methods. These methods should be 
flexible and support utilising existing enabling technological media, e.g., Multimedia, 
Virtual Reality (VR), Process Simulators, etc. 
1.2 Goal definition 
As described in the “motivation and current situation” under Section 1.1, there is a need 
for introducing and implementing integrated methods for improving risk analysis for the 
purpose of reducing operational risks and hazards as well as to improve safety 
production. These integrated methods should take into consideration the aforementioned 
limitations and difficulties, i.e., the high dependency of risk analysis on experts‟ 
judgement, absence of the “human factor” in these analyses, difficulty of 
communicating and understanding HF issues, etc. In other words, an integrated method 
                                                 
3
 Risk analysis and its integration in the risk management process are explained in Chapter 2 
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should enable experimenting with risky situations by utilising HF methods in a way that 
enables an elaborate consideration of consequences and procedures to avoid these 
operational risks or reduce the losses associated with them. 
A solution to this problematic “human caused operational risks and accidents” is 
introduced within the framework of this thesis and is based on experiencing safety 
critical situations in an environment which allows exploiting HF methods and concepts 
for reducing these risks and accidents. The ability of a Virtual Reality (VR) 
environment to represent objects and situations in a 3D interactive way makes it a 
suitable enabling environment (enabler) for this purpose. 
Based on that, the goal of this thesis is to introduce an integrated method for improving 
risk analysis by using relevant HF methods and knowledge in a VR environment. In this 
context, the term method is defined to be “a way, technique, or process of or for doing 
something” (Merriam-Webster (2009)). An improved risk analysis plays a key role in 
reducing operational process risks and enhancing operational safety. This allows 
moving from the current static analysis of process risks and hazards (e.g., HAZOP, ET 
and FT methods (Cacciabue 2001; Shell 1995d; Dhilon 2004; Shell 1995a; Dien et al. 
2004)) into a more dynamic analysis method. The integrated method consists of two 
main building blocks: 
 The first block is the development of end user scenarios and requirements from the 
domain industry; 
 The second block is applying a HF methodology for supporting risk analysis on the 
end users scenarios and requirements to identify functional specifications and 
requirements for supporting risk analysis using a VR environment. 
The development of this integrated method is based on a HF methodology for 
supporting risk analysis that takes the human behaviour and performance into 
consideration. This methodology is developed within the framework of the underlying 
thesis and considered to be the first step in the work approach4 used to produce the 
integrated method. This structure is illustrated in Fig. ‎1.2 by separating the HF 
methodology (the upper box in the figure) from the rest of the integrated method. 
In addition to the development of these two blocks as main elements of the integrated 
method, a VR environment design is introduced as an implementation proposal. The 
                                                 
4
 To avoid terminology conflicts, the term “work approach” refers here to the way applied in 
developing the integrated method in the underlying thesis. The term “integrated method” refers to the 
resulting method itself as an output that can be further used by target users. 
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proposed VR environment design is based on standard VR components as well as 
additional software modules that are required to support particular functional 
requirements and specifications. Fig. ‎1.2 illustrates the approach applied in developing 
the proposed integrated method. The large green bounding box illustrates the integrated 
method itself whereas the small green bounding box illustrates the proposed VR 
environment design. 
Identify Functional VR Requirements 
Applying the HF Methodology to End User Requirements
Identify Technical Features and Modules
Propose VR Environment Design
Development of a HF Methodology for Supporting Risk Anaylsis
Development of End User Scenarios and Requirements
               Validation
 
Fig. ‎1.2: The proposed integrated method for improving risk analysis (the large green bounding box)  and 
the proposed VR environment design (the small green bounding box) 
Since the global goal of this thesis is a human factors driven improvement of safety, it 
does not aim at introducing improvements or innovations in the VR technology: neither 
software nor hardware related. In this regard VR is considered as a communication 
process between human beings, mediated by computer systems, which uses interaction, 
visualisation and other sensory stimulation to convey information. Based on that, this 
thesis intends to introduce an enhanced usability of VR as an enabling technology for 
solving problems with high industrial and social impacts. This usability is moulded into 
a set of functional requirements and specifications as retrieved from field observations, 
i.e., application-oriented and end-user driven. 
Fig. ‎1.3  illustrates the role of VR in the underlying work by acting as a bridge 
(representation medium) for bringing together the three key components that influence 
safety within the framework of this thesis: industrial needs (end user needs), risk 
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analysis and human factors. The double sided arrows in Fig. ‎1.3 illustrate that the 
aforementioned three components do not only influence the design of the VR 
environment (provide input), but also utilise this environment by acquiring knowledge 
and information regarding possible improvements (receive output). The Virtual Reality 
box in the figure has been assigned a brighter colour to emphasise the fact that virtual 
reality represents a medium of representation (enabler) here and not a point of research 
which is the case for the remaining dark coloured boxes of the figure. 
Human Factors
Industrial Needs Risk Analysis
Virtual Reality
 
Fig. ‎1.3: The role of virtual reality as a representation medium among industrial needs, human factors and 
risk analysis 
1.3 Description of the integrated method 
It has been mentioned under “Goal definition” that the integrated method consists of 
two main building blocks, i.e., the development of end user scenarios and requirements 
and applying a HF methodology on the end users scenarios and requirements to identify 
functional specifications and requirements for supporting risk analysis using a VR 
environment. 
The starting point (Fig. ‎1.2) for the development of the integrated method was an 
analysis of existing HF methodologies regarding their support to risk analysis. This 
analysis concentrates on a justified selection of certain HF methodologies as shown in 
Chapter 2. Based on major limitations of the selected HF methodologies, an integrated 
methodology for supporting risk analysis is developed as shown in Chapter 3. The 
methodology is validated by applying it to a case study from the chemical process 
industry as shown in Chapter 6. Despite the fact, that this step is not considered as part 
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of the resulting integrated method, it has been mentioned here due to its elementary role 
for building the integrated method. 
After the development of the HF methodology, a definition of end user requirements 
based on representative end user scenarios is carried out as shown in Chapter 4. 
After having developed the HF methodology for supporting risk analysis and the 
definition of end user requirements, the HF methodology is applied to the end user 
requirements. This process requires three intermediate steps: clustering the HF 
methodology in terms of modelling nature (i.e., error modelling or performance 
modelling), definition of the functions covered by the clusters and mapping the end user 
requirements to the HF methodology as shown in Chapter 4. The identified functional 
VR requirements are validated (reviewed) against the end user requirements as shown in 
Chapter 6. By producing the final list of functional VR requirements, all the elements of 
the integrated method for improving risk analysis have been defined and can be utilised 
to propose a VR environment design that supports risk analysis. 
To propose a VR environment design, an intermediate stage between the VR design and 
the functional requirements is required. In this intermediate stage a mapping of 
functional VR requirements to technical features and modules and the definition of a 
functional model that describes the interplays and information flow among the 
components of the VR environment takes place. This intermediate stage has been 
assigned to Chapter 4 and considered as the concluding part of identifying the 
functional VR requirements. 
For the purpose of completion, a proposal for a VR environment design that supports 
risk analysis is introduced in Chapter 5. Despite the fact, that this VR environment 
design is not part of the integrated method introduced in this thesis, it utilises the 
information gained from the components of the method. The proposed VR environment 
design is not unique by its nature as it resembles existing VR systems in several 
components and aspects. Additional components that do not exist in standard VR 
systems distinguish the proposed design from other VR system designs as illustrated in 
Chapter 5. 
The validation of the results is mainly based on the two building blocks of the method, 
i.e., validating the HF methodology and validating (reviewing) the end user 
requirements. A third validation block is dedicated to the proposed VR environment 
design as shown in Chapter 6. 
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1.4 Contributions 
Introducing an integrated HF methodology for supporting risk analysis by considering 
the limitations of existing methodologies represents a major contribution from the 
human factors and industrial safety perspectives. The introduced methodology has been 
broken down into guidelines and taxonomies that facilitate applying it by safety analysts 
and consequently including human factors aspects in the analysis without being a HF 
expert. This represents a second important contribution that is lacking in existing human 
factors methodologies. A third contribution is the ability of the methodology to consider 
error recovery possibilities in the analysis and providing the analyst with feasible 
alternatives for error correction. A systematic consideration of error recovery is not 
supported in existing HF methodologies. 
A fourth contribution is the end-user-driven definition of functional software 
requirements, i.e., functional VR requirements. The applied process of defining end 
users scenarios, extracting requirements out of these scenarios, applying a human 
factors methodology to the end user requirements and consequently identifying 
functional VR requirements is a unique process that ensures a high level of end user 
involvement in designing a software solution. 
A fifth contribution is provided by the proposed VR environment design. Despite the 
standard components that constitute the core part of the design, some non-standard 
components and modules (e.g., process dynamics and analysis modules) have been 
included to cover specific aspects and functions. These functions have been highlighted 
by end users and are not supported in existing VR systems.  
The sixth contribution is enhancing the usability of VR as a communication and 
representation medium by utilising it as enabler to solve problems with high industrial, 
human and social impacts.  
1.5 Research domain 
Due to the nature of the work in the “process industry” which is characterised by being 
risky through manufacturing and transporting dangerous, high-temperature and 
chemically reactive materials, the research domain is the “process industry”. By 
definition, a process industry is an industry in which raw materials are treated or 
prepared in a series of stages, e.g. using chemical processes. A more descriptive 
definition is provided by (Lager (2002), pp. 108) and (Chronéer (2005), pp. 6) which 
states: 
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“Process Industry is a part of Manufacturing Industry using (raw) materials to 
manufacture non-assembled products in a production process where the (raw) materials 
are processes in a production plant where different unit operations often take place in a 
fluid form and the different processes are connected in a continuous flow. The concept 
of Process Industry is also used regarding the whole industry in general, though it 
should be noted that many different types of process industries dealing with different 
products/material properties exist in Process Industry, e.g. steel, paper, chemical, etc.” 
Typical industries which fall into the category of process industry include: 
 Oil and gas refining 
 Petrochemicals 
 Water and sewage treatment 
 Food processing, and  
 Pharmaceuticals 
Based on that, all collected data which are used to reach the goals of this thesis stem 
from the process industry domain. Further clarifications to the origin of the data are 
provided accordingly in the subsequent chapters and sections. 
1.6 Structure of the document 
For each chapter and some longer sections of this document, an introductory part and a 
definition of the major related terms are provided at the beginning of that particular 
chapter or section. Each chapter and some long sections are concluded by a summary.  
In Chapter 2, a comprehensive literature review regarding the building blocks of the 
underlying thesis (as shown in Fig. ‎1.3) is given. This literature review represents a 
state-of-the-art and review of related works on: 
 Process Risks: overview, risk management process, risk analysis (assessment) 
methods, operational phase of the production (or process) life cycle, etc. 
 Human Reliability and Human Factors: overview, screening of most popular and 
widely used human factors methods, generations and shortcomings of Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods, etc. 
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 Virtual Reality: overview, reasons for selecting VR as enabling technology in the 
underlying thesis, surveys on selected VR systems and solutions: their areas of 
applications, their shortcomings, etc. 
In Chapter 3, a HF methodology for supporting risk analysis is introduced. This 
methodology is based on an analysis of peculiarities and limitations of selected methods 
which could be applied for risk analysis and covers the methods THERP, CREAM and 
ATHEANA which belong to the well established and widely applied first and second 
generation methods of human reliability analysis (Kim 2001; Konstandinidou et al. 
2006; Kim et al. 2006; USNRC 2005). In Chapter 4, the functional specifications and 
requirements for supporting the performance of risk analysis in a VR environment are 
developed. In a similar way to Chapter 3, the results and findings of this chapter are 
end-user driven and based on field observations and dedicated workshops with end 
users and safety analysts from the industrial domain.  
In Chapter 5, a proposal for a VR environment design which can be used as a medium 
(tool) for supporting the performance of risk assessment and analysis based on the 
findings in Chapter 3 and 4 is introduced. In Chapter 6, a validation of the findings is 
carried out and structured in three parts: validation of the HF methodology by applying 
it to a case study from the research domain (i.e., validation of the results of Chapter 3), 
validation (review) of the end user requirements and the functional VR requirements 
(i.e., validation of the results of Chapter 4) and validation of the proposed VR 
environment design (i.e., validation of the results of Chapter 5). 
Finally, a summary of the results together with future developments based on these 
results are provided in Chapter 7. 
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2  
State-of-the-art 
and related work 
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This chapter provides an overview of works that are related to the underlying thesis and 
serves as a review on state-of-the-art on the three major components of this work (as 
defined in Fig. ‎1.3) which are: safety (risks), human factors and virtual reality. 
Section 2.1 introduces process risks and current methods of performing risk analysis 
(assessment). In Section 2.2, human factors methods and techniques are presented and 
discussed and linked to risk analysis. Finally, Section 2.3 provides an overview on 
virtual reality: state-of-the-art in relation to the topics of this thesis, features, 
shortcomings of available VR systems, etc. 
Before proceeding into the definition of risk and the subsequent necessary explanations 
in Section 2.1, it is necessary to mention that the term “risk” is being used here within 
the global context of “safety”, i.e., “risks” represent dangers to safety and should be 
minimised. However, since the expression “reducing risks” within the context of safety 
implies “improving safety”, both of these terms have the same implication within the 
framework of this thesis. Based on that, in the next chapters and sections, the focus is on 
the expression “reducing risks” for the purpose of consistency with the title and the goal 
of this thesis. 
2.1 Risks, risk management and risk analysis  
Since the term “risks” together with some other related terms are frequently used in this 
section and the entire document, a definition of these terms is provided in the next 
subsection to avoid any confusion in the interpretation of these terms. 
2.1.1 Definitions 
Within the area of system reliability and dependability management, the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) introduced the standard IEC 60300-3-95 which 
provides guidelines for selecting and implementing risk analysis techniques, primarily 
for risk assessment of technological systems. This standard defines the term “risks” and 
some related terms as follows (IEC (2006), pp. 9): 
 Risk is defined as “a combination of the frequency, or probability, of occurrence and 
the consequence of a specified hazardous event”. 
                                                 
5
 The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and IEC work on developing joint standards 
in the area of risk management, e.g., ISO/IEC Guide 51 and ISO/IEC Guide 73. 
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 Risk analysis is “the systematic use of available information to identify hazards and 
to estimate the risk to individuals or populations, property or the environment”. 
 Risk management is “the systematic application of management policies, procedures 
and practices to the tasks of analysing, evaluating and controlling risk”. Related to 
this definition and according to (Harms-Ringdahl (2004), pp. 14), risk management 
and safety management are used in varied ways and are often seen as identical. 
In several types of industries, e.g., process industry, the word safety management is 
preferred and defined to be the aspect of the overall management function that 
determines and implements the safety policy. This involves a whole range of activities, 
initiatives, programs, etc., focused on technical, human and organisational aspects and 
referring to all the individual activities within the organisation, which tend to be 
formalised as Safety Management Systems (Papadakis/Amendola 1997). 
Based on that a more specific definition of risk analysis is adopted in the chemical 
process industry and described to be “a systematic procedure for analysing systems to 
identify and evaluate hazards and safety characteristics” (Harms-Ringdahl (2004), pp. 
14). 
2.1.2 Types of risks 
The wide diversity of types of risks makes it impossible to cover all of them within the 
framework of this thesis. A closer literature review (Sadgrove 2005; Fragniere/Sullivan 
2006; Streffer et al. 2004) on main types of risks (or risk families) can be summarised 
below:  
 Compliance risks, e.g. the risk of failing to meet government standards or laws and 
regulations, or failing to meet international treaties. 
 External risks, e.g. risks from economic shocks, changing public attitudes or EU 
legislation. 
 Financial risks, e.g. risks arising from spending on capital projects or fraud or 
impropriety; risks from failed resource bids and insufficient resources. 
 Foresight risks, e.g. risks arising from insufficient forward planning or horizon-
scanning. 
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 Operational risks6, e.g. risks arising during the operation phase of a process or a 
product. 
 Project risks, e.g. risks of equipment exceeding budgets or projects missing key 
deadlines. 
 Reputation risks, e.g. risks from damage to the organisation‟s credibility (reputation). 
 Strategic risks, e.g. risks arising from policy decisions or major decisions affecting 
organisational priorities; risks arising from senior-level decisions on priorities. 
It is necessary to mention that the operational risks under consideration in this thesis 
represent risks with direct impact on human, environment or the technical system 
(safety related risks) during the operational phase of the process lifecycle. These risks 
should not be confused with other operational risks like risks or security issues in IT 
infrastructure, risks associated with the delivery of a particular service, banking or 
operational financial risks which are out of the scope of this thesis. This focus on 
operational risks is due to the following reasons: 
 The operation phase represents the “productive phase” in the chemical process 
industry in which an outcome, e.g., liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, 
etc. is being generated and a major return on investment can be achieved by selling 
this outcome to the customers. 
 The operation phase represents the long-lasting phase among the other phases of the 
process life cycle and consequently represents a permanent source of risks. 
 The largest portion of workforce is allocated to the operation phase which 
consequently raises the risks' opportunities compared to other phases in which lower 
workforce rates are allocated. 
 To enhance a precise goal definition and illustrate the boundaries of this thesis. 
Focusing on the risks in the operation phase of the process life cycle does not imply that 
the remaining phases are free of risks. It is only an indication that risks during the 
remaining phases are not a subject of research in this thesis. Fig. ‎2.1 shows the process 
life cycle with the operation phase in bold text to address the aforementioned focus on 
risks during this phase. 
                                                 
6
 Basel II provides a definition of operational risks which is widely accepted in banking industries: “the 
risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external 
events” (Chorafas (2004), pp. 3). 
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Exploration 
& Drilling 
Design Construction 
Operation 
Maintenance 
Decommissioning 
Commissioning  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. ‎2.1: The process life cycle and the focus on the operation phase (bold underlined text) 
2.1.3 Risk management process 
A continuous risk management process helps organisations to understand, manage, and 
communicate risks so that their negative impacts and the associated losses can be kept 
as low as possible. A typical risk management process can be divided into four phases 
(TBCS 2004) as listed below: 
1. Risk Identification 
2. Risk Analysis 
3. Risk Response 
4. Risk Evaluation and Monitoring 
Fig. ‎2.2 below illustrates that the four phases cannot be separately considered since their 
continuation represents an integrated risk management cycle which is necessary for a 
complete understanding, managing and communicating the identified risks as described 
above. 
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Fig. ‎2.2: The risk management process 
A further goal for dividing the risk management process into four phases, as shown in 
Fig. ‎2.2, is also to illustrate the role of “risk analysis”- which constitutes to the first 
building block of this thesis as described in Chapter 1 and Fig. ‎1.3 - within the global 
context of risk management. This confirms the fact that risk analysis is a step in the risk 
management process, which is further illustrated in the subsequent sections by 
addressing this phase in more details and whenever it becomes necessary to include 
information about the remaining three phases for the purpose of clarification and 
completion.  
2.1.4 Risk analysis 
In Section 2.1.1 “risk analysis” was defined to be the systematic use of available 
information to identify hazards and to estimate the risk to individuals or populations, 
property or the environment. In this section a deeper look into risk analysis is provided: 
stages of risk analysis, methods and techniques of risk analysis as well as the drawbacks 
of these methods and techniques. 
 
The risk analysis process in the process industry domain can be decomposed into the 
following main phases: 
 Hazard identification, i.e., identify hazards and potential hazardous events (top 
events, Section 2.1.6.1) 
 Hazards analysis, i.e., analyse hazards and potential hazardous events using: 
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 Event analysis (likelihood per event, Section 2.1.6.2)  
 Consequence analysis (to people, environment and assets, Section 2.1.6.3) 
 Exposure analysis (likelihood of exposure, Section 2.1.6.3) 
Once the hazards have been analysed, an assessment of these hazards can take place for 
the purpose of interpreting the results and recommending corrective actions. The 
process of analysing and assessing risks is called risk assessment. Since only a thin 
barrier exists between “risk analysis” and “risk assessment”, both terms are used widely 
in the literature to imply the same meaning. Based on that and for the purpose of 
consistency, the term “risk analysis” is used further in the remaining part of this 
document and includes the assessment part as described above. 
2.1.5 Risk analysis methods (RA methods) 
Risk analysis methods and techniques vary widely in complexity, from simple, 
qualitative approaches to fully quantitative approaches. Once hazards and hazardous 
events have been identified, their causes, consequences and probability can be estimated 
and the risk determined by applying the same procedure. Qualitative methods may be 
adequate for risk assessments of simple facilities or operations where the exposure of 
the workforce, public, environment or the asset is low and a more accurate 
determination of likelihoods is not relevant. However, the application of quantitative 
methods (QRA) is considered to be desirable when (Shell 1995a): 
 several risk reduction options have been identified whose relative effectiveness is not 
obvious; 
 the exposure to the workforce, public, environment or the strategic value of the asset 
is high, and reduction measures are to be evaluated;  
 equipment spacing allows significant risk of escalation;  
 novel technology is involved resulting in a perceived high level of risk for which no 
historical data is available (e.g., deep water developments in hostile environments);  
 demonstration of relative risk levels and their causes to the workforce is needed to 
make them more conscious of the risks.  
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The application of QRA should not be limited to large complex expensive studies. It is a 
technique which can be used to help structure the solution to problems for which the 
solutions are not intuitively obvious. 
Since the HF methodology for supporting risk analysis, which is developed within the 
framework of this thesis, aims at supporting the performance of quantitative risk 
analysis, the examination in the next sections and subsections focuses on quantitative 
risk analysis methods and techniques. 
2.1.6 Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) 
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) - which is also called probabilistic risk analysis 
(PRA), probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) or quantitative safety analysis (QSA) 
(Harms-Ringdahl 2004; Cacciabue 2000) - provides a structured approach for assessing 
the potential for incidents and expressing this potential numerically. In QRA statistical 
values are derived for potential loss of life and damage to resources and environment. 
These values should not be interpreted as unavoidable and acceptable losses resulting 
from the operations considered, but as a guideline to measure safety, to raise awareness 
for the potential of accidents and thereby developing measures to prevent lives and 
assets. 
Since different methods and techniques are applied for each step in the QRA, it is 
necessary to zoom into the RA phase which was introduced in Section 2.1.3 (Fig. ‎2.2) 
and investigate the methods and techniques which are currently used so that the 
weaknesses and shortcomings of these methods and techniques in supporting risk 
analysis can be identified. 
2.1.6.1 Identify hazards and potential hazardous events 
The potentially hazardous event is usually called the “top event”. Examples of such top 
events in the process industry include: 
 Gas leakage from process equipment, risers or pipelines 
 Extreme environmental loads 
 Escalation of fire 
 Explosions in buildings 
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 Outdoors explosions 
Many approaches and techniques exist to identify hazards and top events, e.g., Hazard 
Identification (HAZID), Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), Fire and Explosion 
Analysis (FEA), Job Hazard Analysis (JHA), etc. Due to their wide diversity, the 
examination in this section is limited to the HAZID and HAZOP methods which are 
most established and being widely used in the process industry as formal techniques 
(Shell 1995a). Annex A describes the layout of the HAZID and HAZOP techniques 
together with an example on each of them. 
Limitations and shortcomings of HAZID and HAZOP methods: 
Despite that the HAZID and HAZOP methods represent systematic methods for 
identifying hazards or hazardous events (deviations) and are widely used in industrial 
domains characterised by risky environments, these methods suffer from several 
shortcomings. These shortcomings are mainly due to the imaginative and brainstorming 
nature of both methods and include: 
 A main weakness of both methods is that the same group of experts identifies both 
hazards and mitigating measures or controls, whereas a different group of experts 
may better serve the latter function. 
 It is difficult to assign to each guide word (the first column of the HAZID or HAZOP 
sheet as shown in Table  A.1 and Table  A.2) a well-delineated portion of the system 
and failure causes. 
 Errors can be made in the analysis, in particular if the group becomes tired or 
fatigued. Consequently hazards may be overlooked and the study may become 
incomplete or erroneous. 
 Their success heavily depends on the facilitation of the team leader as well as the 
knowledge, experience and degree of co-operation and commitment of the team.  
 Difficulty in dealing with multiple failures (hazardous events or deviations) due to 
the inability of both methods in representing dependency between failures which 
might be a hidden risk factor. 
 Both methods analyse single events or deviations without investigating 
interrelationships between events or linking them. 
 The HAZOP method is optimised for process hazards, and needs modification to 
cover other types of hazards, e.g., hygiene and occupational hazards. 
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 Both methods require the existence or development of procedural descriptions, which 
are often not available in appropriate detail or not updated to reflect the current way 
of performing operations. 
 Documentation of results is a manual and time consuming process which might 
negatively affect the comprehensiveness and completion of the study. 
 Both methods analyse causes and effects with respect to deviations from expected 
system behaviour, but they do not analyse whether the design, under normal 
operating conditions, yields expected behaviour or if the expected behaviour is what 
is desired. 
 Both methods represent stand alone and qualitative tools for identifying hazards and 
deviations. For a complete and quantified risk analysis, the methods either need to be 
modified or additional methods should be used. 
 Both methods assess the hazard potential of technological malfunctions and mal-
operations and the consequential effects. They provide no assessment of the hazard 
potential as a result of faulty human action or interaction, i.e., no incorporation of 
human factors models or methods is considered in both methods (more about human 
factors in Section 2.2).  
2.1.6.2 Development of top events into incident scenarios and estimation of 
frequencies 
Hazardous events themselves do not necessarily cause loss of life or damage; it is their 
development into incidents which lead to losses. The development of the top event into 
a serious incident depends on the effect of mitigating factors, e.g., availability of an 
ignition source close to leakage, wrong intervention by operator, fail in the emergency 
shutdown system (ESD), etc. 
The most known technique to project the development of top events into incidents is 
Event Tree technique (ET) (Dien et al. 2004). An ET provides a diagrammatic and 
systematic presentation of this development and makes it possible to include opinions of 
experienced personnel. A brief description and an example on ET are provided in 
Annex B. 
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Limitations and shortcomings of ET method: 
 A time consuming method as for each top event from the HAZID or HAZOP, an 
event tree needs to be created and analysed. 
 The need for making assumptions regarding the ways in which equipments and 
facilities are operated and maintained during the construction and analysis of event 
trees, makes the production of event trees only possible if experienced persons are 
involved. 
 The major source of data for obtaining the probabilities in this method is historical 
data which contributes to a major uncertainty of this method since the operating 
conditions in which the event happened in the past might change and consequently 
the probability is no more valid. 
 The alternative source of data when historical data is not available by relying on 
experts‟ opinions and estimation is subjective and could not be validated which adds 
a further uncertainty to this method. 
 Numerous pitfalls might happen, particularly for inexperienced users. For example, 
focusing on extracting the required probability from a fault tree and ignoring the 
dependence between events in fault and event trees can lead to errors of several 
orders of magnitude. In an analogous manner, the effect of events' overlapping from 
different trees is not considered in an event tree and might lead to unpredicted 
problems or incidents. 
 Human interventions could be taken into account in an event tree either as an extra 
branch or by updating the actual probability assigned to each branch to reflect this 
manual intervention. In the first case, a complex event tree is created which 
complicates the analysis. In the latter case, the uncertainty of the entered value 
increases since the original failure probability is merged with a probability of human 
intervention. 
 The action or inaction of people during an emergency can have a profound effect on 
how the incident scenarios may develop and on the resulting consequences. In other 
words, the event tree might have a different “end event” than the assumed one 
because people behaved or acted in an unpredicted manner. 
 Some component failure probabilities depend on process variables during operation, 
e.g., pressure, temperature, liquid concentration, etc. which calls for a simultaneous 
inclusion of these variables in the event tree so that a comprehensive evaluation of 
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the event tree is possible. The same considerations apply to human interventions (see 
previous point on human intervention). 
2.1.6.3 Assessment of consequences and calculation of potential loss from incident 
scenarios  
Since the focus of the underlying thesis is on improving the way of performing the first 
two steps of risk analysis which were detailed under 2.1.6.1 and 2.1.6.2, the assessment 
of consequences and calculation of potential loss from incident scenarios are considered 
to be out of the scope of this thesis and were mentioned here for the purpose of 
completing the risk analysis cycle. It is also worth mentioning that the assessment of 
consequences is context and application dependant, i.e., depends on the type of “end 
event” which is adequately documented in the literature ((IChemE 2008; 
Robson/Toscano 2007; Nivolianitou/Kefalas 2005). 
2.1.7 Summary of Section 2.1 
Besides providing definitions of terms which are widely used in risk and safety analysis 
community and are necessary for this thesis, this section provided an overview of the 
risk management process and explained how the risk analysis is integrated into this 
process. A clarification regarding types of risks and operational process risks – which 
are the focus of the underlying thesis – was also given. 
After this introductory part, a deeper look into risk analysis was made: its phases, 
methods and techniques applied as well as examples on these methods. A special 
attention was paid to QRA due to its wide use in the process industry for quantifying 
and analysing risks. 
It was clear from the review of QRA techniques and methods in Sections 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 
that these methods are time consuming and highly dependent on expert‟s imaginations 
and judgments to reach their intended goal which represents a subjective and inflexible 
way of conducting risk analysis work. Furthermore it was also shown that QRA 
provides a crude analysis of barrier performance, emphasising mostly technological and 
process aspects rather than other risk influencing factors such as human and 
organisational aspects. These shortcomings represent requirements for the methodology 
and the definition of functional VR requirements which is introduced in Chapter 3 and 
4. A further analysis of the human-related aspects and the influencing factors is 
discussed and analysed in Section 2.2. 
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2.2 Human Reliability (HR) and Human Factors (HF) 
This section provides an overview about human reliability and human factors: methods 
& techniques, their link to risk analysis (Section 2.1) as well as the link between human 
factors (HF) and human reliability analysis (HRA). The section focuses on the methods7 
which are relevant for the underlying thesis and also introduces their limitations as a 
preliminary step for introducing the methodology in Chapter 3. 
Since the terms human factors (HF), human reliability (HR), human error, together with 
some other related terms are frequently used in this section and the entire document, a 
definition of these terms is provided in the next subsection to avoid any confusion in the 
interpretation of these terms. 
2.2.1 Definitions 
According to (Cacciabue (2004), pp. 12) human factors are “the technology concerned 
with the analysis and optimisation of the relationship between people and their 
activities, by the integration of human sciences and engineering in systematic 
applications, in consideration for cognitive aspects and socio-technical working 
contexts”. 
By this definition human factors science extends the concept of “ergonomics” - as the 
science of humans at work - beyond the workplace by including cognitive and social 
aspects involved in human activity (Edwards 1988). 
According to (cf. Cacciabue (2004), pp. 13) in the definition of human factors, they are 
conceived as “technology” to emphasise their practical nature rather than their 
disciplinary character. He considers the difference between human factors and human 
sciences as the same that exists between engineering and physics. Physics and human 
sciences look at the basic principles and fundamental criteria that govern their locus of 
interest, while engineering and human factors concentrate on the implementation of 
these principles and criteria in the real world and working environment. 
Human reliability is defined as “the probability that a person will correctly perform 
some system-required activity during a given time period (if time is a limiting factor) 
                                                 
7
 The term “methods”, “techniques” and “approaches” of HF and HRA will imply the same contextual 
meaning in this document. 
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without performing any extraneous activity that can degrade the system” (Karwowski 
(2006), pp. 753). 
Human reliability analysis is the identification of human error opportunities that may 
affect system risks, the quantification of their likelihoods and determination of how to 
reduce those likelihoods if needed (cf. Kirwan (1996), pp. 360 et seqq.; Karwowski 
(2006), pp. 753 et seqq.). 
Human error is defined to be “the post-hoc attribution of a cause to an observed 
outcome, where the cause refers to a human action or performance characteristic” 
(Hollnagel (1998), pp. 160). Hollnagel (1993) uses the terms “erroneous actions” and 
“performance failures” instead of “error” since the word “error” does not have a unique 
meaning and it has been historically used to denote either the cause of something, the 
action or the outcome of the action. In this context, the term “cognitive errors” is also 
used to refer to errors resulting from cognition. 
Human error probability is the number of times a human error occurs divided by the 
number of opportunities for that error (cf. Kirwan (1996), pp. 360). 
Performance shaping factors are the aspects of the operational system that influence 
human performance (negatively or positively), e.g., adequate training, stress, time 
pressure, managerial attitudes, organisational factors, cultural differences, etc. 
2.2.2 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
Human reliability analysis can be seen as a specialised scientific sub-field or a kind of 
hybrid between psychology, human factors and engineering reliability analysis (risk 
analysis) (Hollnagel 1998). From the viewpoint of the underlying thesis, HRA is 
considered as an intermediate link between quantitative risk analysis and human factors 
as shown in Fig. ‎2.38. Furthermore and in order to stress the role of the human in the 
HRA rather than its analytical approaches and quantification of errors, HRA was not 
discussed in Section 2.1 (Risk Analysis) and alternatively is discussed in this section 
(Human Factors). In other words, within the framework of this thesis, methods of HRA 
are considered as human factors methods rather than methods of quantitative risk 
analysis. 
                                                 
8
 This representation does not aim at eliminating the role of psychology in HRA. It will not be 
considered here since it represents a science in itself which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Fig. ‎2.3: Human Reliability Analysis as a hybrid between Human Factors, Psychology and Risk Analysis   
Due to the subjectivity of the methods used to evaluate human reliability and the 
uncertainty of data concerning human factors, HRA has always been a serious concern 
for safety experts and risk analysts. Nevertheless, all HRA methods and approaches 
share the need to develop ways of estimating human error probabilities. As a result, 
many studies have been performed to produce data sets or databases which can be used 
as a reference for determining or extracting human error probabilities (HEP) (26: 
Fujita/Hollnagel 2004). 
Since the introduction of the first HRA methods in mid seventies, HRA methods were 
classified into first generation methods and second generation methods9 (Swain 1990). 
The methods of the first generation, e.g., THERP, were highly influenced by the QRA 
approach (Kim 2001), i.e., aimed at quantifying human errors in order to establish an 
integrated assessment of plant risk. The methods of the second generation, e.g., 
ATHEANA, CREAM, account explicitly for how the performance conditions affect 
performance, i.e., modelling errors and error mechanisms into the risk analysis process 
(Kontogiannis 1997). 
Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 provide a closer look into characteristics and shortcomings of 
the methods of each generation. It provides also examples on the best known and most 
used methods of both generations. 
                                                 
9 Due to their focus on the task itself and the information processing related to perform task, first 
generation methods are also called Information Processing Approaches (IPA) whereas second 
generation methods are referred to as Contextual Approaches (CA) due to their focus on the context of 
performing a particular task. 
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2.2.3 1st Generation of HRA methods and techniques 
1
st
 generation HRA methods have been established and developed until early-1990s. 
These methods share the following characteristics: 
 Focus on human error during performance of a task; 
 Emphasise on quantification, i.e., assign probabilities of failure of an operator in 
performing a task; 
 Each method was developed to serve a specific need; 
 Provide reference data on human error probability, e.g., databases on human error 
probabilities (THERP). 
According to surveys and analyses provided by (Kirwan 1994; Gertman/Blackman 
1994; Spurgin/Moieni 1991; Swain 1989; Haney et al. 1989), more than 30 
distinguishable HRA approaches have been classified to belong to the first generation. 
Annex C provides a list of the most known methods of 1
st
 generation HRA and an 
example on these methods. 
1
st
 generation methods – represented by THERP as shown in Annex C – attempted to 
account for the complexity of interaction between humans and machines in order to 
extract HEP which can be integrated in the overall RA process. Since all of the methods 
have been developed to solve a specific need, most of them were (and are still) used. 
The THERP method belongs to these widely used approaches not only due to its rich 
database of human error probabilities that is used as data reference for many safety 
analysts, but also to its way of describing how events should be modelled (event tree) 
and quantified. 
2.2.3.1 Limitations and shortcomings of 1st generation methods 
All limitations of 1
st
 generation methods are based on the central concept around which 
these methods were built, namely the concept of human error in performing a task. In 
other words, the task characteristics – captured quantitatively as HEP – are regarded as 
the most influential element for the estimation of human failure whereas the 
environment in which the task is performed (context) - represented by the performance 
shaping factors (PSFs) - is considered as a minor corrective factor (Marseguerra et al. 
2006). Based on that, the following limitations and shortcomings of 1
st
 generation HRA 
 31 
 
methods were also identified (Hollnagel 1998; Leveson 1995; Kirwan 1996; Swain 
1990; Kim 2001; Dougherty 1990): 
 
 The methods do not have a well developed theoretical basis in terms of a model of 
human cognition and/or a corresponding classification scheme of human errors. In 
other words the methods lack an adequate theoretical treatment and categorisation of 
cognitive errors. 
 The methods attempt to model human and environmental factors, but they fail to link 
them with failures in the technical systems. 
 The methods which include PSF suffer from relatively unstructured and very flexible 
process of considering PSFs which depends on subjective assessor‟s evaluation. 
Many assessors rarely use the PSF, and tend to use the “stress” PSF as a generic one 
influencing the HEP. 
 Inadequate treatment of some important PSFs in the methods, e.g., managerial 
attitudes, organisational factors, cultural differences, etc.  
 Demonstrations of the accuracy of the methods for real world predictions are almost 
non-existent, particularly for non-routine tasks. 
 Inadequate realism in many methods due to questionable assumptions about human 
behaviour. 
 Some of the methods base their quantification process on the assumption that a 
human reliability can be described as equipment reliability, i.e., binary representation 
of human actions, which is no more applicable, particularly in a cognitively 
demanding task environment such as a chemical plant. 
 Highly influenced by QRA, i.e., the HRA is performed within the envelope of QRA 
(also called PSA-cum-HRA (cf. Kim (2001), pp. 1070 et seqq.) which does not 
support the larger perspective where humans are involved in the design, construction, 
operation, maintenance and management of a system. As a result the HRA only 
considers the human actions that are only included in the QRA event trees. 
Consequently, the quality of the HRA depends on the completeness and accuracy of 
QRA modelling which adds a restriction on a successful implementation of the HRA. 
 Many domain experts consider first generation methods as inadequate for HRA 
modelling and can lead to increased risk or wasted risk management. 
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The development of 2
nd
 generation HRA methods took into consideration many of the 
listed shortcomings and weaknesses of 1
st
 generation methods into account as described 
in the next section. 
2.2.4 2nd Generation of HRA methods and techniques 
To overcome the shortcomings of the 1
st
 generation methods, 2
nd
 generation methods of 
HRA have been (and are still being) developed. Unlike 1
st
 generation methods which 
focused on the task rather than the context, the 2
nd
 generation methods pay special 
attention to the contextual conditions in which the task is performed which is considered 
to be of greater importance than the task itself (Marseguerra et al. 2006). 
Methods of this generation are characterised by being based on a multidisciplinary 
framework (cf. Konstandinidou et al. (2006), pp. 706 et seqq.) which considers both the 
performance shaping factors and the conditions of the plant as the factors that give rise 
to the need of actions and create the operational causes for human system interactions. 
Dougherty (1990) and Hollnagel/Wreathall (1996) described an important need in 
second generation HRA methods which is the need to go beyond the PSA-cum-HRA 
construct that represented a constraint in first generation methods (refer also to the 
previous section). This is because the PSA-cum-HRA is not capable of modelling 
characteristics of the plant beyond the “as-built” or “as-operated” concept. 
Compared to 1
st
 generation methods, 2
nd
 generation methods provide – with different 
degrees of complexity and applicability – the following features to support human 
reliability analysis (Hollnagel 1998): 
 Enhanced QRA event trees compared to those of first generation, e.g., by combining 
the results of more than one event tree or introducing a feedback loop from the 
human reliability analysis to the event tree (cf. Hollnagel, pp. 148); 
 Diversified and extended treatment of errors by definition of error modes;  
 Expanded treatment of performance shaping factors by integrating their influence at 
an early stage of the analysis rather than in the form of adjusting HEP as done in 1
st
 
generation methods. 
Among the wide variety of HRA methods which can be classified as 2
nd
 generation 
HRA methods, a list of some of these methods is provided in Annex D. CREAM and 
ATHEANA are considered to be the best known methods of this generation (cf. Kim 
2001, pp. 1069 et seqq.; cf. Konstandinidou et al. 2006, pp. 706 et seqq.; cf. Kim et al. 
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2006, pp. 191 et seqq.; cf. USNRC 2005, pp. 2-2). These two methods are presented 
here as representative methods of second generation HRA for the purpose of comparing 
with methods of 1
st
 generation HRA and completing this literature review. This serves 
also as a base for the HF methodology which is developed in Chapter 3. 
2.2.4.1 Limitations and shortcomings of 2nd generation methods 
2
nd
 generation methods emphasise that the likelihood of something being done 
incorrectly is determined by the performance conditions and not by an inherent human 
error probability as described in 1
st
 generation methods. However, methods of this 
generation are still under development to account for several limitations and 
shortcomings as described below (Pyy 2000; Kim 2001; Hollnagel 1998; Forester et al. 
2004; Kim 2006): 
 The methods provide systematic methodological frameworks but still suffer from 
subjectivity due to lack of information needed to apply the methods, i.e., dependence 
on expert‟s judgments and qualitative estimations. The developer of CREAM 
(Hollnagel 1998) confirms this fact as a shortcoming of 2
nd
 generation HRA methods 
which requires further developments and improvements in the methods. 
 The methods try to model causal mechanisms of events and actions that include a 
considerable amount of randomness. This calls for a wider application of these 
methods in industrial domains to provide practical basis for additional improvements 
in these methods to find practical solutions of the randomness effect. 
 The methods provide detailed procedures which are very useful in retrospective 
analysis of a small number of human failure events. For a predictive analysis, a large 
number of human actions or failure events should be analysed. Consequently these 
methods should be accompanied with a very detailed analysis – which is not always 
available or possible for the situations to be analysed – to achieve the envisaged 
goals and results in risk analysis. 
 ATHEANA and CREAM do not provide explicit consideration of recovering human 
erroneous actions which is extremely necessary in analysing human reliability. 
 With an exception to CREAM, methods of this generation provide no clear 
distinction between phenotypes (manifestation) and genotypes (causes). 
 ATHEANA lacks the availability of an accepted model of human behaviour suitable 
for supporting the quantification of human actions. ATHEANA suggests in its final 
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steps of the quantification process (as presented in (USNRC 2000)) that analysts 
translate the important contextual information identified with the search process into 
human error probabilities (HEPs) using existing HRA methods such as THERP. As a 
result significant judgment must be exercised by the analysts performing the 
quantification which contributes to the ATHEANA‟s subjectivity in quantifying 
human actions and treating uncertainty. 
 ATHEANA‟s analysis begins with an HFE identified from PSA accident sequence 
analysis which leads to classifying the method as PSA-oriented. As a consequence, 
ATHEANA has the PSA-cum-HRA drawback which was presented in Section 
2.2.3.1 and thus limits modelling the consequences of human errors only to the pre-
identified ones in the PSA accident sequence. 
 The theoretical background of ATHEANA seems rather weak for predictive analysis 
and makes this method more suitable for retrospective analysis (post-accident 
analysis). This is due to the nature of cognitive engineering models which are used in 
ATHEANA and assume that most post-accident erroneous actions are cognitive 
errors. (see also next point). 
 CREAM was developed originally for retrospective analysis like ATHEANA and 
needs further improvements to suit predictive analyses. 
 The division of degree of control into four categories in CREAM could affect the 
accuracy of the results since the degree of control is a continuous process and it is 
not possible to put fixed contours between different levels of control or account for 
overlapping among them in an objective manner. 
 The complexity of ATHEANA and CREAM makes these methods difficult to apply 
and use by persons who are not very well trained and familiar with their 
implementation. There is a need to provide implementation guidelines for both 
methods to facilitate using them whenever needed which is unavailable and adds an 
additional limitation to using these methods. 
2.2.5 Human factors methods and techniques 
This section provides an overview on human factors methods and techniques with focus 
on the methods that are relevant for the underlying thesis. It also introduces the link 
between human factors and performance shaping factors which are essential 
components in HF studies. 
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According to (Stanton et al. 2005) Human Factors methods and techniques can be 
classified into:  
 Task analysis methods 
 Data collection methods 
 Charting methods 
 Human error identification (HEI) methods 
 Mental workload assessment methods 
 Situation awareness measurement methods 
 Interface analysis methods 
 Design methods 
 Performance time prediction/assessment methods 
 Team performance analysis methods 
 Root cause analysis methods 
This wide diversity of human factors methods and techniques makes it impossible to list 
and analyse all these methods and techniques within the framework of this thesis. 
Alternatively, the methods which are relevant to this thesis are considered. These 
methods fulfil the following criteria: 
 Well established and widely used methods according to literature reviews; 
 Relevant to the applications of process industry; 
 Can be used within the context of risk analysis and HRA, e.g., task analysis method 
which is used in most HRA methods. 
Based on a screening of most common HF methods, the following set of methods is 
considered to fulfil the aforementioned criteria: 
 Task Analysis methods (Section 2.2.5.1), e.g., initial task analysis, hierarchical task 
analysis, cognitive task analysis, etc. 
 Root-Cause Analyses (Section 2.2.5.2), e.g., event trees and fault trees 
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It should be mentioned here that these methods are not the focus of this thesis and 
represent only “a means to an end”, i.e., they are used as supporting tools for developing 
a methodology and improving the way of performing tasks and activities. Based on that, 
they are presented here as introductory work for the HF methodology (Chapter 3), i.e., 
characteristics of these methods, how they are used, aims of using them, etc. 
2.2.5.1 Task Analysis (TA) 
Task analysis is a way of structuring procedures, actions and contextual information 
regarding human behaviour in a certain working environment. Kirwan (1992) defines 
TA to be the study of what a user is required to do in terms of actions and/or cognitive 
processes to achieve a certain task. Task analysis was first developed in the fifties of the 
last century with the aim of formally describing human behaviour by a series of simple 
and elementary components (Skinner 1957). It was originally applied to language 
learning and then was extended to the wider context of operations and working 
processes (Payne/Green 1986). 
TA aims at providing a better understanding of what is exactly involved in carrying out 
the activity so that a better fit between the person and the workplace (working 
environment) may be achieved. Task analysis is used in many areas of application, e.g., 
design of training programs and plans, design of interactive systems, design and test of 
man-machine-interfaces, etc. (Diaper 1989; Johnson 1991). 
TA does not involve only collecting data about the operational procedures for 
performing a particular task, but in many cases also the collection of information about 
some properties of the tasks such as the job conditions, the required skills and 
knowledge, safety and environmental factors, references, equipments, job performance 
measures, etc. 
Methods for collecting data for TA 
Various methods or techniques could be used to collect data when performing a task 
analysis. The selection of the method depends on the nature or characteristics of the task 
under consideration. Based on field work in the area of application of this thesis, i.e., 
process industry, the following major types of tasks have been identified: 
 Cognitive tasks, e.g., office job, control room job, etc. 
 Accessible or non accessible tasks, e.g., the task is highly dangerous, the field access 
is forbidden to the observer, etc. 
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 Manual or automatic tasks, e.g., a manual maintenance action, automatic distillation 
process, etc. 
Methods for collecting data – which are of particular relevance to chemical process 
industry – for TA include interviews, observations, analysing existing documents, etc. 
(Kontogiannis 1997). It is typical that a single method would not give sufficient results, 
thus a combination of methods is usually applied. Some of these data collection 
methods have been used to extract necessary data for the methodology (Chapter 3) and 
functional requirements (Chapter 4). 
Approaches of TA 
According to the application or case study, for which a task analysis needs to be 
performed, a certain approach (or approaches) of TA can be used. Among the most well 
known approaches are (cf. Kirwan 1998, pp. 299 et seqq.): 
 Initial Task analysis (ITA): involves a basic level of task analysis to provide at least a 
minimum understanding level of the task (Kirwan 1994). 
 Hierarchical task analysis (HTA): involves exploring tasks through a hierarchy of 
goals indicating what a person is expected to do and plans indicating the conditions 
when subordinate goals should be carried out (Shepherd 1998; Shepherd 1989). 
 Cognitive task analysis (CTA): involves analysing the interaction of mental 
procedures, factual knowledge and task objectives in the process of job performance 
(Cacciabue 2004; Schraagen et al. 2000) . 
 Goals, Operations, Methods and Selection Analysis (GOMS): involves identifying 
and analysing the rules for selecting methods for organising operators to achieve 
goals (Card et al. 1983). 
 Task Analysis for Knowledge Description (TAKD): involves identifying, analysing 
and utilising rules for knowledge elicitation against task descriptions (Diaper 1989). 
Further approaches have been analysed by (Kirwan 1998) and (Kirwan 1992). Task 
Analysis is further utilised in Chapter 3 to develop the HF methodology and in Chapter 
4 in the process of extracting end users functional requirements.  
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2.2.5.2 Root-Cause Analysis 
Root cause analysis (RCA) is used in predictive and retrospective analysis to study 
consequences of a risky event (forward analysis, e.g., risk analysis) or to study causes of 
an accidents (backward analysis, e.g., accident investigation) respectively. The aim of 
such an analysis from the point of view of a predictive analysis (risk analysis) is: 
 To construct an overall incident scenario based on a risky event; 
 Link events and consequences in a causal and logical form; 
 Identify inappropriate actions which might lead to incidents. 
A common approach of RCA which is widely adopted in the process industry for risk 
analysis is event tree (ET) which was introduced in Section 2.1.6.2. Despite their 
shortcomings which were introduced in Section 2.1.6.2, ETs are major components of 
risk analysis documents in chemical process industries and contain major sources of 
information on dangerous events and their inter-relationships. For this reason, the focus 
in this thesis is on utilising existing ETs to extract the necessary information for 
developing the methodology and functional requirements in Chapter 3 and four. 
2.2.5.3 Performance shaping factors (PSFs) 
Performance shaping factors (PSFs) or performance influencing factors (PIFs) refer to 
the set of factors that influences the performance and behaviour of the actors 
(employees, operators, technicians, etc.) who work in a certain environment or on a 
particular job (task). 
PSFs are important elements of any comprehensive HF analysis or HF based 
methodology as they can be utilised to define hypothetical accidental or dangerous 
sequences due to human inappropriate behaviour. Examples of the most common PSFs 
include: 
 Training methods, e.g., existing training is inadequate to cope with the underlying 
task or procedure. 
 Rules and regulations, e.g., rules and regulations are complex and sometimes 
contrasting with each other. 
 Communication means, e.g., inadequate or non-reliable communication means 
between operators. 
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 Time pressure, stress, level of supervision, comfort of working context, etc. 
PSFs are further detailed using the terminology “performance conditions” as explained 
in Chapter 3. 
2.2.6 Summary of Section 2.2 
Besides providing definitions of terms which are widely used in HRA and HF and 
frequently used in this document, this section provided an overview on HF and HRA: 
the link between them, their methods and approaches as well as the limitations and 
shortcomings of current HRA methods. 
The well known classification of HRA methods into 1
st
 generation and 2
nd
 generation 
methods was adopted in this section. A deeper look into 1
st
 generation methods 
represented by THERP resulted in identifying the major limitation of 1
st
 generation 
methods by being focused on the concept of human error in performing a task, i.e., task 
characteristics are the most influential elements in the estimation of human failure 
whereas the environment in which the task is performed (context) was almost ignored or 
considered as a minor corrective factor. This limitation of 1
st
 generation methods was 
taken into consideration in 2
nd
 generation methods which paid more attention to the 
context issue. However 2
nd
 generation methods, which were represented by CREAM 
and ATHEANA, still suffer from subjectivity due to lack of information needed to 
apply the methods and their dependency on experts‟ judgments and qualitative 
estimations which might be critical in high-risk environments such as the process 
industry. A second major limitation of 2
nd
 generation methods is their complexity and 
the lack of implementation guidelines that enable using them by safety and risk analysts 
on field. The by-product of these two limitations is the inability to automate or 
formalise these methods which deprived them of having the required IT-support. A third 
limitation is the nature of the methods which is focused on retrospective analysis and 
the absence of applications in which these methods have been used for predictive 
analysis, i.e., risk analysis. These limitations are of major focus in the HF methodology 
for RA which is developed in Chapter 3. 
2.3 Virtual Reality (VR) 
This section provides an overview of VR as the enabling technology within the 
framework of this thesis and as the third and last component of the literature review in 
this chapter. It represents the result of a comprehensive research on state-of-the-art on 
40 
 
using VR: definitions, introduction and features of VR, areas of applications, statistics 
on use of VR, trends in using VR, etc. It also aims at highlighting shortcomings and 
limitations of current VR systems (related works) from the viewpoint of this thesis, i.e., 
whether these systems are used for safety applications, whether they incorporate human 
factors, whether they target end users from the chemical process industry, etc. 
The following points should be mentioned here regarding the scope, content and goals 
of this review: 
 In consistency with the goal of this thesis in which VR is perceived as an enabler, the 
review focuses on VR systems and applications from a usability point of view, i.e., 
state-of-the-art on VR applications and products (projects), relevance of these 
application and products to safety and risk analysis, limitations on using and 
accepting VR by end users and end user requirements. 
 Based on that, this review does not aim at introducing the state-of-the-art on VR 
technology itself, i.e., visualisation techniques and methods, technical features of the 
VR products, VR hardware and accessories, etc. 
2.3.1 Definitions 
Among the many definitions of Virtual Reality (VR) (Bohmann 1999; Blümel et al. 
2003; Reinhart et al. 2002; Burdea/Coiffet 2003) the following definition provides a 
comprehensive description of what is meant by VR (Burdea/Coiffet 2003, pp. 3): 
“A high-end user-computer interface that involves real-time simulation and interaction 
through multiple sensorial channels.” (vision, sound, touch, smell, taste) 
Virtual Environment (VE) is a computer created environment for a 3D visualisation with 
human-machine interaction. In most cases, a virtual environment is used to imply the 
same meaning as virtual reality. 
I/O devices (VR accessories) are hardware devices that are used to interact with a VR 
scene to provide a user input or generate a representation of the scene as an output. 
Desktop VR is the representation of a VR scene on a conventional PC monitor and 
performing the manipulation and interaction using mouse and keyboard. 
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2.3.2 Introduction to Virtual Reality 
Virtual Reality (VR) is a breakthrough technology that allows stepping through the 
computer screen into a 3D simulated world (cf. Pimentel/Teixeira (1995), pp. xvii). 
Virtual Reality is characterised by its capability of providing Immersivity and 
Interactivity in one environment (Salem et al. 2006). The immersive characteristic of 
Virtual Reality can be achieved using the so called “VR-Accessories” which include 
among others, Head Mounted Displays, Data Gloves, Shutter Glasses, etc. The 
interactive characteristic of Virtual Reality enhances the engagement of the user in the 
virtual environment by acting and reacting, and thus enhances integrating the user in the 
virtual world. The interactivity in the virtual environment can be achieved with the 
conventional input/output devices including monitor, mouse and keyboard and does not 
require any special hardware or VR-Accessories. In applications where VR is used to 
visualise and provide a dynamic behaviour of the involved complements, e.g., 
interactive maintenance procedure, 3D assembly manuals, operation instructions, etc., a 
simulation model can be used to represent this behaviour in the virtual environment 
which is considered to be a further important feature of Virtual Reality (Winkler et al. 
2005). 
It is becoming clear that VR is a technology that is continually rising and flourishing 
which is reflected on the interest of the economy in using this technology for training, 
3D interactive product lists, simulation of maintenance tasks, entertainment, etc. In 
some industrial sectors, VR has been integrated in the workflow as a mean of design 
review, virtual prototyping, functionality test, etc. to save construction and development 
times and costs. The automotive sector is one of the leading sectors in using VR and 
integrating it in daily workflows. Several survey researches on applications of VR were 
conducted or examined within the scope of this work and are introduced in the next 
subsections. 
2.3.2.1 Immersive and Non-Immersive Virtual Reality 
Immersive Virtual Reality refers to a high degree of user involvement in the virtual 
environment. Using a Head Mounted Display (HMD) together with other input devices 
like data gloves or joysticks supports this immersion by enabling the user to navigate 
through the 3D environment and to interact with the scene‟s objects as shown in Fig. 
‎2.4. 
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Source: Fraunhofer IFF (Blümel et al. 2005)  
Fig. ‎2.4: An immersive VR environment 
The wide spectrum of advantages combined with immersive Virtual Reality, like 
providing a stereoscopic view of the scene with the possibility of walking around and 
flying in the scene, were not enough for many end users to outweigh the high costs of 
implementing such an immersive VR environment. For this reason there was a need for 
an affordable Virtual Reality solution, which was facilitated by the use of non-
immersive Virtual Reality. 
Non-immersive Virtual Reality includes a mouse- and keyboard-controlled navigation 
through a 3D environment on a PC monitor. A stereo view of the contents can be 
achieved using a stereo projection system together with stereo glasses. Due to its lower 
complexity and costs, non-immersive Virtual Reality was selected by many firms as the 
appropriate Virtual Reality form, particularly for providing the contents at each desktop 
(desktop VR). 
2.3.2.2 Layout of a VR system 
In its basic and synthetic structure, a VR system is composed of the following 
components as shown in Fig. ‎2.5: 
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Fig. ‎2.5: An immersive VR environment 
 Input devices: also called control devices and represent the system components that 
the user needs to interact with the VR scene and to enhance immersivity. Examples 
of input devices include joysticks, 3D mouse, data-gloves, trackball, etc. 
 VR engine (computing unit): represents the heart of a VR system which can be a 
single PC or a complete multi central processing unit system (CPU) with single or 
multi graphics processing unit (GPU) and local/shared or distributed memory. This 
unit (device) controls the whole VR system by: 
 Interfacing with I/O devices 
 Performing graphical calculations and scene rendering 
 Managing and synchronising the devices involved in producing the VR scene, 
e.g., PC-components, tracking, the optional units, etc. 
 Output devices: represent the devices where the virtual environment is presented or 
displayed. There are various implementations for presenting the output, ranging from 
a simple PC monitor to a single/multi-wall, curved screens, front/back projected, 
active and passive, each of them offering greater or slighter immersion. Based on the 
type of projection system used, the output can be in monoscopic or stereoscopic 
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form. In simple desktop VR applications, no separate projection device is used since 
the output is directly presented on the PC monitor. 
 Optional units: represent interfaces and devices which might be incorporated in a VR 
system based on the nature of the application. Since these optional units are used as 
input or output facilitators, they were not presented separately in Fig. ‎2.5 and 
assumed to be an integral part of the input and/or output devices. These optional 
units are being further developed to involve the remaining human senses apart from 
the sense of vision which is an essential part of the VR system and belong to the core 
of the VR system, i.e., the VR engine in Fig. ‎2.5.  
Examples of optional units include: 
 Audio interface for providing audio facilities in the VR scene which might enhance 
immersion (hear sense) 
 Haptic interface for providing force feedback (touch sense) 
 Gustation interface (taste sense) 
 Olfaction interface (smell sense) 
A considerable research has been dedicated to audio and haptic interfaces which 
resulted in reasonable developments in terms of hardware devices and commercial 
products in these areas. The gustation and olfaction interfaces are still in early research 
and development phases (Salem/Kissner 2007) with few prototypes and 
implementations (Yanagida et al. 2004; Yu et al. 2003; Iwata 2003). The historical 
evolution of VR towards ultimate interfaces which incorporate all human senses is 
presented in Fig. ‎2.6. 
2.3.2.3 Reasons for selecting VR as enabler to support RA 
It has been mentioned in the introduction (Chapter 1) that VR is conceived here as an 
enabler which facilitates performing activities in a close-to-real manner, i.e., VR is 
conceived as a medium to extend human potentials for producing the desired safety 
improvements. In most cases, performing these activities in reality might be technically 
impossible, dangerous to humans or equipment or connected with high costs which 
cannot be justified. However, since there are other technologies and media which can be 
seen as enablers, e.g., multimedia, CAD representations, videos, etc. the major reasons 
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for choosing VR in this thesis are its capability to support (Salem 2003; Blümel et al. 
2005): 
 
Fig. ‎2.6: Historical evolution of VR 
 Providing High quality 3D graphics and not only simple images which are used in 
multimedia and video applications;  
 Enabling a high level of interactivity and involvement which can be achieved with or 
without using VR accessories;  
 3D Visual interactive adaptation of the content to user needs or requirements;  
 Performing activities in a “close to real” environment with a high recognition level of 
the components of the virtual environment, e.g., objects, equipments, surroundings, 
etc. compared to the physical one;  
 A flexible provision of contents, e.g., for design, safety analysis, training, etc. which 
can be accessed independent of time, location and availability of an internet 
connection and specific resources or equipment. 
VR potential in supporting risk analysis is illustrated in Chapter 4 upon defining the VR 
functional requirements and specifications. 
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2.3.2.4 Areas of application of Virtual Reality 
VR is being used in different areas of application with varying levels of implementation 
depending on the degree of maturity of VR applications in each particular area.  
According to recent studies and surveys on VR (Klocke et al. 2003; RTO-NATO 2005; 
Burdea/Coiffet 2003; Grau/Broszio 1999; Woods et al. 1987; Salem 2004) the most 
known areas of application include: 
 Production and manufacturing: product design and construction, facility planning, 
maintenance (assembly/disassembly of products), design reviews, functionality tests, 
virtual prototyping, product marketing, etc. 
 Education and training: training on virtual products and processes, learning complex 
procedures, group learning, training on products before their physical existence, etc. 
 Medicine: virtual operations (new operation techniques), 3D visualisation of tumours 
and cancers, virtual laboratories, etc. 
 Entertainment: interactive 3D games (adventure and strategy games), 3D amusement 
parks (Disney Quest and Disney Virtual Jungle Cruise), 3D cinema applications, etc. 
 Architecture: city visualisation, urban planning, 3D interior design of buildings and 
facilities, etc 
 Ergonomics: virtual human models, accessibility of objects, maintainability of 
products and objects, etc. 
 Heritage: virtual museums, virtual story-telling, 3D exploration for art historians, etc. 
 Military: 3D simulators (aircrafts, tanks, battle-field, ship, etc.), visualisation of 
enemy weapon capabilities, crew training, etc. 
The following two facts can be derived from the aforementioned list of VR applications: 
1. It is noticeable that VR applications for safety and risk analysis do not belong to the 
current application areas of VR. The rarity and inadequacy of available VR systems 
and applications to fulfil the requirements and needs in these areas is the reason 
behind that. It is also the absence of distinct end user requirements, methodologies 
and needs which stands behind this lack. This is further illustrated in the remaining 
part of this section based on results of survey and studies. 
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2. It is also noticeable that from a HF point of view, the VR systems and applications 
have been (and are being) used for the purpose of providing ergonomic results and 
validations, i.e., testing the reachability of product or machine parts, design 
verification, verifying the maintainability of a product, designing workplaces to be 
ergonomic and human friendly, etc. However, since ergonomic analysis and studies 
are elements of HF science, current VR applications lack a comprehensive 
consideration of HF methods and techniques, e.g., predictive analyses, recovery from 
a human error, identification of human caused hazards, interdisciplinary 
collaboration of plant teams (field operators, control room operators, fire brigade, 
emergency response team, etc.), working under stressful situations, etc.  
2.3.3 Results of surveys on VR 
As mentioned in the previous section, the rarity or inadequacy of available VR solutions 
which deal with safety and risk analysis as well as the absence of an integrated 
consideration of HF aspects have been investigated within the framework of this thesis. 
This investigation is based on survey results on VR systems in terms of features, areas 
of application, their use within the production life cycle (Fig. ‎2.1), incorporation of HF 
aspects, etc.  
For the purpose of integrity and completion, two types of surveys are considered here: 
1. Surveys conducted in the past by commercial or research institutions (the term 
“external surveys” is used for this type). 
2. Surveys that have been conducted as part of this thesis within the framework of a 
multinational research project on using technology to improve safety (the term 
“internal surveys” is used for this type). 
 
The analysis provided under point 1 (external surveys) focuses on the industrial trends 
in using VR, areas of application and limitations behind a wider use of VR in the 
industry as shown in Section 2.3.3.1. The analysis provided under point 2 focuses on 
survey results that are directly related to the elements of the underlying thesis topic as 
shown in Section 2.3.3.2 
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2.3.3.1 External surveys 
The development of VR applications, which had its revolutionary period in the last 
decade in terms of visualisation techniques and methods, interfacing to external systems 
(e.g., CAD), support to human machine interface, using VR devices (projection, 
tracking, haptic, etc.) and wider integration in workflows (e.g., in design review, virtual 
prototyping, functional tests, training, etc.). This development was accompanied by 
studies and surveys on the use of VR systems, e.g., industrial applications, acceptance 
by users, obstacles for using VR solutions, socio-economical impacts, etc. 
Most of these surveys and studies were focusing on a particular industrial sector due to 
the nature of the projects for which these studies were performed. In this section an 
analysis of the results of three comprehensive surveys and studies is presented (Klocke 
et al. 2003; European Commission 1998; Karaseitanidis et al. 2006). The analysis is 
based on a classification of the results into one of the following categories: 
1. Scope and technical complexity of the VR installations 
2. Industrial use of VR and areas of application 
3. Benefits of use 
4. Limitations on use 
5. End user requirements and needs 
2.3.3.1.1 Scope and technical complexity of the VR installations 
 The trend in using VR systems goes for applying immersive VR solutions with 
stereoscopic presentations; 
 The acceptance of industry for putting higher investments in VR systems is 
increasing (e.g., investment in HW and SW in values of around 1 Million Euro); 
 The industrial trend regarding the technical implementation of a VR system is 
commissioning to external service providers due to complexity of the installation and 
maintenance as well as the lack of know-how on operating the VR system. This 
follows the current outsourcing trends which can be confirmed by comparing recent 
figures on German outsourcing market as an example. According to (Experton 2009), 
the German outsourcing market is expected to reach a total turnover of 18.2 Billion 
Euros which corresponds to a growth rate of 8.2% compared to 2007. Outsourcing of 
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infrastructure components dominates the outsourcing trends with a total market share 
of 70% followed by applications (22%) and business processes (8%). 
2.3.3.1.2 Industrial use of VR and areas of application 
 Chemical and petrochemical applications (process industry) represent a field where 
VR still have to make a strong penetration due to the limited VR applications which 
have been considered so far in these areas; 
 The current use of VR is highly focused on design, construction, product 
development, manufacturing and assembly. This can be justified by the nature of the 
industries in which VR is currently widely used, i.e., automotive and aerospace as 
previously described; 
 Within the focus areas mentioned under the previous point, using VR to support HF 
approaches was not perceived as a priority which was confirmed in the ranking of 
applications of VR within these focus areas. Using VR to support “ergonomic 
studies” – which is an element of HF as previously mentioned under 2.3.3 – occupied 
the sixth place among 12 prioritised uses of VR; 
 Within the framework of the EC-funded project “VIEW of the future” a rating of VR 
applications by VR experts, end users and HF experts resulted in design review and 
visualisation as the key VR applications compared to entertainment, advertisement, 
education and training; 
 Another finding was the limited use of VR to improve safety (place number seven 
out of eight examined uses of VR) which was justified by the low consideration of 
safety as a VR application due to its dependency on many factors which requires 
dedicating specialised research work in this field. The limited applications here 
mainly used in the automotive industry for crash tests, finite element analysis, etc.; 
 Among the most known applications of VR in the chemical process industry are: VR 
for scientific computations, VR for molecular modelling, VR for subsurface 
applications (visualisation); 
 Using VR for safety training represents an area of application in which the 
acceptance is in the process of being won. 
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2.3.3.1.3 Benefits of use 
 The benefits of using VR were significant in terms of productivity and monetary 
profits, i.e., reduction of costs and time as well as improving quality (in the part in 
which VR being used, e.g., design, construction, production, etc.); 
 “Increasing productivity” and “enhancing speed to market” were ranked at high 
positions in all areas of application which confirms the industrial expectation from 
using VR. 
2.3.3.1.4 Limitations on use 
 The current integration of VR solutions in process workflow (process and 
engineering data management systems, PDM/EDM) is weak. Having recognised the 
potentials of VR, many industries intend to invest in integrating VR in daily 
workflows; 
 A major reason which prevents a wider use of VR in industry is the lack of 
employees‟ acceptances. The reasons for this lack of acceptance were found out to 
be: 
 User-friendliness of the VR system 
 Lack of knowledge on using VR 
 Inadequacy of used VR hardware and devices (low resolution, uncomfortable 
VR accessories, etc.) 
 The reason behind the low rate of VR applications and use in the process industry 
belongs to the problems encountered by this industry which are less directly 
amenable to a VR solution than in other industries. 
2.3.3.1.5 End user requirements and needs 
 A support to the well established CAD systems (e.g., CATIA V5 and ProEngineer) is 
a pre-requisite for using the VR solution in industrial applications. This finding is not 
unusual based on the fact that VR has been mostly used in product development and 
construction where conversion of CAD data represents a pre-requisite. The majority 
of commercial VR solutions provide this support via direct import or by installing an 
additional plug-in; 
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 A ranking of the end user requirements regarding VR software resulted in the need of 
having flexible conversion pipelines to and from the VR software, e.g., export the 
VR scene as a video, import objects' data and parameters, extract images for further 
use in a presentation or on a website, providing necessary data for a web service 
(spare parts catalogue, eLearning, etc.), etc. The availability of flexible conversion 
interfaces would also contribute to a better integration of VR solutions in the IT 
infrastructure; 
 The biggest deficits of current VR systems were found to be high costs, insufficient 
software features and functionalities, lack of standardisations in VR and lack of 
integration in PDM or EDM systems; 
 The future trend is not only to use VR as a tool to support product and process 
development but also as a communication platform and discussion medium between 
the employees involved in the construction, design, production and maintenance of 
the product. 
Apart from the results and figures provided by these surveys on using VR and the 
identified research and application gaps, there is a need to extract a synthesis out of 
these results from the point of view of the underlying thesis. This synthesis aims at 
providing guidelines for the definition of the VR functional requirement and 
specifications which is provided in Chapter 4: 
 The most known and widely spread areas of using VR are automotive and aerospace 
industries. 
 There are no comprehensive evaluations on using VR in the process industries since 
it was not a good candidate for first VR applications as automotive and aerospace 
industries. 
 Using VR to improve safety is an area which has not been evaluated due to the 
absence of mature VR solutions and applications in this area and consequently very 
limited results are available in this area. 
 Integrating HF components in VR environments does not exist in a systematic and 
comprehensive way. Only partial consideration of HF aspects (e.g., ergonomic 
studies, effect of environmental conditions, different lightening conditions, etc.) in 
such environments was considered to match the particular area of applying the 
investigated VR system. 
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 The end users‟ acceptance of using VR represents a major obstacle for a wider use of 
VR in industry. This acceptance should be raised by enhancing the usability of VR 
environments which should take the criteria defined by Rautenstrauch (1997) for 
enhancing the end user‟s acceptance as follows: 
 Ergonomic design of the application software with flexible and adequate 
interaction methods and tools; 
 Problem-oriented provision of software functions based on the task (problem) to 
be solved by the end user and not on the technical features which can be 
provided by the software; 
 Moderate strategy for introducing the software application in the company, 
particularly if the new software application will substitute an older one, on 
which the end users used to work since a considerable time. 
2.3.3.2 Internal surveys 
The analysis under internal surveys focuses on survey results that are directly related to 
the elements of the underlying thesis topic as was described in Section 2.1 and 2.2. This 
analysis covers:  
a. Results related to using the investigated VR systems and applications for safety or 
risk analysis (refer also to Section 2.1); 
b. Results related to VR systems and applications dedicated to support the operational 
phase of the production life cycle (refer also to Section 2.1); 
c. Results related to incorporating HF and HR components in the investigated VR 
systems and applications (refer also to Section 2.2); 
d. Combination of any of the previous three aspects. 
2.3.3.2.1 First survey 
This first survey covered eight industrial companies that are collaborating in the 
multinational research project mentioned in Section 2.3.3. A description of the profile of 
these companies and the data collection method for the survey are provided below: 
 Industrial sector to which these companies belong: 
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 Seven companies belong to the process industry (chemical and petrochemical); 
 One company belongs to the nuclear and energy domain. 
 Size of the company: 
 6 of the companies are classified as large scale industries with more than 250 
employees; 
 Two of the companies are classified as SMEs (according to EC definition of 
SMEs (European Commission 2008)). 
 Data collection: the data were collected during 2-3 days on-site workshops with 
experts from these industries (interviews). The interviewed experts have the 
following competencies or belong to the following departments in their enterprises: 
 Training managers and/or trainers; 
 Safety specialists/analyst with a global view of safety actions in the company 
and if possible with operational background; 
 HSE managers (project managers/process managers); 
 IT department (IT manager and/or system engineer); 
 Engineering & Design department; 
 Development and planning department. 
On average, 2-4 experts with the aforementioned profiles have been involved during the 
interviews from each company. The following results regarding the use and applications 
of VR were extracted during the workshops and based on interviews‟ results: 
1. Only one company has a complete VR installation which is being utilised and 
maintained; 
2. The VR applications running in this VR environment do not cover safety or risk 
analysis. The reason for that is the lack of VR solutions which provide support in 
these areas; 
3. Only three of the interviewed industries have experience with VR based on their 
participation in research projects or by using VR tools for design and training; 
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4. Training is still the most popular field of using VR as perceived during the 
interviews; 
5. Even large scale industries were not sure about the potential of VR in supporting 
daily activities which was the reason behind the uncertainty in investing in VR; 
6. The interviewed SMEs mentioned the following obstacles which prevent investing in 
VR: 
 The unaffordable costs of VR compared to the size and turnover of the company 
 The lack of employees who have the knowledge and competencies in VR 
 The need for customising the VR applications to their needs 
7. Only one of the interviewed industries has experience in human factors engineering 
and using VR to support design and operation from the ergonomics point of view; 
8. All large scale industries considered the combination of VR and HF to improve 
safety and risk analysis as an innovative application in their enterprises and the 
willingness to invest in a technological solution which could improve the process of 
performing safety and risk analysis; 
9. All the interviewed industries expressed the need of having a flexible VR solution 
which can run in an immersive environment or on PC (desktop VR). 
2.3.3.2.2 Second survey 
The second survey was dedicated to software products and solutions which make use of 
visualisation techniques and animations as core features. A total of 21 products were 
investigated based on the following criteria: 
 Nature of product: commercial or non commercial (e.g., a closed project or under 
development); 
 Target group of the product: military, entertainment industry, aviation industry, 
process industry, automotive industry, nuclear industry, etc.; 
 Phases of the production life cycle for which the product is targeted: exploration, 
design, construction, operation, etc. (see Fig. ‎2.1); 
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 Availability of advanced VR features in the product: collision detection, reliable 
CAD support, SDKs/APIs, development guides and documentation, authoring 
interfaces, etc.; 
 Support to HF methods and knowledge; 
 Area of application from safety perspective: training, risk analysis, accident 
investigation, safety management, other (non-safety relevant, e.g., design review, 
marketing, games, etc.). 
The detailed survey results are provided in Annex E. Below is an analysis of the results 
based on the aforementioned criteria: 
Nature of the products: 
57% of the investigated products represent non commercial products, i.e., industrial or 
research projects under development. This confirms the inadequacy of available 
commercial products to provide feasible solutions to the critical issues in safety and risk 
analysis as explained in Section 2.3.3.2.1. One of the reasons for this inadequacy is the 
dependency of “safety” and “risks” on many external and overlapping factors which 
requires dedicating specialised research work in this field. 
Target industries of the products: 
The wide range of target groups covered by this survey adds a comprehensive feature to 
it by not focusing only on the sectors which are popular in using VR solutions as 
described in the Section 2.3.2.4. 33% of the investigated products target the process 
industry which is represented here by chemical and petrochemical industries followed 
by manufacturing and military industries. This result should be further examined based 
on the relevance of the product applications to safety and risk analysis as well as the 
inclusion of HF and VR components as illustrated in the next diagrams. 
Inclusion of VR and HF: 
Most of the investigated products are classified to be pure VR products whereas about 
28% of the products provide a mix of VR features and support to HF aspects. In most 
cases this HF support takes the form of facilitating the performance of ergonomic 
studies or adding certain effects to the VR environment to address some performance 
shaping factors (PSFs, see also Section 2.2.5.3), e.g., weather conditions, work 
conditions, adequacy of training procedures, etc. None of these “HF+VR” products 
within the 28% category provides the HF support in the form of a systematic HF 
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methodology which enables extracting the information and parameter for conducting an 
integrated HF study. 
Application areas of the products: 
VR training applications has been found to be the first and most popular area of using 
and applying VR in industrial and research applications. It is also a fact, that almost all 
VR systems can be (or are currently) used to provide training and learning which was 
confirmed by the survey result in this regard, i.e., around 71% of the products are 
dedicated to training applications. The remaining products (29%) are distributed as 
follows: 
 Around 5% of the products are used to provide support for design, marketing, virtual 
prototyping, etc. which are considered to be less relevant to safety applications; 
 24% of the products are used in safety-related applications which include risk 
analysis and safety management. It was not possible to investigate the complexity 
and depth of these products in tackling safety and risk related issues due to 
unavailability of adequate information and evaluations of these products. 
Phases of the production life cycle covered by the products: 
Most of the investigated products aim at supporting the operational phase of the 
production life cycle (38.5%) followed by the maintenance phase (25.5%). This is due 
to the fact that these two phases represent the phases in which most of the production 
time is spent, i.e., improving processes inside these phases is expected to enhance 
productivity, reduce production costs and consequently increase profitability and raise  
market chances which represent the ultimate goal of industries. The design phase – 
which plays a stronger role in manufacturing, automotive and aviation industries – 
occupied the third place with 20%. 
Combination of the analysed elements: 
Fig. ‎2.7 combines the different elements of the underlying thesis on the investigated 
products using the survey results. These elements are: 
 Covering the operational phase in the production life cycle (Op) 
 Using VR 
 Providing support to HF 
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 Providing support to risk analysis (RA) 
 Applied to process industry (PI) 
Increasing the degree of complexity by moving from the first element to the last one 
reduces the number of products that match the defined criteria. Consequently only one 
non-commercial product (project) was found to match all criteria listed above. Since the 
only available information about this product is the filled survey template, additional 
information was requested on this product. Up to the time of producing this thesis, no 
information was received. Even an internet search resulted in no information on this 
product. Despite this unavailability of necessary data and information for evaluation, 
this product was not removed from the list of investigated products for the purpose of 
scientific neutrality. 
A list of the examined products is provided in Table E.1 (Annex E) 
 
Fig. ‎2.7: Effect of combining analysed elements on number of matching products 
The results of the surveys performed within the framework of this thesis (internal 
surveys) confirm to a large extent the findings of external surveys as described in 
Section 2.3.3.1. Below is a synthesis of these results: 
 A systematic and methodological incorporation of HF aspects in a VR environment 
is still a research area with no clear mature commercial products. 
 The operational phase of the production life cycle is the major supported phase by 
VR products due to the fact that most of the production is spent during the 
operational phase. 
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 Using VR for training and learning is still dominating the VR applications due to the 
many research projects in the area of VR training during the 1990s which lead to 
good advancements in this area. Using VR for safety and risk analysis is still under 
development due to the nature of these applications which is more complex and 
demanding than training applications. 
2.3.4 Summary of Section 2.3 
Besides providing definitions of terms which are widely used in the VR community and 
are necessary for this thesis, this section provided an overview about Virtual Reality: 
state-of-the-art on using and applying VR in industrial applications, peculiarities of 
providing contents in a VR environment as well as a review of previous and related 
works. 
After the introductory part on VR, basic system architecture of a VR environment was 
introduced together with a description of its components and their interoperability. After 
that an analysis of surveys which were examined and conducted within the framework 
of this thesis was introduced with a particular focus on the relevance of the results to the 
three building blocks of this thesis (safety/risks, human factors and VR applications 
within the operational phase of the production life cycle). 
It was clear from this review that using VR to improve safety (reduce risks) does not 
belong to the well known VR uses – unlike training and design reviews for example – 
which confirms the need for further research and exploration in this area. Furthermore, 
integrating HF components in VR environments does not exist in a systematic and 
comprehensive way. Only partial consideration of HF aspects (e.g., ergonomic studies, 
effect of environmental conditions, different lightening conditions, etc.) in such 
environments was considered to match the particular area of applying the investigated 
VR system. 
2.4 Summary and conclusions 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of works that are related to the underlying thesis and 
served as a review on state-of-the-art on the three major components of this work (as 
defined in Fig. ‎1.3) which are: safety (risks), human factors and virtual reality from the 
practical (industrial) dimension of use.  
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Based on this review, the following conclusions with direct relation to the motivation 
and elements of the underlying thesis have been extracted: 
 
 Limitations of current methods and techniques for performing risk analysis 
Conventional QRA techniques and tools (e.g., HAZID, HAZOP, event trees, fault trees, 
etc.) are time consuming and highly dependent on expert‟s imaginations and personal 
judgments to reach their intended goal which represents a subjective and inflexible way 
of conducting risk analysis work. Furthermore, QRA provides a crude analysis of 
barrier performance, emphasising mostly technological and process aspects rather than 
other risk influencing factors such as human and organisational aspects. 
 Limitations of 1st and 2nd generation methods and techniques for performing 
human reliability analysis 
1
st
 generation methods focused on the concept of human error in performing a task, i.e., 
task characteristics are the most influential elements in the estimation of human failure 
whereas the environment in which the task is performed (context) was almost ignored or 
considered as a minor corrective factor. 2
nd
 generation methods paid more attention to 
the context issue but still suffer from subjectivity due to the lack of information needed 
to apply the methods and their dependency on experts‟ judgments and qualitative 
estimations which might be critical in high-risk environments such as the process 
industry. A second major limitation of these methods is their complexity and the lack of 
implementation guidelines that enable their usage by safety and risk analysts on field. A 
third limitation is the nature of the methods which is focused on retrospective analysis 
and the absence of applications in which these methods have been used for predictive 
analysis, i.e., risk analysis. 
 Lack of VR applications for safety and risk analysis 
The rarity and inadequacy of available VR systems and applications to fulfil the 
requirements and needs in these areas is the main reason behind this lack. A second 
reason is the absence of clear end user requirements, methodologies and needs on safety 
and risk analysis which can be moulded in a VR environment. A third reason is the 
complexity of translating the safety context into a task-format unlike the case of training 
or maintenance tasks where VR has been widely used. This is due to the nature of safety 
and its dependency on many factors, e.g., human, organisational, technological, etc. 
which are difficult to be modelled in a single task. 
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 Incorporation of HF in VR environments 
Current VR solutions and applications lack a comprehensive, systematic and 
methodological consideration of HF methods and techniques, e.g., predictive analyses, 
recovery from a human error, identification of human caused hazards, interdisciplinary 
collaboration of plant teams (field operators, control room operators, fire brigade, 
emergency response team, etc.), working under stressful situations, etc. The focus in 
current VR solutions was a partial consideration of HF aspects (e.g., ergonomic studies, 
design validation and tests, examining effect of environmental conditions, impact of 
different lightening conditions, etc.) in such environments. 
 VR applications in the process industry 
Chemical and petrochemical applications (process industry) represent a field where VR 
still have to make a strong penetration due to the limited VR applications which have 
been considered so far in these areas. The reason behind this limited use is the nature of 
the working environments which is characterised by being complex, hazards and 
involves different working teams. 
 End‎users’‎acceptance‎of‎using‎VR 
The end users‟ acceptance of using VR represents a major obstacle for a wider use of 
VR in industry which is mainly caused by complexity of the VR systems, high costs of 
introducing a reliable VR solution, the availability of VR specialists for installation and 
maintenance at the end users' enterprises, the fear of losing workplaces, etc. This 
acceptance should be raised by enhancing the usability of VR environments through 
human-cantered design approaches, end-user and problem oriented provision of system 
functionalities and features, ergonomic design of the application with flexible 
interaction methods and a moderate strategy for introducing the VR applications in the 
company to minimise employees‟ resistance. 
These conclusions re-emphasise the need for research on end-user oriented VR 
applications for improving safety under the consideration of human factors methods and 
human reliability analyses which is the core of the underlying thesis. 
Since they represent scientific findings as well, these conclusions are further considered 
in the development of the HF methodology (Chapter 3), definition of functional 
requirements (Chapter 4) and the proposed VR environment design (Chapter 5) to 
support reaching the goal of this thesis as was introduced in Chapter 1. 
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methodology for 
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This chapter introduces a HF methodology for supporting risk analysis which takes the 
human behaviour and performance into consideration, i.e., human errors. It assists 
safety and risk analysts in the qualitative analysis of cognitive reliability upon running 
and controlling processes on complex production systems, e.g., chemical processing 
plants, gas plants, oil refineries, etc. 
3.1 Definitions 
To avoid complication in the definition of the term “methodology” due to the many 
existing definitions, the following definition has been found to match the intended use 
of this term in the underlying thesis and is adopted here: 
Methodology is “a body of methods, rules, and postulates employed by a discipline” 
(Merriam-Webster (2008)). 
Method is “a way, technique, or process of or for doing something”. (Merriam-Webster 
(2009)) 
To distinguish between the two terms within the context of this thesis, the term method 
represents a main process to do something whereas a methodology consists of different 
rules and guidelines to model human factors within the integrated method. The 
difference can be better understood, if we apply it to a mathematical problem. In this 
regard, the formula for solving the problem would be the method whereas the 
methodology would be a step in this formula. 
Further definitions for the term Methodology are provided by (Ritzer 2007, pp. 2967-
2970; Wiktionary 2008b; Johnson 2003, pp. 92). These definitions are widely close to 
the definition provided by Merriam-Webster. 
Human error, cognitive error: see human error in Section 2.2.1. 
Human error is classified into slip, lapses and mistakes. Slips and lapses are failures that 
occur when the plan is adequate, but the execution is wrong, i.e., wrong execution of a 
proper intention (cf. Rasmussen et al. (1994), pp. 139). 
Slips are “associated with attentional or perceptual failures and result in observable 
inappropriate actions” (Cacciabue (2004), pp. 19). According to (cf. Salvendy (1997), 
pp. 120 et seqq.), slip-type errors occur most frequently at the skill-based level. 
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Lapses are “connected to cognitive events and involve memory failures” (Cacciabue 
(2004), pp. 19), i.e., lapses are failures that can be directly attributed to the breakdown 
of memory such as forgetting or confusing material (cf. Salvendy (1997), pp. 120 et 
seq.). 
Mistakes are errors made at high cognitive level (cf. Cacciabue (2004), pp. 19) and 
occur from a proper execution based on the wrong intention or incorrect understanding 
of the situation. Fig.  3.1 illustrates this classification of errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on Hollnagel (1998), pp. 26 
Fig.  3.1: Human error classification into slips, lapses and mistakes 
Error mode is “a possible way of failing to perform an action correctly given specific 
conditions” (Hollnagel (1998), pp. 14). 
Taxonomy is “the practice and science of classification” (Wiktionary (2008b)), i.e., 
classification of things that are arranged frequently in a hierarchical structure. 
Cognitive tasks are tasks characterised with their high cognitive nature such as control 
and supervisory tasks in complex industries (e.g., chemical process industry, nuclear 
industry, aviation industry, etc.). 
Problem-solving is a higher-order cognitive process that requires modulating and 
controlling more routine or fundamental skills (Goldstein/Levin 1987). It forms part of 
thinking and is considered to be the most complex of all intellectual functions 
(Wikipedia (2008a)). 
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Performance mechanisms are aspects of the problem-solving behaviour that can be 
applied to the cognitive functions of identification, interpretation, decision-making and 
planning. Refer also to Section 3.3 and 3.4.3. 
Performance conditions are descriptions of task demands in coping with complex 
events and include contextual factors such as, available time, availability of plans, 
simultaneous goals, feedback, working conditions, etc. Refer also to Section 3.3. and 
3.4.4. 
3.2 Preamble 
Recent trends in Quantified Risk Analysis (QRA) and Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA) have focused on cognitive tasks, such as situation assessment and decision-
making, as we are witnessing a shift of operator jobs from manual control tasks to 
cognitive and supervisory control tasks. Cognitive errors often result in incorrect 
diagnosis and inadequate plans that may fail the safety functions needed to mitigate 
accident scenarios. In this sense, the role of cognitive science is becoming essential in 
providing frameworks of human performance to help safety analysts to examine 
cognitive error modes and underlying causes. 
An enhanced method for improving predictive analysis of human reliability should 
include (Hollnagel 1993; Dougherty 1993; Meister 1995): 
1. An explicit model of human performance for cognitive tasks: 
It has been shown and explained in Chapter 2 that most of the existing HRA methods 
are classified into 1st or 2nd generation HRA methods. In the former methods - e.g., 
INTENT (Gertman et al. 1992), TRACER (Shorrock/Kirwan 2002) and THERP 
(Swain/Guttmann 1983) - explanations of human error are viewed as breakdowns in the 
natural course of information processing, i.e., employees' failure to follow an 
established procedure. These methods assume that reliable criteria of optimal 
performance exist against which deviations can be measured. For tasks, which are well-
specified, reliable criteria may be derived from operating procedures; however, this is 
difficult for unfamiliar tasks. For man-machine interactions high in dynamics and 
uncertainty, it is not always easy to specify in advance reliable criteria of performance 
standards since this depends on the context of work. In this respect, 2nd generation 
HRA methods have attempted to specify operator control strategies that are dependent 
upon the context of work and task characteristics. These methods - e.g., CREAM 
(Hollnagel 1998), ATHEANA (Cooper et al. 1996) and IDA (Smidts et al. 1997) - 
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focused on models of adaptive human behaviour and examined ways in which operators 
can modify their plans to cope with the demands of the situation.  
2. A comprehensible taxonomy of error modes and error causes that can be easily 
applied by safety analysts: 
This requirement addresses the ability of HRA methods to discriminate and classify a 
comprehensive range of errors. While most methods may score high in terms of 
comprehensibility, the logic for deriving the proposed error modes and causes is not 
made clear which may reduce their usability in the hands of safety analysts who are less 
familiar with the theoretical foundations of human performance and human reliability. 
3. A representation of the dynamic interaction between workplace factors and human 
performance: 
This requirement which corresponds to the dynamic interplay between context of work 
and human cognition is difficult to achieve when the proposed method has been 
developed to have general application. Methods developed in the context of specific 
industrial domains appear to offer a more concrete basis for addressing the intricacies of 
the particular application. In the context of nuclear power industry- e.g., ATHEANA 
(Cooper et al. 1996) and AGAPE-ET (Kim et al. 2004) - have provided elaborate 
representations of the interaction between context of work and human performance. 
However these methods are either still under development or lack instructional 
guidelines for applying them which makes them unfeasible for safety and risk analysts 
who are not necessarily human factor experts. 
4. A consideration of the error detection and recovery processes: 
The large number of errors detected and recovered by operators in complex systems 
indicates that it is impossible to achieve total error prevention and that an alternative 
approach to enhancing human reliability could be through error recovery. Relatively 
fewer methods have addressed systematically this fourth requirement of modelling error 
detection and recovery (Kontogiannis 1997; Shorrock/Straeter 2006; Trucco & Leva, 
2007). 
The underlying methodology provides a practical framework for modelling human error 
and recovery processes in a representation format that is widely used by safety analysts. 
The theoretical foundation of this methodological framework stems from a model of 
“performance mechanisms” and “performance conditions” (Kontogiannis 1997). 
Cognitive error modes and error causes are cast in new forms drawing upon the 
keywords used in hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies to facilitate using them by 
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safety experts. A practical model of human error recovery is proposed and presented in 
a dynamic event tree (DET) that is suitable for representing the changing context of 
work and the influence on the detection and recovery of errors. 
3.3 Error causation model 
Before moving into the individual elements of the proposed methodology, Fig.  3.2 
shows the error causation model that is applied in the underlying methodology. The 
model starts by analysing cognitive error causes, error modes and recovery failures that 
might lead to unsafe human interventions with potential critical safety consequences 
(boxes 1-5). This model, which takes a chain form, is influenced by performance 
mechanisms, performance conditions and system defences (boxes 11, 12 and 13). For 
this reason, these three elements are placed on a parallel level to the five basic 
components of the error causation model numbered 1-5 (a grey colour has been 
assigned to these three elements to distinguish them from the remaining elements of the 
error causation model). 
The error causation model starts by analysing causes of an erroneous action (slips, 
lapses or mistakes). In the underlying methodology emphasis is placed on possible 
cognitive error causes, e.g., failure to revise assessment, overlooked constraints in 
searching information, inefficient tests, etc. (box 1). These cognitive error causes are 
examined in the context of the interaction between performance conditions (box 12) and 
performance mechanisms (box 11). Having identified the cognitive error causes, the 
methodology proceeds with an analysis of cognitive error modes, e.g., wrong diagnosis, 
delayed decision, priority error in planning, etc. (box 2) and recovery failures (box 3) 
that might lead to an unsafe intervention (box 4). Unsafe interventions are descriptions 
of error manifestations that could in turn be the result of slips and lapses (i.e., action 
failures as explained in Section 3.1) or mistakes (i.e., cognitive failures as explained in 
Section 3.1). The focus in the underlying methodology is on mistakes (cognitive 
failures), which is also illustrated in the feedback loop in Fig.  3.2. System defences, 
e.g., safeguards and limiting functions (box 13), are examined not only as mechanisms 
for mitigating the error consequences (box 5), but also in their potential to assist 
operators in detecting errors. The methodology is moulded as a set of taxonomies of 
error modes and error causes that provide input to a dynamic tree representation of error 
modes and recovery failures. 
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Fig.  3.2: The error causation model applied in the underlying methodology 
The concept of performance mechanisms relies on a problem-solving view of the 
cognitive functions, i.e., identification, interpretation, decision-making and planning, 
which may fail in certain ways when demands exceed resources. The concept is 
proposed as a more direct assessment of task demands in coping with complex events 
and includes contextual factors such as, available time, availability of plans, 
simultaneous goals, feedback, working conditions and so forth. Possibilities for error 
recovery are explored by examining how performance conditions and performance 
mechanisms change in the course of a scenario. The main support in analysing recovery 
failures is provided in terms of a dynamic cognitive event tree presented in Section 3.5.  
3.4 The methodology 
It has been mentioned that the proposed methodology will assist safety and risk analysts 
in the qualitative analysis of cognitive reliability upon running and controlling processes 
on complex production systems. This is achieved by identifying cognitive error modes 
and causes behind unsafe interventions and modelling paths of error modes and 
recovery opportunities as the situation unfolds dynamically and performance conditions 
change in the course of events. 
To reach these goals, the methodology is introduced based on its building elements, 
which are (refer also to Fig.  3.2): 
 A model of cognitive functions (Section 3.4.1); 
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 Error modes (external error modes: Section 3.4.2.1 and cognitive error modes: 
Section 3.4.2.2); 
 Performance mechanisms (Section 3.4.3); 
 Performance conditions (Section 3.4.4); 
 Cognitive error causes (Section 3.4.5); 
 Error detection and recovery (Section 3.4.6). 
A graphical overview of the methodology and how to apply it to scenarios and case 
studies is presented in Section 3.5. In Chapter 6, the methodology is validated by 
applying it to a case study from the chemical process industry. 
3.4.1 A model of cognitive functions 
In human error analysis, we should be able to identify cognitive functions that have 
given rise to certain human actions as well as the influences exerted by the context of 
work. The Simple Model of Cognition (SMoC) (Hollnagel 1998), (Ritter et al. 2001), 
(Johnsen et al. 2008) has been adopted here to examine the cognitive functions that are 
brought to bear in carrying out operator tasks. Fig.  3.3 introduces the model of cognitive 
functions that is used in the underlying methodology (cognition cycle). This model is 
used to identify cognitive errors in the four cognitive functions illustrated in Fig.  3.3, 
i.e., the functions of identification, interpretation, decision-making (choice of goals) and 
planning as follows: 
 Identification (recognition): 
When a problem occurs, operators have to identify important changes of system 
parameters and signify their consequences in terms of system functions that may be 
threatened in the near future. 
 Interpretation: 
Upon the recognition of a problem, operators have to interpret and organise the 
information into a meaningful whole. In this stage, the operator might acquire more 
specific information in order to understand the causes of the problem since the potential 
for misunderstanding the situation could be critical at this stage 
 Decision-making (choice of goals): 
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This stage encompasses the process of goal selection to compensate for the problem. It 
entails an evaluation of alternative problem constraints and/or solutions and whether a 
decision must be made. 
 Task planning or scheduling 
This stage is required to formulate a sequence of actions based on a set of problem 
constraints and/or solutions identified in the decision-making stage. 
The double-sided arrows in Fig.  3.3 indicate that there is no pre-defined ordering of 
cognitive functions since task organisation and control depend on the particular context 
of work. This issue has been addressed by (Roth et al. 1994) who indicates that 
decision-making and interpretation are often carried out in parallel when coping with 
complex events. Some kind of preliminary decision-making or solutions can also take 
place in the interpretation stage and influence the assessment of situation. On the other 
hand, viable goals can also be proposed at an abstract level without having achieved a 
complete interpretation of problem causes. 
 
 
Fig.  3.3: A model of cognitive functions (boxes) underlying information search and execution 
The first unboxed element in Fig.  3.3 refers to the input, i.e., information search 
(observations), that influences the cognition cycle. The second unboxed element refers 
to the result of the cognition cycle which takes the form of executions, i.e., actions, 
checks, instructions, etc. The feedback loop indicates that the executed actions affect the 
identification of new problems. To illustrate this aspect in an example, let‟s assume that 
for an identified problem, one of the executed actions is “bypass valve X by using valve 
Y”. This fact is taken into consideration in identifying new problems in the same 
working area, i.e., “valve X” is not seen as a cause of the problem here and new 
information search is needed to identify the problem. 
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3.4.2 Error modes 
The underlying methodology distinguishes two types of error modes or human 
malfunctions: 
1. External error modes that are observable by safety analysts (i.e., errors in information 
search and execution); 
2. Internal or cognitive error modes (i.e., errors in identification, interpretation, 
decision-making and planning) that account for the more covert aspects of cognition.  
3.4.2.1 External error modes 
Several taxonomies of external error modes - that are in general agreement - have been 
developed (Reason 1990; Embrey et al. 1994). The underlying methodology proposes 
two taxonomies of error modes for the stages of information search and execution. 
These taxonomies provide categorisation and classification schemes of external errors to 
support safety and risk analysts in understanding and explaining how an error occurs. 
This error classification is used in the next steps of the methodology as explained in the 
upcoming sections of this chapter. 
I) External error modes for the information search stage 
Errors in information search could be due to poor “plans of data collection” and hence, 
could affect the cognitive stages of identification and interpretation. For this reason, 
information search errors must be considered in advance of cognitive error modes in the 
underlying methodology. Table  3.1 provides a taxonomy of information search errors 
based on the application of a HAZOP-style analysis on the available information, data 
and oral instructions. The table illustrates that information search errors could be due to 
missing an important piece of information (items 1 and 2), delayed detection of the 
information (item 3), disregarding a relevant piece of information (item 4), misreading 
of instruments (item 5), mistrusting the information (item 6) or misunderstanding the 
observed information (item 7). 
The second part of Table  3.1 examines errors in fitting information into patterns to 
reach an understanding of the situation. In this sense, the collected data could be fewer 
or greater in number than those required to get at the correct pattern. A fewer number of 
collected data would mean that the data is insufficient to understand the situation (item 
9). On the other hand, a greater number of collected data may imply that some of the 
information could be irrelevant or redundant (items 8 and 10). 
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Table  3.1: Taxonomy of external error modes for the information search stage 
Number Keywords Information search errors 
Individual pieces of information 
1 None                    
(Missing) 
An important piece of information that is not displayed on the 
control panel because of a faulty sensor or lack of sensor. 
2 Not done              
(Missed)         
Failure to detect or identify critical information or failure to 
retrieve data and values from manuals. 
3 Later than            
(Delayed)  
Cues or data are not identified in time (delayed detection) 
because of poor visibility, distractions and workload. 
4 Skipped               
(Discarded) 
Cues or data are identified but ignored because they are not seen 
as relevant at a certain point in time. 
5 More/less than 
(Misread)   
Errors in reading instruments, retrieving data from manuals, or 
receiving oral instructions. 
6 Mistrusted Failure to verify instructions or unreliable instruments. 
7 Misunderstood An event or cue is mistaken for something else.  
Patterns of information collected 
8 Other than            
(Irrelevant) 
Collected data are not pertinent to the situation. Cues are wrongly 
associated to the implications of the situation. 
9 Part of                
(Insufficient) 
Data are not sufficient to understand situation or make decisions. 
Failure to associate two or more cues when their combined 
effects should be noted. 
10 As well as 
(Redundant) 
Operators spend a lot of time gathering cues or data in excess of 
what is required to understand the problem.  
 
II) External error modes for the execution stage 
For the execution stage, Table  3.2 provides a taxonomy of external error modes for the 
execution stage (execution errors) cast as a set of keywords used in hazard and 
operability studies (HAZOP) which does not require a great deal of expertise by the 
safety analyst. The keywords are applied to several operator activities including manual 
actions, checks on instruments, retrieval of information from written procedures and 
communication of information. An analysis of execution errors assumes that there is 
nothing wrong with the plan or course of action developed by operators (i.e., the 
planning phase in Fig.  3.3); in this sense, errors are made during the implementation of 
actions. 
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Table  3.2: Taxonomy of external error modes for the execution stage 
Number Keywords Execution errors (actions, checks and instructions) 
1 Not done The activity is not performed or the operator is unable to do it. 
2 Part of Part of a complex activity has been omitted. 
3 More- less than  The result of the activity is above or below the required level. 
4 Sooner than Performed faster or started earlier than required (overreaction) 
5 Later than Performed slower or initiated later than required. 
6 Opposite,                          
too much or too little                                                           
Performed in the opposite direction or way. 
An action that involves movement, force or rotation exceeds 
recommended control span. 
7 Other than  A similar activity is taken on the wrong object or instrument. 
8 As well as  An additional activity is performed that creates a side-effect. 
9 Repeated or 
continued 
The same activity is repeated a second time, or it is continued 
although the results are not in the expected direction. 
10 Out of sequence An activity is executed in the wrong sequence. A sequence of steps 
is stopped but resumed from an earlier or later step.  
3.4.2.2 Cognitive (internal) error modes 
Cognitive error modes are used in the functions of identification, interpretation, 
decision-making and planning. Table  3.3 provides a taxonomy of cognitive error modes 
which makes use of previous studies on several application domains (Rouse/Rouse 
1983; Meister 1995). We assume that the four cognitive functions entail mental 
processes where operators make decisions about problem constraints, propose 
alternatives for solving the problem, perform an evaluation of alternatives, revising 
assessment, etc. (see also the list of performance mechanisms provided in the next 
section). 
According to Table  3.3, cognitive functions may produce no results either because 
operators were unable to understand the situation and make a decision (item 1) or 
because another cognitive function was given priority (item 2). On the other hand, 
cognitive functions may produce correct but premature or delayed results (items 3 and 
4), wrong results (items 5 and 6) and incomplete or insufficient results (items 7 and 8). 
Furthermore, wrong decisions and interpretations are assigned to two categories which 
are false acceptance of explanations or options (item 5: assuming that the correct one 
was not attended by operators) and false rejection of the correct explanation or option 
(item 6). Finally, Table  3.3 considers the case of interpreting feedback of previous 
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actions as well as additional information that arrive after operators have reached a 
decision (items 9-10). 
Table  3.3: Taxonomy of cognitive error modes for identification, interpretation, decision-making and 
planning 
Number Keywords Cognitive error modes 
1 Unable to understand or 
make plan/decision 
(inconclusive) 
Unable to understand causes or specify goals and plans, 
usually due to a fast evolving situation. It also includes 
failures to identify system states or monitor the effects of 
corrective actions. 
2 Priority error in 
plan/decision  
(misordered) 
Instead of making a decision or plan how to stabilise the 
system and maintain safety margin, operators persevere with 
interpretation.  
3 Premature plan/decision 
(sooner than)  
Correct but premature interpretation or selection of goals and 
plans. Premature decisions and hasty plans are vulnerable to 
new evidence or contingent events. For identification, the 
system is perceived as reaching a critical point when, in fact, it 
hasn‟t. 
4 Delayed plan/decision      
(later than) 
Correct but delayed interpretation or selection of goals. Plans 
may be too slow to achieve the goal or may be initiated too 
late. For identification, it implies delays in realising that the 
situation has changed as indicated by new information. 
5 Wrong plan/decision         
(other than, missed)         
Wrong explanations or goals have been accepted without 
paying attention to the correct ones. The inferred system state 
does not match the plant status information. 
6 Wrong plan/decision            
(as well as, unlikely) 
Considered but rejected the correct goal or explanation in 
favour of others that are sub-optimal or less likely to occur. 
Salient cues may shift attention to other states less unlikely to 
occur. 
7 Incomplete plan/ 
decision (part of) 
Incomplete identification of system state or explanation 
because some data were overlooked or discarded. An 
incomplete plan would achieve only part of the selected goal. 
8 Inefficient plan/decision    
(less than) 
Selected plan may involve errors in the sequence of steps, 
wrong control actions, or wrong cueing and timing of steps.  
9 Unable to detect or 
interpret feedback 
Feedback of corrective actions and changes of the situation are 
not monitored or not interpreted correctly giving rise to 
fixation. 
10 Unable to recover Problems with original interpretation or plan are recognised 
but operators can‟t recover errors due to limited time or 
knowledge. 
 
3.4.3 Performance mechanisms 
In the underlying methodology, human performance is seen as the interplay between 
work context or task demands (performance conditions) and human behaviour 
(performance mechanisms). In this respect, we cannot be dogmatic that certain forms of 
problem solving will lead to errors because the context of performance (e.g., available 
time, feedback, lack of interruptions) may provide opportunities for recovering 
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inappropriate actions or switching to more efficient strategies. On the other hand, what 
may constitute an efficient strategy could fail to produce positive outcomes in 
environments that present excessive task demands, prevent innovation and lack 
recovery opportunities. Performance mechanisms are aspects of problem-solving 
behaviour that appear to be common to the cognitive functions of identification, 
interpretation, decision-making and planning. Based on research on problem-solving 
behaviour (Klein et al. 1993; Frensch/Funke 1995; Goldstein/Levin 1987; Halpern 
2003) a set of performance mechanisms is proposed in Table  3.4. 
Table  3.4: Performance mechanisms 
Number Performance 
Mechanism 
Explanation/Examples 
1 Setting of problem 
boundaries and 
constraints 
To be performed with regard to time (e.g., abort diagnosis and 
try to stabilise system), human resources (e.g., sending an 
auxiliary operator on-site), tasks (e.g., interruption to tasks 
previously performed), procedures (e.g., compliance with 
operational procedures) and training (e.g., training practices 
related to the problem under consideration). 
2 Generating alternatives  Searching and generating alternative explanations (diagnosis) of 
the situation and plausible goals or problem solutions 
3 Testing/evaluating 
alternatives 
Carry out an evaluation test to reduce the list of alternatives and 
converge to one explanation or solution 
4 Assessment of 
performance 
Establish revision steps to take into account new evidence as the 
situations deploys (self-assessment of diagnostic performance). 
This mechanism of self-assessment (see second part of the 
table) is particularly useful in addressing error recovery. 
Self assessment 
4a Assess confidence in 
judgment 
Low confidence can lead to delays whilst over-confidence may 
lead to premature commitment. 
 
 
4b Assess the “cost of 
being wrong”  
To be done in terms of delays in getting back to the right course, 
introducing side-effects and sanctions for inappropriate 
performance, etc. 
 
4c Re-assess the situation Based on oncoming evidence from new events and actions 
previously taken.  
These performance mechanisms provide safety analysts with a common framework to 
analyse human behaviour entailed in the cognitive functions of identification, 
interpretation, choice of goals and planning, i.e., input for defining and analysing 
cognitive error causes as also illustrated in Fig.  3.2. The next two sections explain how 
these performance mechanisms are linked to the four cognitive functions. 
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3.4.3.1 Identification and Interpretation 
It is useful to draw upon a distinction (Rasmussen 1986) between structural (state) 
identification (e.g. in terms of plant equipment, control room components, etc.) and 
functional (categorical) identification (e.g. in terms of cooling capacity, inventory 
functions, etc.). At the structural level, identification of a system state can be useful for 
matching a pattern of changes to a suitable operator response that can be retrieved from 
memory or operating procedures. At functional level, the identification can be useful for 
assigning situations into classes of events requiring a common response (Bainbridge 
1989) which is more challenging than structural identification. This functional 
identification focuses on the situational constraints imposed on the availability of 
equipment, standby systems and operating personnel. As more evidence accumulates, 
operators are able to formulate more specific ideas about alternative explanations of 
problem causes and starting the interpretation phase. The process of (functional) 
interpretation entails making hypotheses about alternative causes and carrying out 
diagnosis tests. Criteria for diagnosis tests include replies to the following questions: 
 Which is the most likely cause or the most serious cause to start with? 
 How long it takes to carry out the test? 
 Are there side effects in performing the test? 
 How reliable the test may be? 
Functional identification and interpretation can be seen as a continuum in our 
understanding of the situation. In process control industries (e.g., nuclear industry, 
Woods et al. 1990) and aviation industries (Amalberti/Deblon 1992), functional 
identification can bring the system to a relatively stable state and this takes precedence 
over making a precise diagnosis of problem causes. Some researchers (Acosta/Siu 1993; 
Gertman et al. 1996) refer to functional identification as global diagnosis whilst local 
diagnosis is reserved for functional interpretation. 
The final aspect of “self-assessment of diagnostic performance” is very important in 
situations of high uncertainty because several subtle criteria are likely to influence 
operator confidence such as, compliance with procedures and team culture. In addition, 
the cost of misdiagnosis could be high, e.g., once an emergency response has been 
initiated, decisive cues arriving after diagnosis are missed since the multiple tasks 
initiated by the emergency response will capture attention. The financial costs of false 
emergency actions are sometime comparable with accidents' costs.  
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3.4.3.2 Decision-making (choice of goals) and Planning  
Decision-making (choice of goals) can be seen as a cognitive process that entails 
thinking of alternative goals and possible goal-conflicts or tradeoffs. Several strategies 
have been proposed for comparing alternative goals in the decision-making literature 
(Hammond et al. 1987; Klein et al. 1993). However, justification for a decision may be 
examined easier on the basis of the criteria used and their perceived importance rather 
than the actual comparison strategy. It is useful, therefore, to draw attention to this 
process of criteria generation and prioritisation per se. Evaluation criteria should not be 
confined to short-term requirements but must include long-term criteria as well. Options 
must be balanced against future changes since one option may have a more stabilising 
effect on the system than another option. Other criteria for decision-making may be 
related to compliance with procedures, team culture and organisational policies; these 
criteria are likely to affect operator confidence in judgment and, hence, their decisions. 
A favoured goal that is not supported by the operating procedures and the team 
members, for instance, can make team leaders reluctant to take this goal or may delay 
their final decision. 
Task planning is also a decision-making process that involves trading-off alternative 
means and resources how to achieve a particular goal. Other decisions may concern 
what goals take precedence and how to minimise the risks arising from unsatisfied 
criteria. More subtle criteria for selecting plans could involve “assessing the risk of 
being wrong” and “correcting a plan on the fly” and “cost of recovery” from several 
slips and lapses during the implementation of a plan. Finally, “re-assessing 
performance” can be seen as an important element of planning. In other words, a plan 
should incorporate a mental check on the progress made over a course of action to 
decide whether some modifications may be needed to correct errors or respond to 
unexpected events. 
3.4.4 Performance conditions 
The term “performance conditions” is used in the underlying methodology instead of 
the traditionally used “Performance Shaping Factors” (PSFs). Performance conditions 
offer some advantages over PSFs, with regard to testing their effects, incorporating 
them in task analysis and relating them to difficulties involved in situation assessment 
and decision-making. PSFs (e.g., training quality, operator experience, and operating 
procedures) are too broad and tend to be defined differently by several analysts. 
Inadequate training, for instance, can refer to inadequate operator plans, inexperience 
with multi-tasking, conflicting decision criteria and absence of verification tests to 
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crosscheck data reliability. All these factors are better stated independently because they 
have different effects on performance. 
To evaluate the context in which human performance takes place, a literature review on 
performance conditions (Hollnagel 2006; Stanton et al. 2005) resulted in the 
development of a set of performance conditions as shown in Table  3.5. 
The descriptions in Table  3.5 also avoid “composite factors” (e.g., stress, workload, task 
complexity, etc.) that are the combined effect of several performance conditions. Stress, 
for instance, can be caused by time constraints, lack of plans to cope, requirements for 
multi-tasking, negative feedback of previous actions and personality factors. These 
composite factors, although strongly related to the context of performance, are rather ill 
suited for the analysis of human reliability due to the following reasons: 
 The complexity of treating them within the work context because of their composite 
nature. 
 The necessity of investigating personal aspects to ensure an adequate consideration 
of these composite factors in the analysis, e.g., personal data, personal behaviour, 
social problems of the examined person, etc. Persons' security laws and data security 
laws imposed many restrictions on analyses of this nature. 
 The need to concentrate on measurable components that might influence these 
composite factors, e.g., availability of time, availability of instructions, accessibility 
of information, etc. as listed in Table  3.5. Improving these (measurable) performance 
conditions will positively influence the composite factors. 
It is also important that performance conditions are not evaluated in a “once-and-for-all” 
fashion but are evaluated throughout an entire analysis because events may evolve 
dynamically or the situation may exacerbate in cases of delays and errors. 
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Table  3.5: Performance conditions 
Number Performance 
Conditions 
Explanation/Examples 
1 Availability of time to 
respond 
The time within which a task must be completed in order to 
avoid adverse consequences; it affects the depth of problem 
solving. 
2 Availability of plans 
and instructions  
Plans may be available but inaccessible because of the way they 
are trained (memory retrieval) or cast in procedures. Plans are 
followed rigidly or serve as guidelines for action.  
3 Availability and 
accessibility of 
information  
The organisation and representation of information on the 
interface, procedures, and drawings (poor design may include: 
delays in finding data, irrelevant information, ambiguities, and 
unreliable data). 
4 Number of parallel  
tasks 
Attending to or performing many tasks at close time proximity 
(multi-tasking, time-sharing).  
5 Criteria of choice & 
decision-making  
Criteria for evaluating goals may be competing (partially 
incompatible) or conflicting (mutually exclusive). 
6 System dynamics and 
coupling 
The response of the system (e.g., lags) and its coupling affects 
feed-back (e.g., delayed feedback) and task interactions (e.g., 
side-effects). 
7 Teamwork  Teamwork may include: team communication, distribution of 
roles, team planning, and team culture.  
8 Supervision Supervision is necessary for allocating tasks, prioritising tasks, 
and providing redundancy (e.g., cross checking the work of 
colleagues).  
9 Organisational factors They include company policies for task scheduling, policies for 
job aids and training, manning levels, and company culture. 
10 Capability Degrading 
Factors (CDF) 
CDFs are environmental and workplace factors that affect 
operators in a global way (e.g., distractions due to noise, fatigue 
and life threats). 
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3.4.5 Cognitive Error Causes 
The causes of cognitive errors can be traced into failures that result from the interaction 
between work context and human problem solving. This section examines several 
cognitive error causes in the functions of identification, interpretation, decision-making 
and task planning. The list is not exhaustive but indicates plausible forms of cognitive 
error causes. 
3.4.5.1 Error causes in identification and interpretation 
Searching for information to identify the system state or diagnose the causes of the 
problem can be seen as a decision process. Information search can be interpreted 
(Rouse/Rouse 1983) as a trade-off decision between accuracy (e.g. gaining a better 
understanding of the problem) and effort or cost (e.g. sending an operator to gather data 
at the cost of not becoming available for other tasks). Information search is also guided 
by interpretation and the context of the task, such as missing or ambiguous data, 
changing parameters and complex relationships between system units.  
Table  3.6 provides a taxonomy of cognitive error causes by using the same categories 
that were applied to the performance mechanisms, i.e., setting of problem constraints, 
generating alternatives, testing alternatives and assessment (refer also to Table  3.4). 
Using the same categories makes sense because cognitive error causes are influenced by 
the performance mechanisms at the first level and then performance conditions (refer 
also to Fig.  3.1). 
Failures in identifying and prioritising constraints for information search (items 1- 2) 
must be understood in the context of multiplicity of constraints, such as, effort or cost in 
searching for information, compliance with team culture, and influences of 
organisational policies. The interpretation processes of explanation generation and 
testing have attracted a lot of research in the fault-diagnosis literature (Su/Govindaraj 
1986), (Patrick 1993). Many studies assume that there is a set of faults which is 
consistent with the information available; as the failure event evolves, more evidence 
becomes available that enables operators to narrow down the possible problem causes 
into one or two alternatives. In this sense, an operator may be unable to think of any 
explanations, or think of a few only, i.e., missed correct explanation (item 3) or consider 
unlikely explanations (item 4). 
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Table  3.6: Taxonomy of cognitive error causes for identification, interpretation, decision-making and 
planning 
Number Keywords Cognitive error causes or mechanisms 
Setting of problem constraints 
1 Overlooked 
constraints/ criteria 
(missed) 
Overlooked constraints in searching information, coping with 
unreliable cues, or shifting attention to cues as situation evolves. 
Overlooked decision criteria or tradeoffs to evaluate alternative 
means to apply a plan of action. 
2 Misordered 
constraints/ criteria                   
Wrong priorities for search constraints, decision criteria and 
evaluation criteria of goals and plans. 
Generating alternatives 
3 Missed states, causes, 
goals (other than) 
Overlooked an important system state or explanation. 
Considered fewer alternative goals or means of plan of action. 
4 Unlikely states, goals, 
means (as well as) 
Spent time in considering unlikely system states, causes or 
options in terms of goals and means of implementation. 
Testing of alternatives 
5 Interrupted test              
(part of) 
Hypothesis test was incomplete because of many interruptions.  
Plan interrupted due to distractions or overload of information. 
6 Inefficient test or 
method (less than) 
Inefficient test or shortcut in assessing possible explanations.  
Inefficient handling of tradeoffs between conflicting goals. 
Plan is inefficient as it lacks a mental check to stop errors, may 
generate side–effects, or can‟t cope with contingent events. 
7 Over/under 
estimation of 
criticality 
(misjudged) 
Misjudged the criticality of the situation, or the consequences of 
alternative decisions or means upon the current situation 
Assessment 
8 Over/under 
estimation of the cost 
of recovery 
(neglected the cost of 
being wrong) 
Cost of being wrong and implications for recovery actions are not 
taken into account. Side-effects implied by certain means to 
achieve goals are not considered. Delays and problems in 
correcting errors or compensating for contingent events were 
under-estimated 
9 Over/under 
confidence (more or 
less than) 
More or less confidence invested on certain hypotheses and 
explanations, competence of staff, or support provided by 
operating procedures or team culture. 
10 Failure to revise 
assessment or plan 
Recovery cues are missed, masked or discarded, or not provided 
resulting in failure to change initial assessment of situation or 
plan. 
 
Testing alternative explanations may consist of following a diagnostic procedure or 
carrying out a mental stimulation of the system to confirm the correctness of a 
hypothesis. A test of a plausible explanation may remain incomplete when interrupted 
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by new developments or poor communications (item 5). Shortcuts in diagnostic tests or 
errors in the execution of the test could also fail the evaluation process (item 6). Finally, 
operators may select an inefficient test to confirm their hypotheses. Understanding 
failures in complex systems usually retains some sort of uncertainty about the real 
causes of the problem. For this reason, diagnosis is affected by the seriousness of the 
situation (e.g., one explanation may imply that we should take more drastic actions than 
another) and the perceived cost of being wrong in assessing the situation (items 7- 8). 
3.4.5.2 Error causes in decision-making 
Identifying and prioritising the constraints under which decisions are made is an 
important aspect of the decision-making process because it permeates the processes of 
searching and testing alternative goals or options. In complex systems, operators may be 
concerned not only with technical constraints (e.g., effort to perform a task, existence of 
liquid inside a pipe, high temperature of the investigated object, etc.) but also with 
organisational constraints (e.g., compliance with procedures, training practices, 
organisational policies, etc.). An analysis of decision-making errors should examine 
how important constraints and evaluation criteria may be missed or prioritised 
erroneously as shown in Table  3.6 (items 1 and 2). The processes of goal generation and 
testing have been debated a lot in the decision-making literature (Klein et al. 1993; 
Frensch/Funke 1995). Although there has not been any agreement with regard to the 
way that goals are selected and tested (e.g., some favouring sequential evaluation over 
concurrent one), the concept of Decisional Balance Sheet (Kontogiannis 1996) provides 
a useful tool for integrating problem constraints with goal evaluation. Cognitive errors 
for goal generation and testing can assume similar forms to those of situation 
interpretation (items 3 – 7).  
A more subtle process of decision-making involves allowing for the cost of being 
wrong, assessing confidence in judgment and establishing revision steps (items 8-10).  
3.4.5.3 Error causes in planning 
In many respects, task planning resembles decision-making in the sense that a decision 
should be made with regard to the most appropriate criteria for selecting means and 
resources to achieve a particular goal. One of the main aims of the underlying 
methodology is to identify the decisional conflicts behind different means and examine 
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how several performance conditions can affect the final decision of the operating 
personnel. 
Table  3.6 quotes four error causes that can be applied in the planning phase10. These are: 
overlooking some important evaluation criteria (item 1), making an error in prioritising 
criteria (item 2), considering fewer means or missing an alternative mean (item 3) and 
considering unlikely means (item 4). 
Testing a plan of action entails more than comparing alternative means and resources. 
Failures to think how to cope with possible side-effects or diversions of how the 
situation will evolve can also lead to inefficient plans (item 6). In this sense, operator 
can pre-plan how to counteract side-effects and exploit any opportunities available to 
change the direction of their solution. These contingency steps should be thought of and 
organised well in advance of the execution of the actual plan to counteract any side 
effects. Neglecting to do that can make plan adaptations difficult to achieve within the 
short time window allowed, i.e., underestimation of situation criticality (item 7). In a 
similar manner, plan interruptions due to distractions or information overload can lead 
to incomplete tests and escalate the situation (item 5). 
A related aspect of planning is remaining alert to changes of the situation and feedback 
that would signify inadequacies in the adopted plan. Operators may fail to revise a plan 
that is proving inadequate because recovery cues are not provided or not communicated 
in time or they are missed out (item 10). On the other hand, operators may have realised 
that the current plan is running into trouble but the cost of recovery and change to a new 
plan could be very high (item 8). Modifying plans as the situation worsens entails a 
complex process of forecasting side-effects of new plans and modifications in the 
context of high uncertainty and criticality. In many cases, the cost of changing to a new 
plan may be unjustified. Finally, the confidence of team members (item 9) on the 
support provided by procedures, team communications and organisational policies 
could affect their decision whether to change to a new course of action. In some cases, 
for instance, team members may need to react quickly even without agreement from the 
team leader. An authoritarian team organisation would make re-planning difficult to 
adapt to such circumstances. 
                                                 
10 Additional error causes can be examined within the particular task context. 
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3.4.6 Error detection and recovery 
With the increasing complexity of technical systems, there has been a realisation that 
total elimination of human error may be difficult to achieve. There are always complex 
situations in which errors may creep up due to high workload, psychological stress and 
poor team coordination. What seems to be more important in these situations is the 
prevention or containment of adverse consequences through the detection and correction 
of errors rather than the prevention or avoidance of errors in the first place. An 
important area elaborated in this framework is the issue of error detection and recovery, 
which has not been addressed systematically in error modelling. 
While in error prevention we intervene between the action and the error, in error 
recovery we intervene between the error and the negative consequences as shown in 
Fig.  3.4.  In this figure, “consequences 1” correspond to an error propagation in which 
neither an error prevention nor an error recovery is possible. “Consequences 2” 
correspond to a successful process of error prevention whereas “consequences 3” 
correspond to a successful process of error recovery. The backward loops represent 
feedbacks for improving the performance of the action and developing better strategies 
for prevention and recovery. 
We may distinguish two broad strategies in managing error recovery. The first strategy 
is to facilitate operators to correct their errors (error handling) while the second strategy 
(mitigation) is to minimise error consequences through system design (e.g., delaying the 
propagation of consequences, or preventing errors from being implemented by 
introducing limiting functions). 
Studies in error recovery (Rizzo et al. 1995; Kanse/van der Schaaf 2001) have tended to 
distinguish three processes in error handling or error recovery, namely:  
 Error detection - realising that an error is about to occur or suspecting that an error 
occurred, independent from understanding the cause of the error  
 Error explanation - explaining why an error occurred 
 Error correction - modifying a plan or developing a new one to compensate 
The first mechanism of error detection takes place at the conceptual stage of 
identification, interpretation, decision-making and planning (e.g., wrong intentions, 
mismatches between intentions and plans, inadequate plans, etc.). The second 
mechanism takes place at the execution or outcome stage by monitoring the results of 
an action (e.g., a mismatch between expected results and observed outcomes). This 
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mechanism relies on a self-monitoring function that captures errors before any 
consequences are ensued. 
Perform Action
Error
Error prevention not possible?
Consequences 1
Consequences 2
Error prevention possible?
Consequences 3
Error recovery possible?
Error recovery not possible?
Feedback 1
Fedback 3
Feedback 2
 
Fig.  3.4: A process diagram for error prevention and error recovery 
Once an error has been detected, operators may try to identify or explain the causes of 
the error. The contribution of the error explanation phase to the error handling process is 
still a topic with a lot of research potential. 
Error correction is a complex process that takes several forms. Three possible corrective 
goals in error correction have been distinguished in the literature (Mo/Crouzet 1996; 
Kontogiannis 1999): 
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 Backward recovery: the system is brought back to its initial state prior to the 
occurrence of the failure; this means that operators have got the means to reverse or 
“undo” the effects of their actions.  
 Forward recovery: the system is brought into an intermediate state in order for the 
operators to “buy time” and find a better solution later on. 
 Compensatory recovery: where redundant equipment is activated to bring the system 
to the final state that was desired. 
In many critical situations, operators have to react quickly even when a thorough 
understanding of the problem has not been achieved yet. In these cases, the adopted plan 
should still allow operators to continue gathering new data to understand the situation 
better and, at the same time, respond to any adverse consequences and minimise an 
escalation of the problem. This is the concept of viable plans that allow operators to 
explore opportunities for detecting their errors and correcting their understanding of the 
situation or amending plans online to contain the problem. It is important, therefore, that 
some desirable features are proposed with regard to viable plans and specifically their 
control mechanism, capacity to cope with uncertainty, and their structure as explained 
below. 
First, a viable plan should have a control mechanism that monitors progress towards the 
goal as well as any changes of the situation that may challenge current understanding. 
This control mechanism is important for error detection and re-assessment of problem 
diagnosis. Experienced operators make certain assumptions in order to build a coherent 
explanation of the situation and accept them as true until there is some reason to doubt 
them. Unfortunately, some assumptions may remain “hidden” and never get tested as 
operators may be unaware of them. Finding and testing hidden assumptions is part of 
the control mechanism for detecting errors and misunderstandings of the situation.  
Testing the plausibility of assumptions may entail cognitive processes such as seeing 
whether a change is levelled-off or made worse in future, cross-checking functionally-
relevant data (e.g., a temperature rise should be followed by a similar rise in pressure), 
and verifying the correct functioning of sensors. Taking account of temporal and 
relational patterns of cues is an operator search strategy that applies equally well to the 
interpretation of action outcomes. Due to limitations in time and resources, some 
assumptions may not be possible to test but this is not a sufficient reason to reject a 
conclusion. Operators should have several options to consider when an assessment rests 
on untested assumptions. 
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This brings up the second feature of viable plans with regard to their capacity to cope 
with untested assumptions, unsatisfied decision criteria and contingent events as the 
situation unfolds dynamically. When a diagnosis of the situation rests on untested 
assumptions, operators should acknowledge the risks in their current assessment but 
take corrective actions so that their plans do not depend upon these assumptions. 
Alternatively, they may develop contingency plans that specify how to counteract the 
risks arising from assumptions that have not been tested in the past. A similar approach 
can be taken for decision-making and planning where there is a residual cost of being 
wrong (e.g., certain goal tradeoffs and plan side-effects cannot be solved). In this sense, 
a viable plan should have some spare capacity to cope with unsatisfied decision criteria 
and plan side-effects at a later stage when such a risk may materialise. The spare 
capacity refers to the additional work involved in planning ahead of time about 
redundant human resources, standby equipment, and back-up means in cases of system 
failures. 
Finally, a viable plan should have a “modular structure” that would allow operators to 
make changes in one part of the plan without worrying how the changes affect the other 
parts. In the opposite side, an “integrative structure” may be efficient in optimising 
resources and costs but would increase the coupling or dependencies between tasks. 
Drawing an analogy with “tight coupling systems” (Perrow 1984), it is possible to 
specify some features of modular plans. In this respect, error detection and recovery 
may be supported when plans take into account of the following issues: 
 Identify alternative means of executing tasks and select those that do not affect 
performance of the following task. 
 Build barriers between tasks so that errors do not propagate to the next task, thus 
making the final symptom easier to detect and attribute to the failed task. 
 Delay performance of the second task until feedback from the first is available. 
Overall, the control mechanism of a viable plan is important for detecting and correcting 
errors in the interpretation of the situation whilst a modular structure and a spare 
capacity are more appropriate for criticising and correcting decisions and plans of 
action. Section 3.5 shows how the concept of viable plans can be incorporated into a 
dynamic event tree (DET) to model the recovery of cognitive errors. 
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3.5 Applying the methodology to risk analysis 
Since the underlying methodology aims at assisting safety or risk analysts in the 
qualitative analysis of cognitive reliability, human error prediction and analysis, it is 
necessary to simplify using it by drawing out the steps of applying this methodology to 
operational safety and risk analysis tasks. 
Fig.  3.5 illustrates the steps of applying the methodology on risk analysis by utilising 
the taxonomies and findings provided in this chapter. 
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Pro
task
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operation
Error Analysis
Analysis of external 
error modes (table 3.2)
Analysis of cognitive 
error causes (table 3.6)
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Fig.  3.5: Graphical representation of the methodology and steps of applying it to risk analysis 
The contribution of the underlying methodology to risk analysis can be summarised by 
two major points: 
1. Identifying cognitive error modes and error causes behind unsafe interventions (i.e., 
external error modes). Using the methodology to perform a task analysis and error 
analysis of operations can reveal several unsafe interventions that could be caused by 
delayed diagnosis, inefficient planning, wrong decisions, etc. 
88 
 
This first contribution to risk analysis is achieved by implementing the first three stages 
(refer to Fig.  3.5) of the methodology that can be applied upon examining human 
reliability within the framework of risk analysis. These three stages are: 
a. Task analysis of operator decision points, information needs to assess the situation, 
and detailed plans to achieve task goals. 
b. Error analysis which covers: 
 Analysis of external error modes; 
 Analysis of cognitive (internal) error modes; 
 Analysis of cognitive error causes. 
c. Performance analysis which covers: 
 Analysis of performance mechanisms; 
 Analysis of performance conditions such as, availability of plans (i.e., training 
and procedures), time window for response, decision criteria, goal tradeoffs, 
expertise, supervision and teamwork. 
2. Modelling paths of error modes and recovery opportunities as the situation unfolds 
dynamically and performance conditions change in the course of events (e.g., control 
panel information, additional tasks, and capability degrading factors). In other words, 
the cognitive error modes identified in task analysis and error analysis are modelled 
in terms of a dynamic cognitive event tree so that opportunities for error detection 
and recovery are explored in the context of specific scenarios. 
This second contribution to risk analysis is achieved by defining recovery plans and the 
producing dynamic event tree (DET), which combines error modes with opportunities 
for error recovery. This event tree consists of a tree representation of cognitive error 
modes and another tree of error recovery paths. Fig.  3.6 shows a tree representation of 
cognitive error modes identified through a process of task and error analysis in a generic 
scenario where operators try to respond to equipment failures. Unsafe interventions (i.e., 
wrong action or check) can be due to mistakes, slips or lapses; however, in order to 
keep the representation simple, slips and lapses are not shown here. The dotted paths 
with the designation “continued” refer to paths which can be further detailed or involve 
more tree branches. The continuation in these paths is not illustrated in Fig.  3.6 and the 
attention is paid to the outcome related to paths with “success” or “go to next tree” 
outcome (e.g., paths 1 and 2 in Fig.  3.6). 
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In principle, a dynamic event tree explores many points in time where operators 
alternate between understanding the problem (i.e., functional identification and 
diagnosis) and responding to the problem (i.e., decision-making and planning). The 
DETAM method (Gertman et al. 1996), for instance, explores all possible combinations 
of understanding and responding at set time intervals (e.g., every minute). To avoid the 
huge space of event trees that result from this approach, we focus only on some critical 
points in time where significant changes occur in understanding and responding to the 
problem. Safety analysts start with a list of credible errors in functional identification or 
diagnosis and try to find whether a “viable plan” can help operators recover their errors. 
A misdiagnosis or delayed diagnosis could be recovered when a correct functional 
diagnosis is made. For instance, operators may identify correctly the problem in 
functional terms (e.g., a gas leakage) but the diagnosis of the precise cause has to 
consider several possibilities (e.g., leakage location, leakage size, etc.). Fig.  3.6 
represents an example of delayed diagnosis that could be due to several error causes 
(e.g., missing correct explanations or performing an inefficient diagnostic test). A viable 
plan would enable operators to recover diagnostic errors before it is too late. For this to 
happen, the viable plan should have a control mechanism that continues to gather 
information without fixating on one hypothesis only. Path 5 shows a recovery route that 
is further explored in order to produce another dynamic tree for error detection and 
recovery (Fig.  3.7). A viable plan pays attention to additional recovery cues that form a 
meaningful pattern for diagnosis (box 6). These meaningful patterns might be utilised to 
re-diagnose and either yield a successful diagnosis (recovered one) or a wrong one that 
does not allow a recovery on time (path 15). In case of a correct recovered diagnosis, an 
ideal recovery can be achieved, if the available time window would allow operators to 
compensate with a proper response (paths 8, 9 and10). 
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interpretation
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4. Task planning 5. Interventions
Correct
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Delayed.
diagnosis
Inefficient goal
(continued)
Viable plan                                                  3
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Success
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Non-viable plan                                           4
Correct execution     1
Error modes            2
Viable plan                                                  5
Non-viable plan                                         6
Go to 
Next tree
Go to 
Next tree
Failure
Failure
(continued)
Wrong Functional Identification                                                                             7
Correct 
functional 
Identification
 
Fig.  3.6: A dynamic event tree of cognitive errors and viable plans  
The concept of “viable plans” can also be applied to goal selection and task planning. 
Plans that have a modular structure and a spare capacity for dealing with unsatisfied 
criteria and contingent events can enable operators to recover from errors (path 3 in Fig. 
 3.6). A spare plan capacity implies some form of pre-planning how to counteract side-
effects and exploit any opportunities available to change the direction of their solution. 
The last two decision nodes in boxes 9-10 (Fig.  3.7) address the issues of error 
correction and mitigation (see Section 3.4.6). Error correction may take the form of 
backward recovery or “undo” (path 8), forward recovery (path 9) and use of redundant 
equipment (path 10). Several mitigation policies (e.g., delaying the propagation of 
consequences, or limiting functions) can minimise error consequences even in cases that 
errors cannot be corrected in time (path 11). 
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Fig.  3.7: A dynamic event tree of error detection and recovery 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter a HF methodology for supporting risk analysis which takes the human 
behaviour and performance into consideration, i.e., human errors, has been introduced. 
It assists safety analysts in the qualitative analysis of cognitive reliability in process 
control tasks. The proposed methodology has four focal points: a causal model of 
operator behaviour, a HAZOP-like taxonomy of cognitive error modes and error causes, 
a dynamic representation of the interaction between work context and human behaviour, 
and a recovery model for detecting and correcting errors. 
In comparison to the conventional event trees and fault trees used in risk analysis, the 
underlying methodology provides an explicit way of modelling:  
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 How error modes arise out of the context of work (e.g., conflicting goals, multiple 
tasks, inadequate procedures). 
 How error modes are affected by previous decisions made by operators. 
 How consequences propagate throughput the system in the dynamic event tree. 
 What aspects of system complexity and coupling can reduce the available time and 
resources and, hence, hinder error recovery. 
The methodology was developed based on limitations of existing methodologies and 
provides a comprehensible tool for analysing human error in complex industries. It has 
been taken as a reference for identifying the VR functional requirements in the next 
chapter. However, it has not been validated in a formal risk analysis study yet due to 
difficulties at some envisaged industrial sites. The primary objective of the 
methodology has been to help safety analysts to examine how operator performance 
may change in the course of an accident scenario. For this reason, a dynamic event tree 
for error recovery has been suggested in Fig. ‎3.6. However, the methodology cannot 
generate estimates of time availability for error recovery because it does not include a 
model of plant behaviour and response. Other dynamic event trees (Acosta/Siu, 1993; 
Cojazzi/Cacciabue 1994) may overcome this specific problem but they are very 
demanding in time or resources and fall into another category of methodologies. 
Finally, error quantification has received limited attention in this methodology. It is 
understood, however, that expert judgment in quantification can benefit from an 
analysis of cognitive error causes and performance conditions where extrapolations of 
human error probabilities are made from simulator data and comparisons with other 
tasks. 
The underlying methodology has also other benefits, aside from supporting risk analysis 
work. For instance, it can be used to examine how the presentation of information on 
the control panel can provide valuable cues for error detection. The methodology can be 
also used to evaluate operating procedures. The application of performance mechanisms 
and performance conditions can help safety analysts to identify goal trade-offs, conflicts 
between procedural compliance and performance variations, weak points in traversing 
from one procedure to another, and difficulties in monitoring progress within particular 
goals. Special warnings and notes can be inserted in the procedures to provide more 
opportunities for error detection and recovery. Finally, the concept of viable plans can 
be applied to examine how to design robust operating procedures that allow operators to 
explore new ways of carrying out tasks provided that they made a correct functional 
identification of the problem.  
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In summary, this methodology has sought to enhance the communication between 
safety analysts and the cognitive science community in the analysis of human reliability 
in process control systems. A model of human performance was presented and cast in 
terms of HAZOP-like taxonomies of cognitive error modes and error causes. The 
methodology demonstrates also the difficulties in characterising operator‟s diagnosis or 
decision as erroneous in the first place, i.e., the safety analysts have to consider all 
possible error recovery opportunities to become confident that the operator‟s diagnosis 
or decision was faulty. New developments in HRA methods should continue to address 
more aspects of error explanation, error recovery and explore models of dependency 
that may threaten opportunities for recovery. 
A validation of the underlying methodology based on a real case study from the 
chemical process industry is presented in Chapter 6. The validation provides – among 
others – customised tables based on the taxonomies provided here, illustration of 
recovery paths using the dynamic event trees, possible risk and accident scenarios, 
influence of work context on the task under consideration, deficiencies in the 
operational procedures, etc. 
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4  
Functional VR 
requirements and 
specifications 
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This chapter provides the functional requirements and feature specifications for 
improving risk analysis work using a VR environment. The definition of these 
functional requirements is based on end user scenarios (requirements) from the research 
domain (chemical process industry) and applying the HF methodology developed in 
Chapter 3 to these end user requirements.  
4.1 Definitions 
Before moving into the process of extracting functional end user requirements, the 
following definitions should be introduced and aim at providing understanding of the 
remaining parts of this chapter. 
Functional requirements are “descriptions of the functionality delivered by software to 
its users” (Ebert/Dumke (2007), pp. 170). They provide information on the tasks and 
features of the software without detailing technical or quality requirements on its 
performance.  
Non functional requirements are criteria that can be used to judge the operation and 
performance of a system, e.g., usability, testability, maintainability, extensibility, 
scalability, etc. (Ludewig/Lichter 2007) 
Since the underlying thesis proposes a VR system layout (system design) which 
requires the definition of features and functionalities that should be considered in such a 
system, i.e., functional requirements, the focus here is on functional end user 
requirements as illustrated in this chapter. 
Based on the fact that running and operating the proposed system design are not goals 
of this thesis, the criteria for evaluating its performance or operation, i.e., non functional 
requirements, is not a point of focus here. Focusing on functional requirements has been 
also favoured by end users due to their need of solving a demanding problem without 
defining pre-requisites on system performance, its usability or similar aspects. 
4.2 The approach 
The term “approach” here refers to the steps that are applied to define VR functional 
requirements based on end user scenarios. These steps are: 
 Development of end user scenarios and requirements (Section 4.3); 
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 Applying the HF methodology developed in Chapter 3 to end user requirements: 
 Clustering the HF methodology (Section 4.4); 
 Definition of the functions covered by the clusters (Section 4.4); 
 Mapping end user requirements to the HF methodology (Section 4.5). 
 Identifying functional VR requirements (Section 4.6). 
Section 4.7 maps the identified functional VR requirements to technical features and 
modules as an intermediate step for the VR environment design (Chapter 5). Section 4.8 
provides a functional model that links these modules and describes the information flow 
among them. 
Fig.  4.1 illustrates these steps (the dark coloured boxes with bold text) based on an 
extraction from the integrated method presented in Chapter 1 (Fig. ‎1.2). 
Identify Functional VR Requirements 
Applying the HF Methodology to End User Requirements
Clustering the HF 
methodology (2 
clusters)
Definition of the 
functions covered by 
the clusters (4 
functions)
Mapping end user 
requirements to the 
HF methodology
Identify Technical Features and Modules
Propose VR Environment Design
Development of a HF Methodology for Supporting Risk Anaylsis
Development of End User Scenarios and Requirements
Definition of end user 
scenarios
Development of end user 
requirements
                   Validation
 
Fig.  4.1: The steps (dark boxes) of identifying VR functional requirements as part of the integrated 
method (Fig. ‎1.2) 
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4.3 Development of end user scenarios and requirements 
The development of end user scenarios as base for the definition of end user 
requirements took place within the framework of a multinational research project with 
the goal of improving safety at production plants and storage sites. In this regard, 
several workshops and interviews were carried out with end users (e.g., plant managers, 
safety analysts, plant engineers, shift supervisors, control room operators, field 
operators, etc.) from the research domain to identify typical safety scenarios. These 
safety scenarios are used as base for defining the end user requirements necessary for 
improving risk analysis. The interviewed persons have been asked about: 
 Scenario general information: scenario name, origin of scenario (industry), short 
summary on scenario. 
 A description of the problem that is being faced in the scenario and could be 
addressed by a VR solution. 
 The staff members who are primarily faced with the situation/problem, e.g., field 
operator, safety manager, production engineers, etc. 
 Description of the operational task(s) of the scenario, e.g., operation steps, involved 
plant items, available documentation, etc. 
 Description of safety challenges in the scenario, e.g., impact of a poor execution of 
the task, frequency of the scenario critical events (frequent or rare), consequences, 
etc. 
 Description of human factors related aspects in the scenario, e.g., human errors, error 
causes, performance conditions (work context), possibilities of error recovery, error 
consequences, etc. 
 Description of how VR could assist in addressing the problem, e.g., navigating in a 
3D scene to get familiar with plant objects, visualise and test properties of equipment 
to identify possible sources of risks, providing an interface for safety managers to 
introduce “virtual errors” in the scene, etc. 
The result of the scenario generation phase was a set of 21 applicable safety scenarios 
(Gounelle et al. 2007). 
In the second phase, the scenario details from the first phase have been used to 
formulate generic end user requirements, which have been considered as guidelines for 
applying the HF methodology (Section 4.4 and 4.5) and identifying the VR functional 
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requirements (Section 4.6). The result of this phase was a set of 19 end user 
requirements that have been classified into “requirements for modelling human error” or 
“requirements for modelling work context” and provided in Table  4.111. The scenarios 
and requirements have been reviewed and validated in further workshops as explained 
in Chapter 6. The list of requirements is not exhaustive, but indicates demanding 
requirements for improving risk analysis work in the domain industry as conceived by 
representatives of the domain industries during the scenario preparation and validation 
workshops. 
It is worth mentioning that an explicit formulation of human factors related aspects by 
end users was not possible at this stage as most of the interviewed end users have no 
human factors background. This effect is noticed in Table  4.1 by the inability to 
distinguish between technological requirements (i.e., VR related) and HF related 
requirements (from an end user point of view). To overcome this obstacle at this stage, 
the end users have been sensitised to the human factors aspect, that match the 
underlying scenario, e.g., work context that might positively affect the scenario, human 
errors in similar situations based on their experience, organisational factors that 
influence the scenario, environmental conditions accompanying the scenario (noise, 
snow, etc.), possibilities or error recovery, qualification and experience levels of 
operators involved in the scenario, etc. This sensitisation enabled an adequate inclusion 
of human factors at this early stage. In the next step (Section 4.4 and 4.5), a more 
structured reflection of human factors based on the developed methodology (Chapter 3) 
took place and provided more confidence of a better consideration of relevant human 
factors in these requirements.   
4.4 Clustering the HF methodology and‎definition‎of‎clusters’‎functions 
In this step, a clustering of the HF methodology (Chapter 3) in terms of its modelling 
nature and a definition of cluster‟s functions is carried out. This intermediate step aims 
at a structured inclusion of human factors in the end users requirements.  
The starting point here is the basic elements of the HF methodology which were 
introduced in Chapter 3 (Fig.  3.2). These are12: 
                                                 
11 To avoid duplication and provide them in categorised form, the end user requirements are listed only 
in Table  4.1 (Section 4.5). 
 
12 The remaining elements in Fig.  3.2 (unsafe intervention, consequences and system defences) represent 
actions and consequences of making a mistake, i.e., elements of a post-analysis (accident analysis) 
which is not the goal of the underlying research. 
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 Cognitive error causes; 
 Cognitive error modes; 
 Error recovery; 
 performance mechanisms; 
 Performance conditions. 
To facilitate the process of reflecting these five elements in the end user requirements, 
these elements have been assigned to two clusters: a cluster for modelling human error 
and a cluster for modelling work context. The cluster “modelling human errors” 
includes the elements that deal with the human error and its causes which are: cognitive 
error causes, cognitive error modes and error recovery. The second cluster “modelling 
performance context” deals with the interplay between workplace factors and human 
performance and includes performance mechanisms and performance conditions. 
Fig.  4.2 illustrates the two clusters and their elements. The direction of the arrows inside 
the cluster “modelling human error” refers to the information flow depicted in Fig.  3.2. 
In the cluster “modelling performance context”, the arrow refers to the interplay 
between performance conditions (work context) and human behaviour (performance 
mechanisms). The double sided arrow between the two clusters indicates the mutual 
impact of each cluster on the other, e.g., a human error would influence the performance 
context by proposing improvements in the work context and vice versa. 
Modelling Work Context
Performance conditions
Performance mechanisms
Modelling Human Error
Cognitive error 
causes
Cognitive error 
modes
Error recovery
 
Fig.  4.2: The interplay between the two clusters of the HF methodology (Salem 2008)  
Based on the predefined two clusters, the functions that are covered in each cluster are 
provided here (Salem 2008; Salem/Kontogiannis 2007): 
Cluster 1:  Modelling human errors, i.e., defining functions (later: functional VR 
requirements) for understanding and representing the human error. This cluster covers 
the following functions: 
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Functions for errors in identification and interpretation which are covered by the 
following sub-functions: 
 Familiarisation with plant layout and equipment design 
 Identification and prevention of hazards by means of barriers (plant hazards, site 
hazards, human hazards, etc.) 
Functions for errors in decision making and planning which are covered by the 
following sub-functions: 
 Prediction of how the plant responds to disturbances and the impact of multiple 
events 
 Identification and detection of errors and examination of  task variations and error 
shaping factors  
 Identification of error consequences 
 Recording of human response and performance 
Functions for error recovery which are covered by the following sub-functions: 
 Error management 
 Error correction 
Cluster 2:  Modelling work context, i.e., defining functions for understanding and 
representing the performance conditions and mechanisms that affect the human 
performance. This cluster covers the following functions: 
Functions for representing work constraints which are covered by the following sub-
functions: 
 Manipulation of  information and work constraints 
 Manipulation of  ambient conditions 
 Manipulation of team composition and interaction  
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4.5 Mapping end user requirements to the HF methodology 
To ensure that the end user requirements are being considered from a HF perspective 
and to provide a structured reflection of these requirements, a mapping of the predefined 
requirements (Section 4.3) to the clusters of the HF methodology (Section 4.4) is carried 
out. The mapping process is based on assigning each of the end users requirements to 
one of the four aforementioned functions of the HF methodology (i.e., the four groups 
of functions listed under the two clusters). The result of this mapping is provided in 
Table  4.1. 
4.6 Identifying functional VR requirements 
The only remaining step in the process of defining the functional VR requirements is to 
derive the VR support needed to represent the set of functions and sub-functions which 
have been defined in Section 4.4. This approach also ensures reflecting the end user 
requirements since they have been mapped to these functions as shown in Table  4.1.  
For the purpose of deriving these functional requirements, an information acquisition 
approach based on the following elements was applied: 
1. An analysis of some VR systems and tools regarding their technical features in 
supporting the predefined functions, sub-functions and consequently the end user 
requirements; 
2. Personal experience in VR environment design and scenario authoring; 
3. Literature reviews in similar areas of applications (Salem/Kontogiannis 2007), 
(Loupus et al. 2007a), (Loupus et al. 2007b), (Bell/Folger 1996), (Haller et al. 1999), 
(Marsot et al. 2004), (Villa-Uriol et al. 2005), (Schatrik et al. 2003), (Gabbard et al. 
1999). 
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Table  4.1: Mapping end user requirements to the HF methodology 
Cluster Function End user requirements 
M
o
d
el
li
n
g
 H
u
m
a
n
 E
rr
o
r 
1. Functions for errors in 
identification and 
interpretation 
2. Functions for errors in 
decision making and 
planning 
3. Functions for error 
recovery 
Req. 2: Improve existing Human Failure data and collections 
Req. 3: Allow industries and analysts to investigate events with 
extremely low likelihoods of occurrence  
Req. 4: Integrate equipment and human failures, and subsequently 
quantify failure probabilities 
Req. 5: Identify Operator Failure modes and responsiveness, such as 
time to act, assessment of decisional factors and influencing factors  
Req. 6: Identify the chain events that can lead to operator failures 
Req. 8: Examine whether an undesirable event can be stopped either 
by certain safety barriers or by human intervention including error 
detection and correction 
Req. 9: Represent official operating procedures and distinguish 
between permissible deviations and critical human errors 
Req. 11: Record, discuss and test - in an experimental facility - 
assumptions about human performance in certain conditions 
Req. 14: Provide estimates on parameters that only exist as an 
assumption and validate these estimates in the VR environment based 
on real operating situations 
Req. 16: Collect data about delays that may lead to crucial factors 
(e.g., pressing the emergency shutdown button when it is too late) 
Req. 17: Collect data about several types of human error related to 
different tasks (e.g., forgetting to test the reliability of gas detectors, 
starting the detection process from an inappropriate location, etc.); 
M
o
d
el
li
n
g
 W
o
rk
 C
o
n
te
x
t 
4. Functions for 
representing work 
constraints 
Req. 1: Postulate hazards and incidents in different positions around a 
plant using a virtual environment with suitable task representations 
Req. 7: Integrate Risk Analysis methods and allow transfer of data 
about tasks, human errors and organisational factors 
Req. 10: Stimulate discussions between safety analysts (by means of 
virtual interactive meetings and discussions), training officers and 
operators on how to get a “feel” of the reliability of their assumptions 
Req. 12: Assess the combined effects of workplace & organisational 
factors in the risk assessment process 
Req. 13: Provide real-time approximate dynamic simulations of toxic 
dispersion, fire etc. for the operator to interact with (This creates a 
real-time dynamic response from the operator-process system and can 
drive the decision for further/different studies); 
Req. 15: Provide feedback for improving operational procedures 
Req. 18: Examine how the context of work affects human response 
and error probabilities.  For this purpose, the same task can be carried 
out under different conditions (e.g., weather conditions, one or two 
field operators, easy vs. difficult access, etc.) 
Req. 19: Develop measures to reduce the overall risk by means of 
task and team changes.  For instance, tasks can be tried out in 
different sequences or assigned to two or more operators in order to 
examine whether the overall risk is reduced. 
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Table  4.2 lists the functional VR requirements which can be further used as a base for a 
VR environment design. The list is not exhaustive but provides a set of 57 major 
functionalities that have been classified by end users as fundamental for supporting the 
risk analysis work in a VR environment under the consideration of non-negligible 
human factors aspects. 
The provided list can be seen as a checklist for a VR system design in the target 
industry, i.e., guideline for functional software design. Since such a list can be further 
extended to include arising needs, e.g., due to plant‟s design changes or operational 
process modifications, the software design should enable adding new features to reflect 
the real setting with higher degree of completeness. 
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Table  4.2: Functional VR requirements 
Cluster Function Sub-Function Functional VR requirements 
M
o
d
el
li
n
g
 H
u
m
a
n
 E
rr
o
r 
Functions for 
errors in 
identification and 
interpretation 
Familiarisation with 
plant layout and 
equipment design 
1. Navigating  in a 3D plant scene and 
superimposing on it a section of a  Pipes 
and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) 
(e.g., walk-through) 
2. Visualising and navigating inside the 
hardware components (walk-through, 
changes of view point, camera movement, 
etc.) 
3. View a hierarchical decomposition of the 
plant in terms of units and equipment and 
Present virtual menus to search for 
equipment that its location is difficult to 
find 
4. View geographical layout of  units and 
equipment as well as all emergency exits 
and assembly points 
5. Present virtual labels on equipment with 
appropriate information (e.g., name, 
purpose of use, constrains in use, etc) 
6. Visualising and testing the properties of 
equipment to  identify possible sources of 
accidents and eliminate unsafe operations 
or disassembly methods (e.g., 
hide/unhide) 
7. Visualising pipelines and vessels 
(inside/outside) and extracting/calculating 
necessary parameters (e.g., volume, 
inventory, viscosity, etc) 
8. Validating safety procedures by inserting 
virtual components inside the real plant 
(Augmented Reality) and testing whether 
the adopted plant design suits the desired 
safety requirements 
9. Detecting and controlling sources of fire 
and explosion (e.g., sparks, frictions, high 
temperature surfaces) by means of object 
selection, setting transparencies, 
highlighting high-temperature surfaces, 
etc. 
Identification and 
prevention of hazards 
by means of barriers 
(plant hazards, site 
hazards, human 
hazards, etc.) 
10. Presenting a catalogue of physical barriers 
to try-out in order to prevent or neutralise 
hazards.  
11. Displaying the consequences of physical 
barriers both in real-time and in a fast-
forward mode.   
12. Simulating distressing  environmental 
conditions and input variations to examine 
how robust a physical barrier may be (e.g., 
corrosion, heat stress,  etc)   
13. Examining how difficult it is to inspect 
physical barriers and carry out 
maintenance activities to keep them 
functional.   
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14. Examining cases of inappropriate use of 
barriers where the barrier is used rather 
late, or in the wrong way. 
15. Linking the VR scene with the dynamic 
process simulator to provide additional 
information about the behaviour of the 
plant in normal conditions as well as the 
response of the plant to abnormal events. 
Functions for 
errors in decision 
making and 
planning 
Prediction of how the 
plant responds to 
disturbances and the 
impact of multiple 
events 
 
16. Visualising and navigating inside the plant 
components 
17. Creating and saving animations of single 
events and multiple events that can causes 
disturbances, e.g., a set of pointers and 
connections on the equipment affected by 
the disturbance, a set of pointers to 
indicate the sequence of  the propagation 
of event, a virtual menu that contrasts the 
effects of two or more events in terms of a 
set of common and different process 
parameters 
18. Using overlays or transparencies so that 
the effect of one event is superimposed on 
the effects of previous events, e.g., display 
all  affected equipment in a highlighted or 
flashing mode, hide all items apart from 
the affected equipment, etc. 
19. Coupling the VR environment with 
available simulators (process simulator, 
training simulator, etc.) 
20. Enabling “what if” scenarios and a visual 
distinction of different event outcomes in 
order to check whether expectations match 
with reality 
21. Visualising clouds of hazardous 
substances and changes in dispersion 
influenced by wind and rain 
22. Identifying possible escalation scenarios 
when a hazardous material approaches any 
ignition sources (collision-detection) 
Identification and 
detection of errors / 
Examination of  task 
variations and error 
shaping factors  
 
23. Allowing a 3D visualisation of possible 
error shaping factors (e.g., ineffective 
barriers, faulty equipment, difficult access, 
etc) 
24. Interactive exercises on possible error-
shaping factors and erroneous actions 
25. Using animations of mal-practices and 
asking operators to detect errors 
26. Allowing task variations to occur from 
pre-defined procedures and visualising 
their effects 
Identification of error 
consequences 
27. Visualising the propagation of the effects 
of human errors and equipment failures on 
the whole plant 
28. Increasing or switching the Field Of View 
of operators so that they oversee the work 
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of their colleagues and correct errors 
29. Assessing different human responses by 
online visual comparisons of their system 
consequences 
30. Providing an interface for safety managers 
to introduce “virtual errors” (e.g., false job 
card, work interruptions) and ask 
operators to correct them 
Recording of human 
response and 
performance 
31. Measuring and logging human responses 
in executing tasks, e.g., by a time-limited 
execution of a task or a scenario 
32. Measuring and logging human responses 
in discovering errors, e.g., by a time-
limited execution of a test 
33. Recording average error frequencies and 
operator response times for critical 
procedural steps to validate historical data 
(or provide data for risk analysis, if 
historical data is not available) 
34. Measuring qualitative aspects of human 
performance based on fulfilled criteria, 
e.g., response time, number of successful 
checks, frequency of constraints' 
violations, number of unnecessary actions, 
etc. 
Functions for 
error recovery 
Error management 35. Visualising and testing error consequences 
by safety managers or risk analysts 
36. Providing a monitoring interface for safety 
managers to “manipulate” virtual errors 
and ask operators to correct them 
37. Trying several safety barriers to minimise 
the impact of human error (machines‟ 
layout, safety procedure changes, 
workflow changes, etc.) 
38. Examining dependencies between human 
behaviour and use of barriers (e.g., 
barriers are not used properly or not used 
at all) 
Error correction 39. Setting up the surrounding conditions to 
allow for error correction (undo effect for 
assembly operations)  
40. Displaying proper warning notes (alarms) 
before executing critical task steps 
41. Allowing/restricting facilities for 
backtracking to previous steps in the 
scenario 
42. Mark plant information that was not 
consulted by the operator in error which 
could have assisted in the detection 
process. 
43. Insert icons of information on specific 
equipment that could have prevented an 
error if an actual instrument had been 
installed earlier in the plant 
44. Explore whether an operator can UNDO 
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an action and return to the previous 
system state or, at least, to another state 
that is temporarily safe. 
45. Explore how operators could delay the 
propagation of an effect that cannot be 
undone. 
46. Explore how operators could 
moderate/attenuate  the adverse effects of 
an erroneous action 
M
o
d
el
li
n
g
 W
o
rk
 C
o
n
te
x
t 
Functions for 
representing 
work constraints 
Manipulation of  
information and work 
constraints 
 
47. Providing unavailable information (e.g., 
invisible gauge, hidden indicators, etc.) or 
non-measurable information (e.g., friction, 
gravity, wind speed, etc.)  
48. Experimenting with additional 
information that is usually not available at 
work in order to evaluate the extent to 
which human errors could be prevented or 
recovered on time 
49. Simulating several constraints at the 
workplace and their impact on human 
response and performance (e.g., lack of 
tools, lack of procedures, difficult access 
to equipment, etc) 
50. Presenting operational procedures and 
checklists and linking them to the VR 
environment 
Manipulation of  
ambient conditions 
 
51. Providing audio effects to simulate real 
operational environment (e.g., noise, 
alarm, communication disturbance) 
52. Manipulating weather conditions (such as 
smoke, smells of ordure, rain, wind, snow, 
hot/cold weather, etc) 
53. Simulating operation and response under 
extreme conditions (e.g., fire, explosion, 
gas dispersion, etc.) 
Manipulation of team 
composition and 
interaction  
 
54. Displaying parameters together that 
cannot be observed at work from the same 
position in order to increase the “Field Of 
View” of team members and allow them 
to oversee others.   
55. Automating or speeding-up certain tasks 
so that the team members devote attention 
how to organise tasks rather than how to 
perform tasks.   
56. Showing panoramic views of the scenario, 
e.g., the layout of safety equipment, the 
distribution of persons to the plant site, the 
location of the rescue teams etc.  
57. Monitoring task progress by means of an 
overview of tasks that have been 
accomplished, interrupted or assigned to 
other colleagues. 
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4.7 Mapping VR functional requirements to technical feature groups 
In Section 4.6 a set of 57 functional VR requirements (functionalities) has been 
identified. They were classified into eleven groups of functional features (third column 
in Table  4.2). To propose a VR environment design that supports these functionalities 
(Chapter 5), it is necessary to map them to abstract groups of technical features to 
extract the technical capabilities of the VR environment based on these abstract 
features. Fig.  4.3 illustrates this intermediate stage (dark coloured box with bold text 
inside it) as part of the integrated method developed in this thesis. 
Identify Functional VR Requirements 
Applying the HF Methodology to End User Requirements
Identify Technical Features and Modules
Propose VR Environment Design
Development of a HF Methodology for Supporting Risk Anaylsis
Development of End User Scenarios and Requirements
                   Validation
Map functional VR requirements 
to technical feature groups
Identify modules Functional model
 
Fig.  4.3: The steps (dark boxes) of Identifying technical features and modules within the integrated 
method (Fig. ‎1.2) 
Table  4.3 provides an overview of the technical feature groups and the modules of the 
proposed VR design. In the first column, the eleven groups of functional features 
obtained from the previous step (Section 4.6, third column of Table  4.2) have been 
listed. In the second column, these functional features have been mapped to the groups 
of technical features. The groups of technical feature represent a translation of 
functional descriptions into technical ones to facilitate assigning the VR component 
(third column) to the functional feature groups.  The third column lists the part (module) 
of the proposed VR design that targets these groups. 
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Section 4.8 describes the functional model that links the modules of the proposed VR 
design and the information flow among these modules. Chapter 5 provides descriptions 
of the modules together with the technical features supported by each module. 
Table  4.3: Groups of technical features and VR support 
Functional feature group 
(third column in Table  4.2) 
(WHAT) 
Technical feature group                                 
 
(HOW) 
Module of the proposed 
VR design 
(WHICH tool) 
Prediction of how the plant 
responds to disturbances and the 
impact of multiple events 
Enrichment of the VR 
environment with simulations, 
i.e., dynamic simulations on plant 
and process behaviour, process 
and control room simulators, etc. 
Process Dynamics 
Module 
Manipulation of team 
composition and interaction  
Considering of team work in the 
VR environment, i.e., 
collaborative environments 
Core-Client Architecture 
Familiarisation with plant layout 
and equipment design 
Identification and prevention of 
hazards by means of barriers 
(plant hazards, site hazards, 
human hazards, etc.) 
Supporting 3D visualisation, i.e., 
navigation, interaction, 
manipulating objects and their 
attributes (pressure, temperature, 
valve status, etc.), etc. 
Core-Client Architecture 
(runtime phase) 
Authoring Module 
Recording of human response 
and performance 
Error management 
Error correction 
Identification of error 
consequences 
Error identification and 
detection / Examination of  task 
variations/ error shaping factors  
Awareness of HF in the VR 
environment, i.e., representation 
of tasks, supporting human error 
detection, error recovery, error 
modes, etc. 
Event Based Module 
Logging Module 
Analysis Module 
Manipulation of  ambient 
conditions 
Supporting environmental 
conditions, i.e., day/night 
conditions, weather conditions, 
etc. 
Authoring Module 
Core-Client Architecture 
Manipulation of  information 
and work constraints 
Supporting work context, i.e., 
sound, noise, communication, etc. 
Authoring Module 
Core-Client Architecture 
4.8 The functional model 
Before concluding this chapter, an illustration of the functional model that links the 
aforementioned technical components and modules should be provided. This model 
aims at introducing the functional information flow upon using the listed VR 
components and modules (Table  4.3) to run a scenario or an experiment. 
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The functional model is explained based on the following typical problem13 from the 
target industry: 
Problem: 
 For a particular operational task, the safety analyst (or risk assessor) needs data and 
information on human behaviour (e.g., under different weather conditions, in case of 
fire, etc.), response times (e.g., in case of gas leakage detection), time to complete a 
certain task or part of it, error causes, error modes, error recovery (undo), etc. for 
completing the risk analysis work. 
 The required data and information usually do not exist (e.g., because similar 
situations did not happen in the past, available data were obtained before process and 
operation modifications, new staff with specialised qualifications have been hired, 
changes in work conditions). 
Solution: 
The safety analyst uses the VR environment to obtain the required information. 
Information flow: 
 The safety analyst prepares (or adapts it, if a similar one exists) the scenario - e.g., 
gas leakage scenario, fire fighting scenario, pipe maintenance scenario, etc. - that 
corresponds to the information he is looking for with all its initial conditions 
(weather, barriers, escalation of situation, etc.). This step is achieved using the 
authoring module. 
 A safety analyst asks operators to run the VR scenario and perform the assigned 
task(s) as they normally do in reality. While running the scenario (experimenting), 
the main VR application communicates with the process dynamics module and event 
based module to get experiment relevant data. 
 Operators' actions and reactions during the virtual experiment are logged into log-
files. This step is achieved via the logging module. 
 Operators complete running the scenario and stop when finishing. 
                                                 
13 The formulation of other problems or imaginary scenarios is possible and should lead to the same 
result, i.e., to illustrate the links among the components of the VR environment and the information 
flow. 
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 Once the data is logged, safety analyst can start analysing the data and storing the 
results into a database for accessing and querying it. This step is achieved via the 
analysis module. 
The functional model is illustrated in Fig.  4.4. An explanation of the components of this 
model is provided in Chapter 5. 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter introduced the functional requirements for supporting the performance of 
risk analysis in a VR environment. The definition of these requirements took into 
consideration a set of end user needs that have been derived during field work on 
industrial sites, interviews and workshops with safety experts from the chemical process 
industry. The HF methodology, which was developed in Chapter 3, was also applied 
here to make sure that the HF dimension is also well covered within these functional 
requirements. Chapter 5 moulds these functional requirements and specifications into a 
VR environment design. 
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Fig.  4.4: Functional model that links the VR components and modules 
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It has been mentioned in Chapter 1 that in the underlying thesis, VR is considered as a 
bridge (representation medium) for bringing together the three key components that 
influence safety within the framework of this thesis: industrial needs (end user needs), 
risk analysis and human factors. This perception of VR contributes to enhancing its 
usability as an enabling technology for solving problems with high industrial and social 
impacts. This usability has been moulded into set of functional requirements and 
specifications as retrieved from field observations, i.e., application-oriented and end-
user driven (Chapter 4) mapped to a HF methodology for improving risk analysis 
(Chapter 3). 
These findings are used in this chapter to propose a VR environment design for 
supporting risk analysis work. Since the proposed VR environment design resembles 
standard VR systems in its core functionalities, it is not considered as unique from this 
point of view. However, it offers uniqueness from another perspective, which is the end 
user- and application-oriented nature, i.e., it focuses on the needs of the target industry 
(chemical process industry) and the challenges faced by the end users employed within 
these industries. This aspect has been achieved by integrating specific modules in the 
proposed design which is necessary to compensate for one of the major limitations in 
VR tools and applications, i.e., their usability and ability to solve end user problems as 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
5.1 Architecture of the VR environment 
The proposed architecture is based on the typical rendering process (pipeline) which 
consists of the three steps “application, cull & draw14” for scene generation (cf. Martz 
2007, pp. 16 et seq.). The steps are normally put in a continuous iterative cycle, which 
produces a rendered image (one frame) per iteration. Furthermore, the proposed 
architecture has been designed to be: 
 Scalable and ready for future evolution which is necessary as the complexity of 
applications might increase and new features are needed to cope with this 
complexity. 
                                                 
14 APPlication: updating the scene (geometries, location and orientation), CULL: determines which 
geometries in the scene are visible, DRAW: rendering all visible geometries. 
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 Modular by having design modules that are separate and independent from the core 
system to allow a more effective implementation and a better performance upon 
running the application since necessary modules are only loaded. 
The VR environment design is based on two building units as shown in Fig.  5.1 (Salem 
2008; Loupos et al. 2008a; Loupos et al. 2008b): 
1. The main VR application: provides the visualisation and interactivity features (i.e., 
the rendering process “application, cull and draw”). The main VR application is 
decomposed into: 
 Core system: the core part of the system, which processes all the requests that 
have an impact on the scene graph, i.e., in charge of the “application” step in the 
typical rendering process; 
 Client system: the part in charge of preparing the scene and actually drawing it, 
to produce the output frame, i.e., responsible for the “cull” and “draw” steps in 
the typical rendering process. 
2. External Modules: necessary to support creating, modifying and running a scenario 
with all its specifications and surrounding elements. These modules are necessary to 
cover all functions that belong to a scenario which are outside the rendering process 
“application, cull and draw”. These modules are introduced later in this chapter and 
are: authoring module, process dynamics module, event based module, logging 
module and analysis module. 
External Mdoules
Authoring Module
Process Dynamics Module
Event Based Module
Logging Module
Anaylsis Module
Main VR Application
Core System
Client System
VR Environment
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Fig.  5.1: Architecture of the proposed VR environment 
The proposed architecture utilises the plug-in architecture pattern, i.e., external modules 
can be developed and maintained without expanding the main VR application to cover 
evolving requirements (Mayer et al. 2003). Furthermore, the external modules can be 
installed as individual components or an entire set of components depending on the 
intended use of the system without influencing the installation of the main VR 
application. 
Compared to standard VR systems which typically consist of the core-client 
components, a content creation interface (authoring) and an information-logging 
component, the underlying architecture provides customised modules for supporting the 
predefined functionalities and features. These customised modules are the process 
dynamics module, the event based module and the analysis module. Descriptions of 
these modules, their supported functions and features and links to other modules are 
provided later in this chapter. 
The authoring and logging modules proposed here provide similar functionalities to 
those supported by standard VR systems. However the logging module is presented here 
as a component that records all interactions for further analysis (e.g., in the analysis 
module) and replaying the scenario which is not the case in many VR systems, as they 
only record user input and system alerts in a log-file for error tracking or debugging.  
It is worth mentioning that the proposed system architecture provides high level design 
guidelines and descriptions of the required components to ensure a consideration of the 
predefined functional requirements. Implementing this architecture requires further 
technical details which are not provided here as they do not belong to the goals of the 
underlying thesis.  
5.2 Core system 
The core system is a program which is in charge of handling the greatest part of the 
“application” step in the rendering process. It takes care of updating objects‟ positions 
and states, it processes user actions and input from external devices (tracking devices, 
mouse, joystick, keyboard, etc.) and it keeps all the state attributes up to date. The core 
system does not invoke any image rendering; it has a main cycle in which each iteration 
processes all the received input and updates the scene, but it does not produce an output 
frame. It has a copy of the scene graph in memory; this is needed to update positions, 
compute interactions and prepare for next steps. Since the core system does not draw an 
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image, the actual geometry (triangles) and the material information are not used inside 
it. This information is used in the client system, which is in charge of the “cull and 
draw” steps. 
The core system processes all the requests that have an impact on the scene graph: 
tracking devices, collision detection, interactions that may impact how an object is 
displayed, etc. and communicates to the client system all the modifications that occur to 
the scene graph. 
The core system is composed of “state module”, “task module” and “log module” which 
are in charge of handling specific parts of the scene update step as shown in the next 
subsections. 
5.2.1 State Module 
The state module is the central module in the core system which is responsible for the 
administration of the entire scenario and keeping all scene information up to date. The 
whole core system behaves like a state machine in which the “state module” manages 
the state attributes of this machine. The following is a list of functionalities assigned to 
the state module: 
 It reads/modifies state attributes15. 
 It controls when a state changes and reacts accordingly, e.g., to detect when a given 
object has to move (due to some user action like pushing a button or moving a piece 
of equipment). To achieve that, it constantly queries model components to know 
when they need to change state (based on their predefined behaviour). 
 It controls and modifies the local copy of the scene graph based on actions and 
events to be executed. It also computes collision detection (used also by the actor 
module as described later). 
 It communicates to the scene module of the client system all the changes in the state 
that affect the scene. 
 It accesses model and state data (attributes) of each component by communicating 
with the modules in charge of delivering and maintaining these data, i.e., the 
                                                 
15
 State attributes are attributes that describe the current state of an object, e.g., valve status (open/close), 
pipe temperature (high/middle/low), gas pressure (high/middle/low), etc. 
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component library as provider of model data and the external modules (e.g., process 
dynamics module, event based module) as providers of state data. 
5.2.2 Task Module 
This component is in charge of monitoring the execution of a task - in cooperation with 
the event based module - which requires the ability to detect when a given action 
occurs. To illustrate the concept of task module, the following instruction “place gas 
detector over the valve”, which is part of the task “gas leakage detection” can be taken 
as an example. The task module checks that a given user is executing the “gas leakage 
detection” task and it knows that the next step should be “place gas detector over the 
valve”. Based on that, the task module constantly monitors the objects involved in this 
instruction, namely the “gas detector” and the “valve”. 
At some point, the user will move the “gas detector” and put it over16 the “valve” which 
is detected by the task module as the time point for casting a message that confirms the 
correctness of performing this step. In a similar manner, the task module has the key 
role of applying the logic behind each task step for the entire scenario in order to 
understand and confirm when a given action occurs. The task module embeds a task 
tracker that assists in monitoring the completion of a task by the proposed actor and 
logging relevant task information to the log module, e.g., duration of task steps, user 
interactions during running the task, response times, etc. 
5.2.3 Log Module 
The log module is in charge of processing all requests from the various modules to log 
information. The log module receives from the components of the core system requests 
for logging information and routes them to the recorder of the external logging module 
(Section 5.4.4) to record or skip the logging request. 
A typical log request from the core system consists of asking the system to write all the 
state changes for the plant elements – caused either by an actor or by some internal 
action – so to analyse them later. 
                                                 
16
 Since the term “over” would be confusing, it can be imagined that when the vertical axis of the “gas 
detector” is aligned with the vertical axis of the “valve” with a pre-defined minimum vertical 
translation, the system accepts that as “being over”.  
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Fig.  5.2 shows the architecture17 of the core system. The elements “External Modules”, 
“Component Library” and “Task File” are not components of the core system, but 
provide input to its components. These elements are explained in the upcoming 
sections. 
Task MdouleState Module Log Module
SceneGraph
Core System
[log] [log]
Component Library
[use]
Task File
<<artifact>>
[use]
External Mdoules
[use]
 
Fig.  5.2: Architecture (component diagram) of the core system 
5.3 Client system 
The client system is the part in charge of handling the “cull” and “draw” steps of the 
rendering pipeline. It has a main cycle which produces one rendered image (one frame) 
per iteration. 
The client system is in charge of preparing the scene and drawing it to produce the 
output frame. It has a copy of the scene graph in memory, which is synchronised with 
the main one managed by the core system via updates received from the core system 
itself. The client system receives updates from the core system concerning 
modifications to the scene graph, it processes them and stores them to the local copy of 
the scene graph and proceeds to drawing the frame. Therefore, before drawing a frame it 
                                                 
17
 The architecture diagrams introduced in this Chapter have been produced using the tool StarUML 
version 5.0.2. This tool is based on UML 1.5 and accepts UML 2.0 notation. [StarUML 2009] 
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applies all the changes sent by the core system which is necessary to complete the 
“application” step mentioned above. The “cull” and “draw” steps are handled 
completely in the client system. The client system is also in charge of producing output 
other than the images, e.g., sound, noise, tactile feedback based on input from sensory 
devices, etc. 
It should be mentioned here that it is possible to have more than one client system 
running on different machines (e.g., for multi-display systems). The simplest hardware 
configuration would be to have the core and client systems running on the same 
machine. 
5.3.1 Scene Module 
The scene module is in charge of updating all the data so that a scene can be drawn, 
which includes updating positions, materials, textures, environment, etc. based on the 
input received from the state module. The scene module updates the scene objects by 
accessing the model data stored in the component library. This module is also in charge 
of audio rendering, i.e., reproducing the needed sounds according to the current 
conditions. 
5.3.2 Actor Module 
The actor module controls and updates all the information related to the actor18 while 
running a scenario. This information ranges from the user profile, user roles up to 
his/her visual representation (position, orientation, collision, etc.). In particular, the 
actor module is in charge of: 
 Managing interaction devices connected to the actor (for example a tracker placed on 
a user‟s hand) and accordingly updating the actor position. 
 Checking if the actor (or a part of it) is colliding with any object in the scene. The 
actor module facilitates differentiating between colliding directly with a plant 
element and collision that is mediated for example by a tool, i.e., placing a screw 
driver on a bolt or similar. 
                                                 
18
 An actor is a player who can act (perform operations) in the VR environment. An actor can be a real 
user interacting with the VR environment via tracking devices or a fully virtual character.  
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 Notifying the core system (and in particular the state module) when actions occur, 
using the proper messages. 
 Driving the system through the execution of a given task (which consists in a series 
of operations that have to be performed on the plant). For example it can raise alerts 
when an actor does not perform correctly a task. For this purpose, the actor module 
works in cooperation with the task module which was presented in Section 5.2.2. 
It is worth mentioning that since actors are handled independently from each other by 
the actor module, the task module is responsible for managing situations where more 
than one actor are interacting with the scene. 
5.3.3 Log Module  
The log module here has a similar function to the one of the core system, i.e., processes 
all requests from the various modules to log information. The log module receives from 
the components of the client system requests for logging information and routes them to 
the recorder of the external logging module (Section 5.4.4) to record or skip the logging 
request. 
A typical log request from the client system would be asking the system to write the 
current user position and time value to disk, so that a reconstruction of the path walked 
by the user is possible. Another request would be to log the time that elapses between 
receiving an alarm signal and taking the proper action, which can be further used for 
extracting response time.  
5.3.4 Component library 
The component library is a building block that can be used or accessed by either the 
core or the client system and considered as a shared or common module. It is a library 
of components which lists all the elements that can be used to create a full plant model. 
Each component in the library is linked to a component model that provides the 
following information about the component itself: 
 Properties to describe the geometry and the link to piping and instrumentation  
diagram; 
 A series of specific attributes and all their possible values (called “states”). For 
example a “switch” object has a “Status” attribute which can have two states only: 
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ON or OFF. A “valve” can have an “Open” attribute which is a continuous set of 
values between 0 and 1 or represented as a discrete set of five possible values (for 
example): 0% (closed), 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% (fully open); 
 The rules which determine the behaviour of the component, e.g., Valve “Xvlave” can 
only rotate around its Y axis. When asked to do so, a component can update its 
information based on its behaviour. 
The information about the plant model and the components listed in the component 
library are mainly accessed by the state and scene modules. The accessed information is 
designated as “model data” and normally stored in a specific file format that can be 
interpreted by other modules (e.g., authoring module to modify a scenario). In this 
context, “model data” is the complete information needed to describe a plant model and 
its properties including environmental data, e.g., lightening conditions, weather effects 
(snow, rain, wind, etc), noise. 
Fig.  5.3 shows the architecture of the client system. The element “Actor Input” refers to 
user‟s interactions while running a scenario as explained in Section 5.3.2 (actor 
module). 
Log Module
SceneGraph
[log]
Component Library
[use]
Actor Module
Actor Input
<<artifact>>
Client System
Scene Module
[use]
[log]
 
Fig.  5.3: Architecture (component diagram) of the client system 
Fig.  5.4 illustrates the links among core system, client system and the external modules 
(external modules are explained in the next section). 
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Fig.  5.4: The core and client systems and their links to the external modules 
5.4 External modules  
External modules are important elements that provide functions19 that do not belong to 
those covered by the core and client systems. These elements can run on separate 
machines and communicate with the core and client system using a network protocol. 
This modular structure which can be extended over time represents one of the major 
features of the proposed VR environment design. 
Some functions that are covered by external modules (based on the functional 
requirements provided in Chapter 4) include: 
 Authoring and configuration functions for scenario preparation and configuration 
(Authoring Module); 
 Linking the VR environment process simulator to ensure a reflection of process 
dynamics within the VR scenarios (Process Dynamics Module); 
                                                 
19
 These functions can be described as non-visualisation functions which are not covered by the core-
client components. 
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 Monitoring the execution of procedures and rules of plant-specific behaviour (Event 
Based Module); 
 Logging (recording) events and messages for replaying scenarios or post-analysis 
(Logging Module); 
 A module for analysing the logged results and extracting the data that can be used by 
HF and safety experts (Analysis Module). 
The next sections provide more descriptions on these modules supported by 
architectural diagrams of each module. 
5.4.1 Authoring module 
The goal of the authoring and configuration module is to provide an environment for 
creating and modifying the VR scenarios by target users. The authoring and 
configuration module enables performing two main functions: 
 Configure the 3D content of the virtual environment, i.e., plant components, objects, 
geometries, materials, textures, etc. (visual appearance). 
 Configure the content of the scenarios that are running in the VR system, i.e., 
scenario steps, initial conditions, parameters, properties, etc. (scenario content). 
The authoring module is mainly used by the persons who are responsible of creating 
and editing scenarios and not by those who run these scenarios. The term “scenario 
authors” could be used here to indicate the group of person who create and edit 
scenarios. It should be emphasised here that scenario authors are not computer 
specialists or programmers. The authors of a scenario could be also users of the 
scenarios. A scenario author in the target industry, i.e., chemical process industry, could 
be: 
 Safety manager who is about to improve the safety plan of the plant. 
 Trainer who is about to design a new training course on a certain procedure and then 
develop this scenario using the authoring module. 
 An experienced technician, who knows the details of the machine and how it can be 
operated, disassembled or maintained. 
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 An accident investigator who is about to build the collected field data inside the VR 
environment and produce an “accident investigation scenario”. 
 A safety analyst, process engineer, etc. 
Preparing data and scenario authoring involves several aspects: 
 Handling 3D geometry and the related materials or textures; 
 Setting initial values and conditions for all the parameters that affect the scenario 
once it runs. 
The result from the authoring module is a scene file which can be directly loaded by the 
client system and viewed. This scene file is enriched with specific procedures that are 
executed in a VR experiment (i.e., a maintenance procedure, an operational procedure 
for doing a certain job, etc.), environmental conditions and other components which 
comprise together a safety scenario. 
Fig.  5.5 provides the architectural layout of the authoring module which consists of the 
following layers: 
 View Editor: for displaying the plant items and components as individual 3D models 
for further processing. This enables manipulating these objects, i.e., translation, 
scaling and rotating them in the viewport. The camera can be moved through the 
plant using the viewport, to get the optimal viewpoint and save it as a favourite 
viewpoint. 
 Model Editor: for importing, editing and deleting model libraries. The hierarchy of 
the scene's objects can be also created or updated in this layer. 
 Property Editor: for setting, modifying and displaying the properties assigned to each 
component of the scene. The properties need to be set and changed to correspond to 
the desired state and appearance of the plant components under certain conditions, 
i.e., increased temperature, opened valve, a switched-on pump, etc. 
An additional element that can support authoring functions is the “P&ID Wizard20”. It 
supports translating the P&ID diagrams into a 3D representation which can be further 
used in the authoring module. 
                                                 
20
 The “P&ID Wizard” is an optional external component and will not be further introduced due to lack 
of information and APIs on translating P&ID into 3D modelling data. A recommendation for future 
work on P&ID is provided under “future work” in Chapter 7.  
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Fig.  5.5: Architecture (component diagram) of the authoring module  
5.4.2 Event based module 
The goal of this module21 is to respond in predefined ways when certain conditions 
occur. To perform this function, the event based module has to manage two sets of 
internal data: 
1. A set of attributes that represents the parameters to monitor, e.g., valve widely open, 
high increase in temperature inside pipes, sudden drop of pressure, etc. 
2. A set of predefined rules that defines the system response when a specific state 
change occurs, i.e., when the attributes take on a specific set of values. An example 
rule would be “if the valve is more than 80% open (widely open), send an alarming 
signal”. 
                                                 
21
 The terms “rule based module” and “expert system module” are also used in the literature to refer to 
these systems. 
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When something changes, the event based module checks if a rule applies for the new 
state and reacts accordingly. This module can be used for four main purposes: 
 To add visual effects to the virtual environment according to what is happening. For 
example, when the temperature in a given pipe reaches a certain value and if in that 
pipe a flammable gas is flowing, the event based module reacts by directing the state 
module to put a fire in that specific position. 
 To apply a plant-specific behaviour, which is not part of CAD or P&ID models. For 
example a given process line may be designed so that a single button activates two 
pumps and opens a valve. The event based module manages such cases, i.e., when 
that button is pressed, a specific rule is activated and the produced event triggers two 
pumps on and opens the valve. 
 To help monitoring execution of tasks and procedures. The task module (see Section 
5.2.2) is driving this monitoring activity, but it relies on the event based module to 
detect if and when a given step of the task has been executed. For example, it may be 
required that a pump is turned on before a particular valve is opened. If the valve is 
open whilst the pump is still off, a warning message is sent. 
 As a replacement for the external process simulator. When an actor performs a given 
operation (i.e. activating a pump), instead of always invoking the simulator, this 
module can react in predefined ways. This feature can be utilised in situations where 
no process simulator is available or no link between the VR system and the available 
process simulator can be produced. 
The input to this module is in a simple and abstract form, a syntax that can be used to 
quickly specify system behaviour that can be read and understood by people who are 
not familiar with programming. 
Fig.  5.6 provides the architectural layout of the event based module which consists of 
two main components: 
 Message translator: grasps ongoing messages from the state module of core system, 
translates them into facts that can be processed by the rules shell. The message 
translator receives also messages from the rules shell regarding actions which are 
forwarded to the state module again to update scene stat (outgoing messages). 
 Rules shell: processes input files which consist of list of facts and rules. These input 
files monitor the execution of procedures and rules on plant-specific behaviour. 
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Fig.  5.6: Architecture (component diagram) of the event based module  
Since a VR scenario file involves hundreds of objects (plant elements) - where each of 
them has its own variables and properties that can be monitored during a VR 
experiment - the core system can receive and dispatch a high number of messages on 
scene objects. Processing all these messages by the event based module affects its 
performance and response which is reflected into delayed update of object states or 
actions. 
To reduce this effect and since the user (safety analyst, technician, operator, trainer, 
etc.) is interested in monitoring a few objects and properties, certain “points of interest” 
are inserted in the scenario file. These “points of interest” represent indications on the 
objects and properties that should be reported to the event based module, i.e., only 
messages concerning these objects are forwarded to the event based module. A “point of 
interest” can be seen technically as a class that consists of a few basic members: 
 object name; 
 property name; 
 current property value, used to store the last know value for that property; 
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 tolerance, used as threshold to detect when the value has changed. 
When the scenario is loaded, the message translator reads the list of “points of interest” 
and starts listening to messages from the core system about those objects and properties 
only.  
5.4.3 Process dynamics module 
The process dynamics module provides the link between the VR system and an external 
process simulation22 engine, thus providing realistic, dynamic plant and process 
behaviour to VR scenarios. The link between this module and the actual process 
simulator depends on which specific simulator is chosen. The process dynamics module 
is linked to the state module of the core system and processes messages to and from the 
external process simulator, e.g., Dynsim™ (INVENSYS 2008), D-SPICE® (Kongsberg 
(2008)), etc. 
In the proposed process dynamics module it is assumed that the external process 
simulator adheres to the OPC (Object-linking and embedding for Process Control) 
standard. OPC is “a series of industry standards specifying a standard set of objects, 
interfaces and methods for use in process control and manufacturing automation 
applications to facilitate interoperability” (Wikipedia (2008b) ). The purpose of OPC is 
to define a common interface that is written once and then reused by any business or 
customised software package. OPC was originally based on Microsoft's OLE COM 
(component object model) and DCOM (distributed component object model) 
technologies. (OPC Foundation (2008)) 
OPC based process simulators provide an OPC server, also called an OPC Gateway 
engine, which allows the exchange of data between the process simulator and the 
external application, which is called OPC client. Providing an OPC based module 
ensures the compatibility with industrial standards, being independent from particular 
commercial software and provides design flexibility by replacing the bottom box 
(process simulator) in Fig.  5.7 without the necessity of making radical modifications in 
the OPC client. 
Fig.  5.7 illustrates the architectural layout of the process dynamics module which 
consists of two main components: 
                                                 
22
 A dynamic process simulator is a program that enables engineers and designers to test the dynamics of 
designing and operating a process plant in a safe manner based on a dynamic copy of the real plant.  
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 OPC client: the interface that passes messages between the state module of the core 
system and the process simulator. An example message that would arrive from the 
state module would be to request the current value of tank X from the process 
simulator. Once received from the OPC server, the value is forwarded to the state 
module to update the scene accordingly. 
 Process simulator: commercial software that simulates the process dynamics and is 
interfaced to external applications using its OPC server. 
The OPC client initiates communications with the OPC server which reads a properties 
file that specifies which item properties (called “points” in OPC terminology) in the 
process simulation should be exposed to the outside world. Only these points may be 
read or written by external applications through the OPC server. The points are read 
from the OPC server and added to a list maintained by OPC client who passes messages 
of particular types to and from the state module, e.g., get value, set value, stop 
reporting, resume reporting, etc. 
Core System
Process Simulator
OPC Client
Process Simulator Core
OPC Server
Properties
<<artifact>>
Simulation File
<<artifact>>
State Module
component...component...
Storage medium/Network
Process Dynamics Module
[use]
[use]
Storage medium/Network
Update Message
Operation Message
Storage medium/Network
 
Fig.  5.7: Architecture (component diagram) of the process dynamics module 
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5.4.4 Logging module 
The logging module logs all the activities occurring while running a VR scenario. 
Actions and updates that are logged range from change to objects' properties (e.g. 
changing the open value of a valve, change pump status to “off”, etc.) up to changes in 
user‟s position, time to respond, completion of tasks, etc. The goals of such a logging 
module are: 
 Using the logged data to playback a particular simulation at a later stage. This helps 
reviewing procedures, discovering errors and putting necessary plans to avoid them 
in reality, monitoring bottle-nicks, etc. 
 Recording information on events, actions, operations, etc. which can be used as 
source for extracting HF-relevant data (error modes, error causes, etc.). 
The output produced by the logging module (Fig.  5.8) is a file that contains all the 
relevant information to reproduce the entire simulation or extract necessary information. 
This file represents an important input for the analysis module which uses this file as 
basis for extracting and populating particular information, i.e., time to perform an 
action, time to take a decision, path followed to reach a leakage point, etc. 
Core System
component...component...
Log Mdoule
Client System
component... component...
Log Mdoule
Logging Module
Recorder
Recording Filter
Log File
<<artifact>>[write]
 
Fig.  5.8: Architecture (component diagram) of the logging module  
To make sure that the user, i.e., operator, trainee, technician, etc. is aware of logging his 
actions and reactions, a recording button (recorder) should be activated so that the 
logging process can run as illustrated in Fig.  5.8. If the recording is disabled, an empty 
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log file is produced. A recording filter is used to specify the information that should be 
logged and avoid producing huge log files.  
5.4.5 Analysis module 
This module is in charge of extracting necessary data from the log files (logging 
module), storing it in a structured form that allows using it by HF or safety experts for 
analysis purposes and querying the stored information when needed. 
The analysis module is responsible for the following operations: 
 Data processing: for processing the log files together with the initial condition file – 
which are produced upon creating and running a VR scenario – and extracting the 
information to be stored in the database, i.e., the data and information that are needed 
by the risk and safety analyst; 
 Data storing: for storing the extracted information in a database so that it can be 
queried when needed; 
 Data querying: for interfacing with the database and querying the stored data. 
Fig.  5.9 illustrates the architecture of the analysis module. A description of the 
operations covered by the components of the analysis module is provided as next. 
Data Processing
Component
Data Storing
Component
Data Query
Component
Scenario File(s)
<<artifact>>
Log File
<<artifact>>
Database
Anaylsis Module
[use]
[use]
[write]
[read]
 
Fig.  5.9: Architecture (component diagram) of the analysis module  
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5.4.5.1 Data processing 
The data processing is performed in the following sequence: 
1. Select the following input files (necessary for analysis): 
 The scenario file: the file that contains all information about initial conditions of a 
VR scenario23. It summarises the elements that are necessary to run the VR scenario 
which include: 
 Scenario context: scenario name and paths to map files (i.e., path to Component 
Library in Fig. ‎5.4, Fig. ‎5.3 and  
 Fig.  5.5 ); 
 Points of interest: the path to the objects and properties that are monitored while 
the scenario is running (i.e., path to Points of Interest in Fig. ‎5.6); 
 Rules: path to rule file that applies for the underlying scenario and to be 
processed by the event-based module (i.e., path to Rules File in Fig. ‎5.6); 
 Process dynamics: the path to the configuration file which includes the 
parameters needed to start the process simulator interface and the properties in 
the process simulation that should be communicated (i.e., path to Properties File 
and Simulation File in Fig.  5.7); 
 Actor information: information about the actor who is supposed to run the 
underlying scenario, i.e., his role: field operator, control room operator, shift 
supervisor, etc. It contains also information about the path to the task files to 
assign the appropriate task for each actor. (i.e., path to Task File in Fig. ‎5.4 and 
Actor Input in Fig. ‎5.3 ); 
 The log files: the files which contain all information about running a VR scenario at 
a specific date and time and which are produced by the logging module. Log files 
record all events, actions and interventions that occur at run-time as illustrated in Fig. 
 5.8. 
2. Extract all general information about the scenario, actors, roles, etc. from the 
scenario file. This information provides content to the tables persons, actors and 
experiments in the database as shown in Section 5.4.5.2. 
                                                 
23
 Annex F provides an overview (checklist) on the data and information required for creating a VR 
scenario. 
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3. Search for completed tasks in the log files. The completion of tasks is being 
monitored by the task tracker inside the task module who then indicates the 
completion of a task by the proposed actor in the log file. For each completed task, 
the information related to tasks, operations and events of the database are filled 
accordingly as shown in Section 5.4.5.2. 
4. For each task, the safety analyst - who is running the analysis module - is asked to 
indicate if the task's operations have been completed correctly or not. If not, he can 
specify the corresponding external error modes, cognitive error modes, performance 
conditions and error causes (e.g., via drop-down lists or similar). These elements 
have been introduced in Chapter 3 as basic elements that are needed to apply the HF 
methodology. The values that can be assigned here are based on the entries of the 
corresponding tables in Chapter 3 (Table ‎3.1, Table ‎3.2, Table  3.3, Table ‎3.5 and 
Table ‎3.6). 
It is worth mentioning here, that some error modes can be automatically discovered in 
this data-processing phase based on a comparison between task file and log file. Below 
are some examples of these error modes: 
 An operation exists in the task file and does not exist in the log file. This corresponds 
to the error modes Not done (Table  3.1, Table  3.2), part of (Table  3.2), None (Table 
 3.1). 
 The time for completing this operation in the log file is less or more than the time in 
the task file. This corresponds to the error modes sooner than, later than (Table  3.2).  
 The sequence for performing an activity in the log file is different than the sequence 
in the task file. This corresponds to the error mode out of out of sequence (Table  3.2), 
skipped (Table  3.1). 
 An operation appears more than one time in the log file and only once in the task file. 
This corresponds the error mode out of sequence or repeated (Table  3.2). 
 An operation appears only in the log file. This corresponds to the error mode as well 
as (Table  3.2). 
This automatic recognition of some error modes should not prevent the safety analyst 
from rechecking their correctness and validity in relation with the underlying situation. 
Cognitive error modes (Table  3.3), performance conditions (Table  3.5) and cognitive 
error causes (Table  3.6) should not be automatically selected since the safety analyst has 
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to evaluate the actions taken by the operator and then select the error modes that fit to 
the situation. 
5.4.5.2 Data storing 
The data extracted in the first analysis phase (i.e., data processing, Section 5.4.5.1) 
together with the initial evaluation of the safety analyst (the person who is running the 
analysis module) are stored in a structured form in a database so that relevant 
information about performed experiments can be retrieved. In this database, the data are 
stored in the following tables24: 
1. Persons: general data about persons25 who can be involved in experimenting with the 
VR system. This table should be prepared by the organisation or the unit who 
experiments with the VR system in advance. Examples of this data include: name, 
job title, qualification, experience, anthropometric information (weight, height, 
stretch, etc.), etc. 
2. Actors: data about the actors who can perform operations in the experiment. It can be 
a real user (e.g., a field operator who is interacting with the system via tracking 
devices) or a fully virtual character. Examples of this data include: actor 
identification, role, link to persons who can act as this actor, link to the experiments 
that can be assigned or performed by this actor, etc. 
3. Experiments: all data about experiments and related scenarios. Some of the data are 
obtained from the scenario file whereas other data are obtained from the log files. 
Examples of this data include: name of experiment, start/end date and time of the 
experiment, name of the map file used in this experiment, name of the rules file used 
in this experiment, environmental conditions (wind speed, weather, etc.), etc. 
4. Tasks: all data about the task(s) that can be performed in an experiment. Examples of 
this data include: task name, task description, actor in charge of performing this task, 
task file, start/end date and time of the task, etc. 
                                                 
24
 An experiment in the virtual environment involves the execution of a task - which consists of 
operations - by an actor. An experiment might include events (actions) that are not part of the task 
operations. 
25
 It is assumed that the organisation that runs such a system pays attention to personal data and privacy 
protection, i.e., the involved persons are informed about the process and the stored data will not be 
misused, distributed, etc. 
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5. Operations: all data about the operations performed by the actor in a task and mostly 
obtained from the log files. Operations play an important role in providing key 
information on operator's behaviour and response. The information stored under 
“operations” includes the name, the property and the value of the object (component) 
that the actor “operates” with. Further information stored here cover the final result 
related to a particular operation, i.e., success or failure of the operation itself. This 
information includes external error modes, cognitive error modes, performance 
conditions and error causes as was introduced in Section 5.4.5.1. This information is 
entered or verified by the safety analyst who is also familiar with the experiment 
conditions as well as real operating conditions for further analysis. 
6. Events: contains all incidents that happen in the experiment at run-time. Unlike 
operations, events represent manual or automatic actions that are not part of the 
operational task for performing a certain process. An event can be caused by a safety 
analyst, field operator, control room supervisor, etc. Typical examples on events are 
automatic gas alarms, temperature change, igniting a gas leak, etc. 
5.4.5.3 Data querying 
The results and data stored in the database can be accessed and queried using a 
dedicated tool or interface. Using a query-interface, it is possible to extract customised 
information on persons, the experiments they performed, error types and modes during 
running these experiments and any other information that might be needed by the safety 
or human factors analyst. The queried information can be displayed in a web browser, 
stored in a text-file, exported to an EXCEL sheet, etc. 
An example that illustrates the extraction of some human factors and risk analysis 
related data after running a VR experiment is presented in Section 6.3. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter proposed a VR environment design for supporting risk analysis work. The 
provided design focused on the needs of the end users from the research domain 
(chemical process industry) by basing it on a HF supported set of functional 
requirements that have been developed and introduced in chapters three and four. The 
proposed system architecture emphasised the need of linking external modules, i.e., 
authoring module, process dynamics module, analysis module, etc. for the purpose of 
providing support for functions that are not typically supported by a VR system. 
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6  
Validation 
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In this chapter a validation of the findings of the underlying thesis is introduced. The 
chapter applies the same structure followed in this thesis, i.e., in Section 6.1 the results 
of Chapter 3 are validated (the HF methodology for supporting risk analysis), in Section 
6.2 the results of Chapter 4 (end user scenarios and functional VR requirements) are 
validated and in Section 6.3 the findings of Chapter 5 (VR environment design) are 
validated. 
6.1 Validation of the HF methodology: A case study 
To validate the HF methodology, it is applied to a case study on “detection of gas 
leakage at a gas processing plant” (chemical process industry). This case study stems 
from a plant for processing and transporting gas and condensate (light oil). An improper 
or delayed detection of gas leakage might have dangerous consequences as the gas 
clouds might be easily transformed into fire upon approaching an ignition source. A 
successful detection of gas leakage (i.e., exact leakage location, leakage cause, leakage 
quantity, etc.) reduces the negative consequences and increases the opportunity of a safe 
removal of the leakage. In case of uncertainties in dealing with the gas leakage, i.e., 
leakage could not be correctly identified, leakage quantity is high, location of leakage is 
not accessible, etc., the field operator might press the next Emergency Shut-Down 
(ESD) button close to him. This action represents the safest solution in case of 
uncertainties but at the same time the most expensive one due to the resulting 
production stop for days, the investigations that have to be conducted, the reports that 
have to be produced by involved persons, the revisions, etc.  
Based on that, it is of great importance to perform a correct and satisfactory gas 
detection to enhance safety and reduce the chance of pressing the ESD button26. 
It is worth mentioning here that due to confidentiality of data and the signed secrecy 
agreements, no plant-specific illustrations, diagrams or equipment photos are presented 
here. 
                                                 
26 None of the reported gas leakages in the plant required pressing ESD button so far. Based on that, 
there are no experience values on response time, plant consequences, escalations, etc. in such a case. 
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6.1.1 The process under consideration 
The pressure-drop process which takes place at the “Pressure Drop Station” (PDS) of 
the plant is considered here as a potential source of gas leakage. The pressure-drop 
process can be decomposed into the following steps: 
1. The process gas, which comes from the field, is processed in a cyclone liquid 
separator to be drained (inlet pressure 120-180 bar); 
2. The gas is heated from 4 °C to 21°C using two parallel heat exchangers; 
3. The pressure is then reduced to 118 bar using a parallel set of Pressure Reducing 
Valves, 
4. The 118-bar gas passes through mercury removal columns to be cleaned of mercury 
particles; 
5. The gas passes further to H2S removal,  
6. The gas leaves the PDS to further process pipelines. 
6.1.2 Data collection 
An empirical method of data collection has been followed based on: 
1. Interviews with involved persons: Safety managing director, process supervisor, ESD 
supervisor, fire brigade operators, control room operator, field operator and shift 
supervisor;  
2. Review of available documentation on the plant's specific process of gas leakage 
detection; 
3. Monitoring the operators while performing the job; 
4. A joint analysis of the results with the involved persons. 
The collected data focused on the operational, safety and emergency procedures applied 
to the PDS. The data covered: 
 Description of the pressure-drop process 
 Detailed description of operations during: 
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 PDS and plant Start-up 
 Normal functioning 
 Programmed maintenance 
 Description of procedures to be adopted and consequences in case of: 
 Shut-down 
 Blow-down 
 Emergency 
 Fire 
 Evacuation 
 Roles' description during each procedure: 
 Control Room operators 
 Field supervisors 
 Field operators 
 Maintenance operators 
 Emergency response team 
 Fire brigade operators 
This work has been carried out within the framework of 3 visits to the plant and a total 
of 10 days of on-site-work. These visits have been also utilised to review and fine tune 
the end user requirements presented in Chapter 4. 
6.1.3 Applying the HF methodology on the gas leakage detection 
6.1.3.1 Task analysis 
A gas leakage detection process is carried out in the following simplified sequence: 
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1. Detection phase: an alarm flashes in control room, alerting operators of a possible 
leakage; 
2. Alert phase: control room operator communicates with the field operator, using a 
walkie-talkie, to go to the area to check the possible leakage with a portable gas 
detector; 
3. Observation and classification phase: field operator observes and classifies the 
leakage. The leakage is classified as small if the measured gas concentration up to 
25%. A medium leakage corresponds to a gas concentration of 25-65% whereas a 
large leakage is reported by a concentration of more than 65% (also called explosion 
leakage to due to the high explosion risk); 
4. Confirmation phase: field operator reports to control room by confirming the leakage 
(size, location, etc.); 
5. Decision phase: control room operator, shift supervisor and field operator take a 
decision on the correct action to perform; 
6. Action phase, leading to 2 possible operations: 
 ESD and, if necessary, blow down (BD) by isolating a segment of the pipeline, 
by means of ESD valves. This action is done by pressing the ESD/BD button, in 
case of an escalated medium or large gas leakage. 
 Corrective maintenance: field operator or maintenance technician repairs the 
leakage without closing the operative pipeline or pressing ESD button. This 
action is mostly performed in case of small gas leakages due to the lower risk of 
gas leakage escalation. 
One of the most important factors for a safe and adequate execution of the gas leakage 
detection on the field is the response time of the operators (control room and field 
operators). Short response times mean a safe and adequate dealing with the problem 
whereas long response times increase the risk of escalation. 
It is worth mentioning, that the confirmation phase of the gas leakage detection process 
represents the most critical phase as reported by end users. This is due to the fact that a 
wrong (or delayed) confirmation would lead to an incorrect (or delayed) decision and 
negative consequences, e.g., explosion, fire, production stop for a couple of days, plant 
damages, etc. For this reason, the dynamic event trees that are produced in later steps 
focus on the confirmation phase and its impact on subsequent phases. 
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The result of the task analysis is illustrated in the task diagram of the gas leakage 
detection as shown in Fig.  6.1. 
Detection (25% leakage) Detection (25-65% leakage) Detection (>65% leakage)
Alert
Confirmation:
small-leakage
Confirmation:
medium-leakage
Confirmation:
large-leakage
Decision
Action:                 
   ESD
Action:                 
      BD
Action:                   
corrective maintenance if necessary
Observation and classification
(small/medium/large leakage)
 
Fig.  6.1: Task analysis results  
6.1.3.2 Error analysis 
I) Define possible deviations (external error modes) 
Table  6.1 lists the most common and relevant deviations that might occur during the gas 
leakage detection as reported by the interviewed persons (first column). The 
corresponding external error mode is assigned to the deviation in the second column and 
an explanation of the error mode is provided in the third column. 
 145 
 
Table  6.1: Possible deviations and the corresponding external error modes 
Deviation External error 
mode 
Explanation 
Detection 
Detection fails 
 
Not done An important piece of information on detecting a 
leakage is not displayed (i.e., faulty sensor) 
False alarm 
 
Skipped Received data (i.e., alarm signal) is ignored because 
they are not relevant. Happens often in case of 
snowy or windy weathers. 
Delayed observation by 
control room operator  
Later than Cues of data are not identified in time 
Misreading of tag 
number from control 
room screen 
More/less than Error in reading instruments 
Alert 
No communication to 
field operator 
None An important piece of information, i.e., the 
communication process, is not available 
Delayed connection Later than Cues of data are not identified (i.e., communicated) 
in time 
Misunderstanding Misunderstood An event is mistaken 
Observation and classification 
Wrong part of plant Other than Collected data are not pertinent to the situation 
Component failure, i.e., 
faulty portable detector 
Mistrusted Unreliable instrument 
Wrong detection 
procedure 
Not done Failure to identify critical information 
Wrong classification of 
the leakage size 
Other than Cues are wrongly associated to the implications of 
the situation 
Omit to check some parts Part of Data are not sufficient to understand the situation 
and make a decision 
Confirmation 
No confirmation from 
field operator 
None An important piece of information, i.e., the 
confirmation statement, is not available 
Wrong confirmation 
from field operator 
Other than Cues of data are wrongly associated to the 
implications of the situation 
Delayed confirmation Later than Cues of data (i.e., the confirmation statement) are 
not identified  in time 
Decision 
Wrong decision on 
corrective  maintenance  
Wrong decision on 
pressing ESD button 
Wrong decision on not-
pressing ESD button 
Other than Cues of data are wrongly associated to the 
implications of the situation 
Delayed decision on 
initiating ESD 
Later than Cues of data (i.e., initiating ESD) are not identified  
in time 
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Action 
Wrong/insufficient 
corrective maintenance 
Other than/part of Cues of data are wrongly associated to the 
implications of the situation 
Action is not sufficient to solve the situation 
Delayed corrective 
maintenance 
Later than Action is not performed in time 
Failure in Field ESD 
button 
Mistrusted Unreliable instrument 
 
II) Define possible causes (cognitive error causes) 
Table  6.2 lists the most common and relevant causes of errors and deviations that might 
occur during the gas leakage detection as reported by the interviewed persons (second 
column). The corresponding cognitive error cause is assigned in the third column and an 
explanation of the cognitive error cause is provided in the fourth column. An empty 
field under the column “cognitive error cause” means that no cognitive error cause can 
be assigned to the particular deviation. This is common in technical deviations27 caused 
by instrument errors, device failures, equipment damage, etc. or environment caused 
deviation, i.e., weather, ambient noise, etc. 
Table  6.2: Possible deviation causes and the corresponding cognitive error causes 
Deviation 
(external error 
modes) 
Causes Cognitive error 
cause 
Explanation 
Detection 
Detection fails (not 
done) 
Faulty detector  A technical deviation, no cognitive 
error causes 
False alarm 
(skipped) 
 
Faulty detector  A technical deviation, no cognitive 
error causes 
Weather 
(snow/wind) 
 Environment caused deviations, no 
cognitive error causes 
Delayed 
observation by 
control room 
operator  (later 
than) 
 
Attenuation to 
repeated  false 
alarm sound  
Underestimation 
of criticality 
Frequent false alarms might lead to 
ignoring a real one, i.e., Operator 
misjudged consequences 
Distraction Missed 
states/under-
estimation of 
criticality/under-
estimation of cost 
of recovery 
Overlooking the real alarm 
Operator misjudged consequences 
Operator is not aware of costs of 
recovery 
                                                 
27 The technical deviations meant here are unexpected ones that are identified while performing gas 
leakage detection. A pre-existing device failure or wrong sensor readings do not belong to this 
category as they might have cognitive error causes like “under-estimation of criticality” or “under-
estimation of cost of recovery”. 
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Multitasking  Inefficient method The control room operator is involved 
in other tasks. Working method 
(procedures) and task allocations is 
inefficient. 
Misreading of tag 
number from 
control room screen 
(more/less than) 
 
Ambient 
lightening 
conditions  
Inefficient method Working conditions in control room are 
not adequate 
Distraction Missed 
states/under-
estimation of 
criticality/under-
estimation of cost 
of recovery 
Overlooking the real alarm 
Operator misjudged consequences 
Operator is not aware of costs of 
recovery 
Multitasking Inefficient method Control room operator is involved in 
other tasks. Working method 
(procedures) and task allocations is 
inefficient 
Alert 
No communication 
to field operator 
(none) 
Distortion on 
walkie-talkie 
Battery problems 
 Technical deviations, no cognitive 
error causes 
Difficulty in 
directing field 
operator to 
leakage location 
Interrupted test Due to inability of control room 
operator to direct field operator, the 
communication is interrupted.  
Delayed connection 
(later than) 
Weather 
Ambient noise  
 
 
Environment caused deviations, no 
cognitive error causes 
Misunderstanding 
(misunderstood) 
Heavy 
communication 
traffic on radio 
Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (communication 
priority procedures in case of gas 
leakage) is inefficient.  
Ambient noise  Environment caused deviation, no 
cognitive error causes 
Observation and classification 
Wrong part of plant 
(other than) 
Mis-
communication  
Misordered 
criteria 
Wrong evaluation criteria leading to a 
wrong selection of leakage location 
Component failure, 
i.e., faulty portable 
detector 
(mistrusted) 
 
Battery failure 
Calibration failure 
Reliability of 
device 
 Technical deviations, no cognitive 
error causes 
Wrong detection 
procedure (not 
done) 
 
Very close or far 
from the leakage 
source 
Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (detection procedures 
in case of gas leakage) is inefficient. 
Approaching the 
leakage source 
from wrong 
direction 
Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (detection procedures 
in case of gas leakage) is inefficient. 
Wrong 
classification of the 
leakage size (other 
than) 
Lack of 
experience 
Over/under 
confidence 
Staff experience and competence is 
inadequate 
Weather/Ambient 
noise 
 Environment caused deviation, no 
cognitive error causes 
148 
 
Omit to check some 
parts (part of) 
 
Source of leakage 
is difficult to 
access 
 No cognitive error cause 
Overlooked due 
to distraction 
Overlooked 
criteria 
Overlooking an important criteria, i.e., 
an important part of the plant 
Stress Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. Lack 
of appraisals and personal talks with 
field operators 
Confirmation 
No confirmation 
from field operator 
(none) 
Channel Occupied Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (communication 
priority procedures in case of gas 
leakage) is inefficient 
Ambient noise  Environment caused deviation, no 
cognitive error causes 
Microphone 
distortion 
Battery problems 
 Technical deviations, no cognitive 
error causes 
Wrong 
confirmation from 
field operator 
(other than) 
Field operator  at 
wrong place 
Misordered 
criteria 
Wrong evaluation criteria leading to a 
wrong selection of leakage place 
Wrong 
measurements  
Misordered 
criteria 
Wrong evaluation and decision criteria 
leading to a wrong measurement 
Lack of 
experience 
Over/under 
confidence 
Staff experience and competence is 
inadequate 
Delayed 
confirmation (later 
than) 
Ambiguous 
delineation of 
responsibility  
Inefficient method 
 
Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (responsibility of 
confirmation) is ambiguous. 
Time pressure 
 
Unlikely states 
 
 
Field operator spent time in 
considering unlikely system states. 
In most cases, this deviation is situation 
dependent, i.e., there is a very narrow 
time slot to confirm due to severity of 
situation. 
Stress Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. Lack 
of appraisals and personal talks with 
field operators 
Lack of 
experience 
Over/under 
confidence 
Staff experience and competence is 
inadequate 
Heavy 
communication 
traffic on radio 
Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (communication 
priority procedures in case of gas 
leakage) is inefficient 
Ambient noise  Environment caused deviation, no 
cognitive error causes  
Decision 
Wrong decision on 
corrective  
maintenance  
(other than) 
Wrong decision on 
pressing ESD 
button (other than) 
Wrong decision on 
not-pressing ESD 
button (other than) 
Ambiguous 
delineation of 
responsibility 
Inefficient method 
 
Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (responsibility of 
confirmation) is ambiguous. 
Stress/Fatigue Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. Lack 
of appraisals and personal talks with 
field operators 
Lack of 
experience 
Over/under 
confidence 
Staff experience and competence is 
inadequate 
Lack of 
procedural 
guidance 
Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (decision procedures) 
is not available. 
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Delayed decision 
on initiating ESD 
(later than) 
 
Ambiguous 
delineation of 
responsibility 
Inefficient method 
 
Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (responsibility of 
confirmation) is ambiguous. 
Stress/Fatigue Inefficient method Inefficient handling of situation. Lack 
of appraisals and personal talks with 
field operators 
Lack of 
experience 
Over/under 
confidence 
Staff experience and competence is 
inadequate 
Lack of 
procedural 
guidance 
Inefficient method 
 
Inefficient handling of situation. 
Working method (decision procedures) 
is not available. 
Underestimation 
of consequences 
underestimation 
of recovery cost 
Costs and consequences of being 
wrong are not taken into account 
Action 
Wrong/insufficient 
corrective 
maintenance (other 
than/part of) 
Lack of 
experience 
Over/under 
confidence 
Staff experience and competence is 
inadequate 
Underestimation 
of consequences 
Underestimation 
of cost of 
recovery 
Costs and consequences of wrong 
maintenance are not taken into account 
Overlooking a 
system state 
Missed state Technician considered fewer 
alternatives and plans of action for 
maintenance 
Delayed corrective 
maintenance (later 
than) 
Lack of 
experience 
Over/under 
confidence 
Staff experience and competence is 
inadequate 
Underestimation 
of consequences 
Underestimation 
of cost of 
recovery 
Costs and consequences of delayed 
maintenance are not taken into account 
Failure in Field 
ESD button 
(mistrusted) 
Reliability of 
device 
 Technical deviations, no cognitive 
error causes 
 
III) Define cognitive error modes 
After an examination of the listed deviations and their causes and with the assistance of 
Table  3.3, the applicable and situation-relevant cognitive error modes have been 
identified and provided in Table  6.5 (fifth column). These cognitive error modes are 
further used in producing the dynamic event tree of cognitive errors and viable plans. 
6.1.3.3 Performance analysis 
I) Define performing mechanisms 
The definition of performance mechanisms that affect the execution of a particular task 
or operation represents a supporting tool for the analyst to examine behavioural reasons 
of making a particular decision. 
The application of performance mechanisms on the underlying case study is illustrated 
for the confirmation phase in which the operator has to trade off two conflicting goals: 
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spending more time in the confirmation phase to have a more reliable decision or make 
a quick (uncertain) confirmation which might lead to an ESD action. The first option 
entails a higher risk of increased leakage and escalation whilst the second option has a 
higher risk of financial losses. This decision dilemma is likely to be influenced by the 
cost of recovering from one option to another and the operator confidence in their 
judgment as illustrated in Table  6.3. 
Table  6.3: Analysis of goal tradeoffs in terms of performance mechanisms (confirmation phase) 
 Evaluation 
criteria 
Option 1: Longer 
confirmation time 
Option 2: Quick 
(uncertain) 
confirmation 
leading to ESD 
Explanation 
Plant consequences 
Risk of 
leakage 
escalation 
Higher risk of 
uncontrolled gas 
leakage 
Lower risk of 
uncontrolled gas 
leakage 
A longer confirmation increases the 
risk of uncontrolled gas leakage 
Financial 
losses 
 
Low risk of 
financial losses (no 
production stop) 
Higher risk of 
financial losses due 
to production stop 
A quick (uncertain) confirmation 
increases the risk of financial losses 
Confidence in judgment 
Performance 
demands 
(experience 
and training) 
High performance 
demands 
High performance 
demands 
In both cases, a high level of 
experience and training is required to 
cope with task demands 
Quality of 
procedural 
guidance 
Decision seen as 
stretching 
procedure 
Decision interpreted 
as conform with 
procedure 
Pressing ESD in similar cases is 
consistent with operational 
procedures  
Cost of recovering errors 
Reverse or 
undo decision  
Possible Impossible  In case of longer confirmation, there 
is a possibility to switch to option 2, 
i.e., press ESD. No possibility to 
recover, in case of pressing ESD 
Performance 
feedback 
Possible Impossible Operator may choose later to switch 
to option 2, i.e., press ESD. 
II) Define related work context (performance conditions) 
Table  6.4 introduces the performance conditions (work context) related to the listed 
deviation, i.e., the working conditions that participate in causing the deviation (fourth 
column). An explanation of the performance conditions is provided in the fifth column. 
An empty field under the column “performance conditions” means that no performance 
conditions can be assigned to the particular deviation. Similar to cognitive error causes, 
this is common in technical deviations28 caused by instrument errors, device failures, 
equipment damage, etc. 
                                                 
28 The technical deviations meant here are unexpected ones that are identified during the task. A pre-
existing device failure or wrong sensor readings do not belong to this category as they might have 
causes related to performance conditions, e.g., “availability of plans” or “organisational factors”. 
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Table  6.4: Performance conditions 
Deviation 
(external error 
modes) 
Causes Cognitive error cause Performance conditions Explanation 
Detection 
Detection fails (not 
done) 
Faulty detector    
False alarm (skipped) 
 
Faulty detector    
Weather (snow/wind)  Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Environmental  factors that affect 
operators in a global way 
Delayed observation by 
control room operator  
(later than) 
 
Attenuation to repeated  false 
alarm sound  
Underestimation of criticality Poor training 
(Availability of plans and 
instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Frequent false alarms might lead to 
ignoring a real one, i.e., Operator 
misjudged consequences 
Distraction Missed states/under-
estimation of criticality/under-
estimation of cost of recovery 
Poor training 
(Availability of plans and 
instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Poor training and poor supervision are 
main reasons of distraction 
Multitasking  Inefficient method Performing many tasks at close 
time proximity (Number of 
parallel tasks) 
The control room operator is 
performing many tasks at close time 
proximity 
Misreading of tag 
number from control 
room screen (more/less 
than) 
 
Ambient lightening conditions  
 
Inefficient method Inadequate policies for job aids 
(organisational factors) 
Job aids and supports which includes 
adequate lightening conditions to 
perform work belongs to the company 
policy. 
Distraction Missed states/under-
estimation of criticality/under-
estimation of cost of recovery 
Poor training 
(Availability of plans and 
instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Poor training and poor supervision are 
main reasons of distraction 
Multitasking Inefficient method Performing many tasks at close 
time proximity (Number of 
parallel tasks) 
The control room operator is 
performing many tasks at close time 
proximity 
Alert 
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No communication to 
field operator (none) 
Distortion on walkie-talkie 
Battery problems 
   
Difficulty in directing field 
operator to leakage location 
Interrupted test Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of experience, poor training and 
poor supervision contribute to the 
causes of this deviation  
Delayed connection 
(later than) 
Weather 
Ambient noise  
 
 
Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Environmental  factors that affect 
operators in a global way 
Misunderstanding 
(misunderstood) 
Heavy communication traffic 
on radio 
Inefficient method Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Inadequate policies for task 
priorities (Organisational factors) 
The supervisor has the authority of 
stopping non urgent communications. 
Control room operators do not have 
this authority (company policy)  
Ambient noise  Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Environmental  factors that affect 
operators in a global way 
Observation and classification 
Wrong part of plant 
(other than) 
 
Miscommunication  Misordered criteria Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of experience, poor training and 
poor supervision contribute to the 
causes of this deviation 
Component failure, i.e., 
faulty portable detector 
(mistrusted) 
Battery failure/ Calibration 
failure/ Reliability of device 
   
Wrong detection 
procedure (not done) 
Very close or far from the 
leakage source 
Inefficient method Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Lack of a clear written procedure for 
gas leakage detection. Lack of 
guidelines in case of inaccessible gas 
leakage. 
Approaching the leakage 
source from wrong direction 
Inefficient method Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Lack of a clear written procedure for 
gas leakage detection. Lack of 
guidelines in case of inaccessible gas 
leakage. 
Inadequate training of field operators 
Wrong classification of 
the leakage size (other 
than) 
 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Weather 
Ambient noise 
 Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Environmental  factors that affect 
operators in a global way 
Omit to check some 
parts (part of) 
Source of leakage is difficult 
to access 
 Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Lack of a clear written procedure for 
gas leakage detection. Lack of 
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 guidelines in case of inaccessible gas 
leakage 
Overlooked due to distraction Overlooked criteria Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Workload distraction (CDFs)  
Field operator is not well trained and 
distracted himself to unimportant 
information. 
Field operator is distracted due to 
workload (e.g., intensive leakage at 
many locations) 
Stress Inefficient method Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Lack of teamwork (Teamwork) 
Field operator is distracted due to 
personal or workload factors (stress) 
Lack of team communication and 
team culture for “stress-relief” 
Confirmation 
No confirmation from 
field operator (none) 
Channel Occupied Inefficient method Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of a clear written procedure. 
 
Poor supervision as supervisor has the 
authority of stopping non urgent 
communications 
Ambient noise  Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Environmental  factors that affect 
operators in a global way 
Microphone distortion 
Battery problems 
   
Wrong confirmation 
from field operator 
(other than) 
Field operator  at wrong place 
 
 
Misordered criteria Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of a clear written procedure for 
gas leakage detection 
Inadequate training of field operators                    
. 
Lack of guidance by supervisor 
Wrong measurements  Misordered criteria Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of a clear written procedure for 
gas leakage detection 
Inadequate training of field operators                    
. 
Lack of guidance by supervisor 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Lack of guidance by supervisor 
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Delayed confirmation 
(later than) 
Ambiguous delineation of 
responsibility  
Inefficient method Ambiguous procedures 
(Availability of information) 
Lack of sharp procedure for 
confirmation 
Time pressure Unlikely states Narrow time slot to respond 
(availability of time to respond) 
The time to respond is very short 
Stress Inefficient method Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Field operator is distracted due to 
personal or workload factors (stress) 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Lack of guidance by supervisor 
Heavy communication traffic 
on radio 
Inefficient method Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Inadequate policies for task 
priorities (Organisational factors) 
The supervisor has the authority of 
stopping non urgent communications. 
Field operators do not have this 
authority (company policy) 
Ambient noise  Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Environmental  factors that affect 
operators in a global way 
Decision 
Wrong decision on 
corrective  
maintenance  (other 
than) 
Wrong decision on 
pressing ESD button 
(other than) 
Wrong decision on not-
pressing ESD button 
(other than) 
 
 
Ambiguous delineation of 
responsibility 
Inefficient method 
 
Ambiguous procedures 
(Availability of information) 
Lack of sharp procedure for decision 
and consequences in case of wrong 
decision 
Stress/Fatigue 
 
Inefficient method Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Field operator is distracted due to 
personal or workload factors (stress) 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Lack of guidance by supervisor 
Lack of procedural guidance Inefficient method Inadequate procedures 
(Availability of information) 
Lack of sharp procedure for decision 
Delayed decision on 
initiating ESD (later 
than) 
 
Ambiguous delineation of 
responsibility 
Inefficient method 
 
Ambiguous procedures 
(Availability of information) 
Lack of sharp procedure for decision 
and consequences in case of wrong 
decision 
Stress/Fatigue Inefficient method Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Field operator is distracted due to 
personal or workload factors (stress) 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Lack of guidance by supervisor 
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Lack of procedural guidance Inefficient method Inadequate procedures 
(Availability of information) 
Lack of sharp procedure for decision 
Underestimation of 
consequences 
underestimation of cost of 
recovery 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Poor teamwork (teamwork) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Lack of supervision 
Lack of teamwork for a better 
estimation of consequences 
Action 
Wrong/insufficient 
corrective maintenance 
(other than/part of) 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Lack of guidance by supervisor 
Underestimation of 
consequences 
Underestimation of cost of 
recovery 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Poor teamwork (teamwork) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Lack of supervision 
Lack of teamwork for a better 
estimation of consequences 
Overlooking a system state Missed state Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Delayed corrective 
maintenance (later 
than) 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Lack of guidance by supervisor 
Underestimation of 
consequences 
Underestimation of cost of 
recovery 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Poor teamwork (teamwork) 
Lack of experience and poor training 
of field operators 
Lack of supervision 
Lack of teamwork for a better 
estimation of consequences 
Failure in Field ESD 
button (mistrusted) 
Reliability of device    
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6.1.3.4 Define possibilities of error detection and recovery 
A closer consideration of the underlying case study and its individual operations and 
steps lead to defining three possibilities for performing each operation: 
 Operation is performed correctly (i.e., detection is successful, confirmation is 
successful, etc.). 
 Operation is performed with delays (i.e., detection is delayed, confirmation is 
delayed, etc.). 
 Operation is performed wrongly (i.e., wrong detection, wrong confirmation, etc.). 
The potential of error recovery (viable plans) is very high in delayed operations and 
limited in wrongly performed operations. Correctly performed operations do not require 
recovery plan as they represent safe implementation of the operational procedures. 
Based on that, the consideration of possible cues for error recovery is limited to delayed 
operations as shown in the sixth column “error recovery” of Table  6.5. 
To reduce complexity and enable producing a well-arranged DET (see next section), 
only 7 possible viable plans29 for error recovery have been presented in Table  6.5: 
1. Viable plan 1 for error recovery in the detection phase; 
2. Viable plan 2 for error recovery in the alert phase; 
3. Viable plan 3 for error recovery in the observation and classification phase; 
4. Viable plan 4 for error recovery in the confirmation phase; 
5. Viable plan 5 for error recovery in the decision phase; 
6. Viable plan 6 for error recovery in the action phase in case of insufficient corrective 
maintenance; 
7. Viable plan 7 for error recovery in the action phase in case of delayed corrective 
maintenance. 
 
                                                 
29 The possibilities of error recovery in this case study are not only limited to these 7 viable plans. 
Further recovery plans can be defined. 
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Table  6.5: Cognitive error modes and error recovery plans (viable plans) 
Deviation 
(external error 
modes) 
Causes Cognitive error cause Performance conditions Cognitive error mode Error recovery 
Detection 
Detection fails (not 
done) 
Faulty detector     
False alarm (skipped) 
 
Faulty detector     
Weather (snow/wind)  Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
  
Delayed observation by 
control room operator  
(later than) 
 
Attenuation to repeated  false 
alarm sound  
Underestimation of criticality Poor training 
(Availability of plans and 
instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Delayed plan (delayed 
diagnosis) 
Viable plan 1: 
Shift supervisor 
recognises the alarm 
and takes 
responsibility Distraction Missed states/under-
estimation of criticality/under-
estimation of cost of recovery 
Poor training 
(Availability of plans and 
instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Multitasking  Inefficient method Performing many tasks at close 
time proximity (Number of 
parallel tasks) 
Misreading of tag 
number from control 
room screen (more/less 
than) 
 
Ambient lightening conditions  
 
Inefficient method Inadequate policies for job aids 
(organisational factors) 
Wrong plan (wrong 
diagnosis) 
 
Distraction Missed states/under-
estimation of criticality/under-
estimation of cost of recovery 
Poor training 
(Availability of plans and 
instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
 
Multitasking Inefficient method Performing many tasks at close 
time proximity (Number of 
parallel tasks) 
 
Alert 
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No communication to 
field operator (none) 
Distortion on walkie-talkie 
Battery problems 
  Wrong plan  
Difficulty in directing field 
operator to leakage location 
Interrupted test Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
 
Delayed connection 
(later than) 
Weather 
Ambient noise  
 
 
Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Delayed plan  
Misunderstanding 
(misunderstood) 
Heavy communication traffic 
on radio 
Inefficient method Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Inadequate policies for task 
priorities (Organisational factors) 
Delayed plan 
Unable to understand 
Viable plan 2: 
Shift supervisor stops 
all unnecessary 
communications and 
alerts field operator 
Ambient noise  Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Observation and classification 
Wrong part of plant 
(other than) 
 
Miscommunication  Misordered criteria Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Wrong plan  
Component failure, i.e., 
faulty portable detector 
(mistrusted) 
Battery failure/ Calibration 
failure/ Reliability of device 
    
Wrong detection 
procedure (not done) 
Very close or far from the 
leakage source 
Inefficient method Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Wrong plan  
Approaching the leakage 
source from wrong direction 
Inefficient method Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
 
Wrong classification of 
the leakage size (other 
than) 
 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Wrong plan  
Weather 
Ambient noise 
 Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
 
Omit to check some 
parts (part of) 
 
Source of leakage is difficult 
to access 
 Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Incomplete plan 
 Delayed plan 
Viable plan 3: 
Shift supervisor re-
checks situation with 
field operator 
Overlooked due to distraction Overlooked criteria Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Workload distraction (CDFs)  
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Stress Inefficient method Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Lack of teamwork (Teamwork) 
Confirmation 
No confirmation from 
field operator (none) 
Channel Occupied Inefficient method Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Unable to make plan  
Ambient noise  Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
 
Microphone distortion 
Battery problems 
   
Wrong confirmation 
from field operator 
(other than) 
Field operator  at wrong place 
 
 
Misordered criteria Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Wrong plan  
Wrong measurements  Misordered criteria Poor procedures (Availability of 
information) 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
 
Delayed confirmation 
(later than) 
Ambiguous delineation of 
responsibility  
Inefficient method Ambiguous procedures 
(Availability of information) 
Delayed plan 
Inefficient plan 
Viable plan 4: 
Shift supervisor stops 
all unnecessary 
communications 
Shift supervisor sends 
a more experienced 
field operator to re-
observe and re-
classify 
Shift supervisor takes 
complete 
responsibility of 
Time pressure Unlikely states Narrow time slot to respond 
(availability of time to respond) 
Stress Inefficient method Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Heavy communication traffic 
on radio 
Inefficient method Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Inadequate policies for task 
priorities (Organisational factors) 
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Ambient noise  Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
confirmation 
Decision 
Wrong decision on 
corrective  
maintenance  (other 
than) 
Wrong decision on 
pressing ESD button 
(other than) 
Wrong decision on not-
pressing ESD button 
(other than) 
 
 
Ambiguous delineation of 
responsibility 
Inefficient method 
 
Ambiguous procedures 
(Availability of information) 
Wrong decision 
Unable to recover 
 
Stress/Fatigue 
 
Inefficient method Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
 
Lack of procedural guidance Inefficient method Inadequate procedures 
(Availability of information) 
 
Delayed decision on 
initiating ESD (later 
than) 
 
Ambiguous delineation of 
responsibility 
Inefficient method 
 
Ambiguous procedures 
(Availability of information) 
Delayed plan Viable plan 5: 
Shift supervisor takes 
decision and presses 
ESD button 
Stress/Fatigue Inefficient method Capability Degrading Factors 
(CDFs) 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Lack of procedural guidance Inefficient method Inadequate procedures 
(Availability of information) 
Underestimation of 
consequences 
underestimation of cost of 
recovery 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Poor teamwork (teamwork) 
Action 
Wrong/insufficient 
corrective maintenance 
(other than/part of) 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Incomplete plan Viable plan 6 
 Maintenance 
technician calls for 
additional support Underestimation of 
consequences 
Underestimation of cost of 
recovery 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Poor teamwork (teamwork) 
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Overlooking a system state Missed state Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Delayed corrective 
maintenance (later 
than) 
Lack of experience Over/under confidence Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Delayed plan Viable plan 7 
 Maintenance 
technician 
recommends pressing 
ESD 
Underestimation of 
consequences 
Underestimation of cost of 
recovery 
Poor training (Availability of 
plans and instructions) 
Poor supervision (Supervision) 
Poor teamwork (teamwork) 
Failure in Field ESD 
button (mistrusted) 
Reliability of device   Wrong plan  
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6.1.3.5 Produce dynamic event trees 
In this section, two dynamic event trees are produced: a dynamic event tree for 
cognitive error modes and viable plans and a dynamic event tree for error recovery. 
It is obvious that producing dynamic event trees that cover all cognitive errors and 
recovery plans provided in Table  6.3 would lead to complex trees. To illustrate how 
dynamic event trees can be applied in the underlying case study, the focus is on the 
most critical part of the case study, i.e., the confirmation phase as explained in Section 
6.1.3.1 (Task Analysis). Based on that, an abstracted scenario of delayed confirmation 
and its recovery mechanism (recovery plan 4) - as shown in Fig.  6.2 - is considered for 
producing the dynamic event trees. 
Detection ok
Observation/classification ok
Action
Decision ok
Corrective
maintenace ok
Recovery plan 4
Confirmation ok
Confirmation delayed
ESD ok Insufficient/Delayed
corrective
maintenance
ESD fails
Recovery plan 6/7
 
Fig.  6.2: The scenario to be used for producing dynamic event trees  
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The scenario assumes that detection and classification/observation phases are performed 
successfully. The confirmation phase is delayed which might lead to escalation if this 
delay is not treated correctly. A delayed confirmation requires an operational deviation 
to recovery plan 4 (viable plan 4 in Table  6.5). Based on viable plan 4, a re-observation 
and re-classification take place since uncertainty in observation and classification is one 
of the reasons for delaying the confirmation. A successful execution of viable plan 4 
recovers the situation and lead to “confirmation ok”. The scenario proceeds by making a 
decision on the action to be taken. The two safe actions here are a successful corrective 
maintenance or a successful pressing of ESD button. The third action is “insufficient or 
incomplete corrective maintenance” which requires an operational deviation to viable 
plan 6 or 7. The fourth and last action is “ESD fails”, which is rare. 
Fig.  6.3 provides the dynamic event tree for cognitive error modes and viable plans 
based on a delayed confirmation that requires executing viable plan 4. Fig.  6.4 provides 
a dynamic tree for error recovery upon executing viable plan 4. 
1. Detection 2. Alert
3. Observation 
and 
classification
4. Confirmation
5. Decision and 
action planning
Detection ok Alert ok
Detection delayed
(delayed plan)
Obs. & Class.
ok
(continued)
(continued)
Confirmation ok
(continued)
Viable plan 4
(continued)
Detection fails
(wrong plan)
(continued)
(continued)
Alert delayed
(delayed plan)
Alert fails
(wrong plan)
Obs. & Class. delayed
(delayed plan)
Obs. & Class. fails
(wrong plan) Confirmation fails
(wrong plan)
Confirmation delayed
(delayed plan/
inefficient plan)
Outcome
Failure
Success
Failure
Go to 
recovery 
tree 4
Non-viable plan
(Unable to recover)
(continued)
Viable plan 3(continued)
Viable plan 2
Viable plan 1
Go to 
recovery 
tree 3
Go to 
recovery 
tree 1
Go to 
recovery 
tree 2
 
Fig.  6.3: A dynamic event tree of cognitive error modes and viable plans of the case study  
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The dotted paths with the designation “continued” refer to paths which can be further 
detailed or involve more tree branches. These branches are not illustrated here to reduce 
complexity and focus on the core part related to “delayed confirmation” and “viable 
plan 4” as explained above. 
The outcome of the event tree is an identification of the branches that lead to “success” 
and “failure”. The branches that end with “go to recovery plan” require further 
elaboration to see whether a “success” or “failure” would come out. 
Re-observation 
and re-
classification
Confirmation 
by shift 
supervisor
Decision
Action: 
corrective 
maintenace
Action: ESD
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Fig.  6.4: A dynamic event tree of error recovery upon executing viable plan 4  
6.1.4 Case study: conclusions 
The underlying industrial case study “detection of gas leakage at a gas processing plant” 
has been used to validate the developed HF methodology and explain how the 
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methodology can be applied to other case studies by providing its implementation steps 
(Chapter 3: Section 3.4.2 until 3.4.6 and Fig.  3.5). 
To illustrate the usability of the methodology, it is necessary to figure out how the 
safety analyst can utilise the results achieved upon applying the methodology to the case 
study in an improved risk analysis (compared to the conventional QRA that was 
presented in Section 2.1.6): 
1. Define accidental scenarios based on the illustrated deviations, including human-
caused one. The definition of human-caused deviations is possible due to the nature 
of the underlying methodology which focuses on “cognition” and the projection of 
the simple model of cognitive functions - in the form of tables (Table  3.1, Table  3.2, 
Table  3.4 and Table  3.6) - on each phase of the underlying case study. Conventional 
QRA supports defining accidental scenarios based on technical deviations as 
explained in Chapter 1. An example on one of the most critical and possible 
scenarios has been introduced and illustrated in Section 6.1.3.5.  
2. Improving the way of dealing with errors compared to conventional risk analysis, 
which is based on defining errors, error causes and probabilities. This has been 
achieved by dividing errors into external and cognitive errors, defining cognitive 
error causes and cognitive error modes. This 3-step analysis off errors has the 
advantages of deriving communalities between errors by classifying them into a 
higher level, i.e., error modes, and optimising the analyst's effort of solving the error 
roots. For example, if we consider the cognitive error modes of the confirmation 
phase (Table ‎6.5), we identify 4 modes: delayed plan, wrong plan, unable to make 
plan and inefficient plan. Providing a solution for each of these error modes, i.e., by 
changing operational procedure, changing safety instructions, introducing new 
communication equipment, providing field operators with more decision power, etc. 
would eliminate or reduce 13 roots (second column in Table ‎6.5) that would cause 
these types of errors. In a similar way, the safety analyst can extract the error modes 
of the remaining phases and propose design or operational improvements for 
eliminating their roots. 
3. Including aspects of human performance, i.e., performance conditions, in the risk 
analysis. This enables identifying the work context elements that affect the 
performance of the task or a certain step of the task. For example, if we examine the 
confirmation phase, we identify five major performance conditions that contribute to 
a wrong or inefficient execution of this phase: availability of information 
(operational procedures), availability of plans and instructions (training), supervision, 
organisational factors and capability degrading factors. Improving the work 
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conditions related to these performance conditions, i.e., sharpening operational 
procedures, providing regular customised training, introducing a second supervisor 
during the shift, etc. affects positively the operator's accuracy and efficiency during 
the confirmation phase. In a similar way, the safety analyst can extract the 
performance conditions related to the remaining phases and propose necessary 
operational or organisational improvements for reducing their effects. A definition of 
performance mechanisms can be supportive here to provide an analysis of goal 
tradeoffs related to certain situation. The definition of performance mechanisms 
represents a supporting tool for the analyst to examine behavioural reasons of 
making a particular decision as illustrated in Table ‎6.3. 
4. Including recovery plans in the analysis, which is not provided in conventional QRA. 
The recovery plans represent mechanisms for error correction or minimisation of 
negative consequences. For each step or phase of the case study, a recovery plan 
might be defined and initiated upon demand. An example of a recovery plan for the 
confirmation phase has been introduced here (i.e., viable plan 4) and shown that 
despite the delay that would accompany the execution of this recovery plan, it 
produces tolerated consequences compared to a wrong confirmation. Defining 
several recovery plans for operational deviations gives operators flexibility in 
making decisions and reduces the stress of taking immediate decisions, since 
incorrect decisions might be recovered.   
5. Producing dynamic event trees (DETs) as a combination of cognitive error modes, 
viable plans and consequences. DETs provide a visualisation of the dangers 
incorporated into an operation and reflect the dynamic nature of an operational 
procedure. They allow examining critical paths and check how an error can be 
completely corrected or recovered. An example of DETs has been provided here for 
the scenario of “delayed confirmation” and the recovery plan (viable plan 4) that is 
initiated to recover the situation. The safety analyst should pay special attention to 
scenarios leading to “failure” in the DETs. 
6.2 Validation of end user scenarios and functional VR requirements 
The end user scenarios and functional VR requirements have been validated in a loop of 
iterations under the participation of end users within the framework of the multinational 
research project mentioned under Section 2.3.3 and Section 4.3. In this regard several 
workshops took place at industrial sites to ensure a wider qualification and experience 
profile of the involved end users. 
 167 
 
First workshop: 
In the first workshop (2 days), the end users were interviewed to fill in the questionnaire 
template illustrated in Section 4.3. The filled questionnaire template provided an initial 
input on safety demands, end user requirements and possible scenarios (case studies) 
that can be defined and detailed. 
Second workshop: 
In the second workshop (2 days), representatives of the interviewed industries and 
further invited industries joined a workshop that aims at sharpening the collected 
requirements from the first workshop and merging the scenarios based on similarities 
and degree of importance. In this workshop, key industries have been identified as 
originators of the scenarios and agreed to support a further detailing of the scenario at 
their own sites. The result of this workshop was a first validation of scenarios. 
Third workshop:  
The third workshop (3 days) took place at the industrial sites that have been selected in 
the second workshop. In this workshop, the following aspects have been covered: 
 Presentation and validation of the scenario(s) under consideration and agreement 
on the most relevant one. 
 Agreement on the part of the plant to be considered for detailing the scenario. 
 Initial evaluation of the availability of documentation related to the selected 
scenario (operational procedures, safety instructions, risk analysis 
documentations, etc.). 
 Initial evaluation regarding the availability of CAD and 3D data for VR 
modelling. 
 Agreement on the layout of the next workshop and the persons to be involved. 
 The management‟s commitment to support the entire process and clarifying 
issues on data confidentiality. 
The main result of this workshop was a second validation of scenarios with focus on the 
scenario of interest for the hosting industrial partner. 
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Fourth workshop:  
The fourth workshop (5 days) took place at the same industrial site of the fourth and had 
the goal of detailing the selected scenario. To achieve this goal, the workshop has been 
divided into the following blocks: 
 First block: review of risk analysis documents (ET, FT, HAZOP, HAZID, etc.) 
related to the part of the plant and the operational process under consideration; 
 Second block: Detailed task analysis via interviews with the persons in charge at 
the selected part of the plant. The interviewed persons were: process engineer, 
control room operator(s), field operator(s), shift supervisor, maintenance 
technician, one member of the emergency response team, one member of the fire 
brigade team and the safety manager. This part has been accompanied by 2 site 
tours to the operational part of the plant under consideration and the control 
room to explain the task (gas leakage detection) inherited in the scenario and 
show the equipments and devices involved in the task. 
Third block: final review of documents and briefing with the involved staff 
Fifth workshop:  
In the fifth workshop (2 days), a consolidated task analysis was produced based on all 
interview results from the fourth workshop. Based on the results of task analysis, the 
required VR support (functional VR requirement) for each step in the task has been 
identified. 
Sixth workshop:  
In the sixth workshop (1 day), the results from the fifth workshop have been presented 
to selected staff from the industrial site. A step-by-step validation and review of the task 
details and the identified VR support took place. The result was a third validation of the 
results with focus on the functional VR requirements. These functional VR 
requirements have been grouped into groups of technical features for the purpose of 
defining the VR module required to realise these features as illustrated in Table ‎4.3.  
The entire process of requirements‟ validation and review is illustrated in the activity 
diagram presented in Fig.  6.5. 
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Fig.  6.5: Requirements validation and review 
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6.3 Validation of VR environment design 
The proposed VR environment design (Chapter 5) is being implemented within the 
framework of the multinational research project mentioned in Section 2.3.3, Section 4.3 
and Section 6.2. 
An intermediate step before starting the implementation of the proposed design was a 
definition of the VR technical modules needed to realise the predefined functions. This 
work has been introduced in Section 4.7. The definition of these modules is based on 
the foundations achieved in the workshops mentioned in Section 6.2 which were 
confirmed by the industrial end users participating in the project.  
It is worth mentioning, that the dynamics of the ongoing development process in the 
project lead to several adaptations and modifications in the proposed VR environment 
design to cope with further safety demands other than those identified in typical risk 
analysis applications. 
Due to issues on data secrecy and confidentiality of project results, it is not possible to 
insert screenshots or similar proofs of implementation. 
To illustrate how the VR environment is used as a medium for running safety scenarios 
and obtaining relevant data for risk and safety analysis, Table  6.6 provides an example 
of querying information after running the task “gas leakage detection” (the case study 
presented in Section 6.1) in the VR environment. In this example, the safety analyst is 
looking for the following information:  
 A list of the persons and actors who run the task “gas leakage detection” (in the VR 
environment) on the first two days of the current week and acted as field operator 
(Experiment: standard gas leakage detection, task: gas leakage detection, actor: field 
operator); 
 Error modes upon executing the operation “confirmation” of the task (operation: 
confirmation); 
 Response time30 of the actors who run the experiment during the operation 
“confirmation”; 
 Time of completing the entire task, 
                                                 
30
 Response time is defined here to be the time for the field operator, who located a leakage point, to 
report to control room operator. 
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 Possibilities of recovery. 
Table  6.6: Example on information that can be retrieved (queried) after running a VR experiment 
Person Actor Error modes 
(operation: 
confirmation) 
Response time 
(operation: 
confirmation) 
Time of 
completing task 
(seconds) 
Recovery 
A. Averageman Field 
Operator 
Later than 33 196 Plan 4 
B. Wrongman 
 
Field 
Operator 
Other than 7 170 No 
Recovery 
C. Goodman  Field 
Operator 
 No Error 29 188 N.A. 
D. Newman Field 
Operator 
None No value 404 Plan 4 
E. Quickman Field 
Operator 
Sooner than 19 100 Plan 4 
 
Assuming an ideal response time of 30 seconds and a period of 190 seconds for 
completing the task, the following knowledge is gained from the results of this 
experiment: 
 The employee “A. Averageman” is performing on average and was able to confirm 
without large delays. His delay can be recovered by viable plan 4. (error mode: later 
than). 
 The employee “B. Wrongman” made a wrong confirmation (error mode: other than), 
which does not allow any recovery. The reason for the wrong confirmation might be 
the quick confirmation of the leakage (7 seconds). 
 The employee “C. Goodman” is performing very well (no error). 
 The employee “D. Newman” is confused and finished the task with more than double 
of the average task time (error mode: none, i.e., operation is not performed). 
 The employee “E. Quickman” is rushing to finish the experiment (error mode: sooner 
than). 
Based on these results, the safety analyst makes recommendation on how to improve the 
performance of the employees, i.e., “D. Newman” should be trained further before 
doing field work, an appraisal should be conducted with the employee “B. Wrongman” 
since his results are frequently inadequate, the employee “E. Quickman” should 
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accompany the employee “E. Goodman” during field work and be educated to avoid 
quick reactions, etc. 
In a similar manner, further data and information can be retrieved from different tasks 
and experiments executed by different persons and actors in the VR environment. The 
obtained information can be analysed and further used to enhance operators' familiarity 
with the operational tasks, improve operational procedures, identify human performance 
problems, recommend work improvements, identify training needs, etc. 
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7  
Conclusions and 
outlook 
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The underlying work provided an integrated method for improving the risk analysis 
process by enriching it with human factors. It also proposed a VR environment design 
based on functional VR requirements that stem from industrial field works.  The 
proposed VR environment can be used as an experimentation medium for extracting 
and evaluating human factors and risk analysis related data to compensate for 
unavailable data or validate existing ones. 
The underlying work utilises enabling technologies to provide a link between safety 
(risks), human factors and industrial requirements. This link has been achieved via 
virtual reality (VR) as an enabling technology and a platform for integrating further 
enabling IT tools and modules (authoring tools, process simulators, event-based 
techniques, etc.). 
7.1 Results and concluding remarks 
A list of the results of the underlying thesis and the conclusion related to each result is 
provided below: 
 Result 1: a HF methodology for supporting risk analysis which takes the human 
behaviour and performance into consideration. This methodology builds on 
limitations of existing approaches, e.g., ATHEANA, CREAM, THERP by providing: 
1. An explicit model of human performance for cognitive tasks; 
2. A comprehensible taxonomy of error modes and error causes that can be easily 
applied by safety analysts; 
3. A representation of the dynamic interaction between workplace factors and 
human performance; 
4. A consideration of the error detection and recovery processes. 
The methodology provides a comprehensible tool for analysing human error in complex 
industries. Its primary objective is to help safety analysts to examine how operator 
performance may change in the course of an accident scenario. It should also enhance 
the communication between safety analysts and the cognitive science community in the 
analysis of human reliability in process control systems. The methodology has been 
taken as a reference for identifying the VR functional requirements (result 2). 
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This methodology has been validated on an operational task from the chemical process 
industry (gas leakage detection).   
 Result 2: Identification of functional requirements and features specifications for 
supporting risk analysis work in a VR environment. 
The definition of these requirements followed a user-centred design approach, i.e., end 
user needs that have been derived during field work on industrial sites, interviews and 
workshops with safety experts from the chemical process industry. 
A set of 21 applicable safety scenarios have been shaped and validated. After detailing 
and validating the scenarios, a task analysis of the scenarios was carried out for the 
purpose of detailing the requirements and boundaries of each scenario step. The result 
was a non-exhaustive list of the most demanding end users requirements for a better 
performance of risk analysis in the domain industry. 
Utilising the components of the proposed HF methodology (result 1), four major groups 
of functions have been defined: 
1. Functions for errors in identification and interpretation;  
2. Functions for errors in decision making and planning ; 
3. Functions for error recovery;  
4. Functions for representing work constraints. 
After mapping the end users requirements to the listed functions, a further detailing of 
these functions into sub-functions and functionalities was performed. As a conclusion, a 
set of 57 major functionalities were extracted and classified as fundamental for 
supporting the performance of risk analysis work in a VR environment under the 
consideration of non-negligible HF aspects as confirmed by end users. These functional 
requirements have been used as a base for the VR environment design (result 3). 
 Result 3: Proposing a VR environment design that supports risk and safety analysts 
in performing their analyses (based on result 1 and result 2). The following 
conclusions can be listed here: 
1. The need to translate the functional requirements (HOWs) into technical feature 
groups (HOWs) to enable deriving the appropriate system architecture; 
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2.  The need to integrate specific modules and components into the VR platform to 
cover some identified functions, which do not belong to VR functionalities, e.g., 
authoring, analysing, linking to process simulator, etc.; 
3. The need to have a scalable and modular design to gain more flexibility and 
expandability. 
Based on that a system architecture that consists of the main VR part supported by five 
external modules for content authoring, linking the VR environment to external process 
simulators, monitoring the execution of procedures and rules of plant-specific 
behaviour, recording events and messages for post-analysis and analysing the data for 
further use by safety or risk analyst has been proposed. 
The advantage of the proposed VR environment design is its end user- and application-
oriented nature, i.e., it focuses on the needs of the target industry (chemical process 
industry) and the challenges faced by the end users employed within these industries.  
7.2 Outlook 
The following ideas for future work can be derived from the underlying work and its 
results: 
1. The execution of further case studies for the purpose of validating the HF 
methodology (Chapter 3) in a formal risk analysis study. This requires the 
collaboration of at least one industrial partner from the research domain (chemical 
process industry) and the availability of plant facilities and personnel for interviews 
and analysis work during the period of performing the case study. Carrying out such 
an on-site case study would also serve the re-validation of the functional 
requirements and ensuring a better integratibility with the HF methodology. 
2. Performing a dedicated research on piping and illustration diagrams (P&ID), 
technical specifications, interfacing possibilities with external read/write tools, etc. 
This would enhance the features of the proposed authoring module and enhance an 
automated generation of 3D content based on exiting P&ID illustrations and 
information. 
3. Translating the underlying functional requirements and the proposed VR 
environment design into detailed technical software specifications for a structured 
implementation of the proposed system architecture. 
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4. Utilising the findings of the underlying thesis for other safety actions (rather than risk 
analysis), e.g., accident analysis, safety management and safety training. This can be 
achieved by applying the methodology to a case study which is relevant to one of 
these safety actions (or all) and reviewing the functional VR requirements to cover 
functions of importance for these actions. 
5. Utilising the findings of the underlying thesis in areas of application with high 
demand on risk management (other than chemical process industry). A typical 
application area could be “IT infrastructures” where the developed HF methodology 
(Chapter 3) can be utilised to examine and analyse typical risks, their escalation 
scenarios and the role of the human in avoiding or minimising these risks. 
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A HAZID and HAZOP methods 
HAZID (Shell 1995b) 
Objective  
To identify at an early stage of a project or a development plan the major Hazards that 
must be removed or managed. Unlike event trees (Annex B), HAZID analysis does not 
provide estimations or calculations on risk probabilities. Figured estimations are only 
provided for the priority of the risk under consideration as illustrated in Table  A.1 (sixth 
column) 
Method  
A multi-disciplined team review of the overall project (i.e., product, process or a part of 
it) including infrastructure, plant design and operation together with its impact on the 
local environment. The study uses a step-by-step methodology and a checklist of guide 
words to identify hazards and assess the influence these hazards may have on the project 
development and design philosophy. The scope will encompass both current and future 
life cycle issues.  
Information Required (Input)  
Information pack on the project, its potential scope and related environmental issues. 
All available conceptual and preliminary drawings and development plans.  
Information delivered (Output)  
Information on major identified hazards together with recommendations in priority 
order. This information can be entered in the Hazards and Effects Register for further 
processing. 
Documentation of the results 
The results of the team review (brainstorming) are entered into HAZID-sheets for 
further analysis. 
Example 
Table  A.1 shows an example of a HAZID-sheet with an entry about a possible top event 
from the process industry domain (rim fire with possibility of escalation) (Shell 1995c). 
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HAZOP (Shell 1995b) 
Objective  
To identify the Hazards, Effects and Operability problems relating to the process design 
and intended method of plant operation which must be removed or managed in the 
operation. Similar to HAZID, HAZOP analyses does not provide estimations or 
calculations on risk probabilities. Figured estimations are only provided for the priority 
of the risk under consideration as illustrated in Table  A.1 (eighth column).  
Sequence for conducting a HAZOP study 
 Coarse HAZOP - Early study to identify basic flaws in design which would be costly 
to correct later.  
 Main HAZOP - Primary vehicle for identification of hazards, effects and operability 
problems. Main HAZOP is performed when the front end engineering design is 
almost complete so that systems can be covered in detail.  
 Final HAZOP - Coverage of those systems which were not (sufficiently) considered 
in the Main HAZOP, e.g. vendor data, and a formal review of action responses to 
previous HAZOPs.  
 Procedural HAZOP - Identification of hazards and operability problems arising from 
procedures such as commissioning, maintenance and other non-continuous 
procedures.  
Method  
A multi-disciplined team review using a structured step-by-step methodology with the 
application of parameter and guide word combinations to sections (nodes) of the system 
to identify hazards and operability problems normally with a facility but also with 
procedures.  
 Coarse HAZOP - Large nodes concentrating on major issues, requires a team of 
experienced senior engineers. The recommendations from a Coarse HAZOP may 
involve significant changes to the design.  
 Main HAZOP - Rigorous application of the technique to relatively small nodes 
which requires a team of experienced engineers with extensive project experience.  
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 Final HAZOP - Rigorous application of the technique to relatively small nodes 
which requires similar team as for Main HAZOP with the addition of vendor 
representatives. At this stage recommendations should be concentrated on “will it 
work” rather than “it would improve the safety of design to have”.  
 Procedural HAZOP - Application of specialised guide words to operating procedures 
which requires a team similar to that for main HAZOP with greater emphasis on 
operational personnel. 
Information Required (Input) 
 Coarse HAZOP: Basic layouts, process flow schemes (PFSs) and any 
operating/control philosophies that are available. 
 Main HAZOP: Process and Utility Process Engineering Flow Schemes, (PEFSs, 
UEFSs) Operating and Control Philosophies, Cause and Effect Diagrams, Process 
Safeguarding Drawings, line lists, alarm and trip settings. 
 Final HAZOP: EFSs and Vendor drawings, data, previous HAZOP findings and 
responses and any design changes since last HAZOP. 
 Procedural HAZOP: As for Main HAZOP and Operating Procedures. 
Information delivered (Output)  
 Coarse HAZOP - Recommendations for adjustment to design options, QRA studies 
and other supporting investigations. A risk ranking may be given to assist in 
prioritising the actions. This list may be incorporated into the Hazards and Effects 
register for the project.  
 Main HAZOP - Recommendations to amend the design to remove or reduce hazards 
and operability problems. Categorisation of the recommendations into approximate 
risk groups to assist in prioritising the actions. This list should be used to update the 
Hazard register for the project.  
 Procedural HAZOP - Recommendations to amend the procedures to remove or 
reduce hazards and operating problems. This will allow Safety Critical 
Procedures/Operations to be identified. 
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Documentation of the results 
The results of the team review (brainstorming) are entered into HAZOP-sheets for 
further analysis. 
Example 
Table  A.2 shows an example of a HAZOP-sheet with an entry from the process industry 
domain (a possible deviation in operating one of the plant equipments (tank)) (Shell 
1995d).
  
1
9
6
 
Table  A.1: An example of a HAZID- sheet (Shell 1995 c) 
Category Natural & Environmental Hazards 
 
Guide 
Word 
Potential Hazards & Effects Threats Controls Development Phase P* No. 
Lightning Rim fire on oil storage tanks 
with possible escalation to loss 
of inventory and major fire. 
Lightning is a threat to 
all elevated or isolated 
parts of the plant. The 
incidence of lightning is 
high in this location. 
Existing conventional lightning conductors have been 
prone to failure. Determine what novel equipment or 
techniques are available and their benefits. If lightning 
strikes cannot be prevented determine optimum tank 
design to prevent rim fires and fire fighting techniques 
Initial project 
development phase 
2 5 
       
 
* P (Priority): 1=High Severity  2=Medium Severity  3=Low Severity 
 
Table  A.2: An example of a HAZOP- sheet (Shell 1995d) 
Parameter: Flow 
Intention: Tank 29-TA-301 is used as a hold-up facility for off-spec condensate and also as a receptacle for hydrocarbon liquids collected in the knock-out pots and 
maintenance flare. 
Guide 
Word 
Deviation Causes Consequences Protection Recommendation By P No
. 
No Flow High level trip in tank 29-TA-
301 shutting inlet due to 
excessive off spec production or 
operator failure to drain tank and 
recycle liquid 
Possibly unable to 
blow down plant as 
liquids cannot be 
removed from flare 
knock-out drum via 
route to 29-TA-301. 
There may be adequate 
volume in the flare knock-
out drum negating the 
requirement to transfer 
liquids to the off-spec tank 
during blow down. 
Determine if there is adequate liquid 
volume in the knock-out drum for blow 
down scenarios. If not, consider ways of 
providing adequate liquid storage 
capacity during blow down. 
PE 
 
 
1 1 
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B Event Trees (ET) 
The event tree starts by the top event which was identified in the HAZID or HAZOP 
(Section 2.1.6.1) as shown in Fig. ‎B.1: . The escalation of the top event appears on the 
right hand branch where each of the branches terminates at the bottom of the tree in an 
“outcome” or “end event”. The “outcomes” or “end events” represent an “incident 
scenario” since they reflect the development of hazardous event into an incident.  
On each branch of the event tree probabilities of occurrence are entered. The frequency 
of the end events (incident scenarios) is found through multiplication of the top event 
frequency by the probabilities along the branches that lead to the end event. Fig. ‎B.1 
below shows an example of an event tree and the possible escalation of the top event 
into incident scenarios. 
 
Source: Shell 1995a 
Fig.  B.1: An example of an event tree (ET) 
The estimation of frequencies and probabilities of events in Event Trees can be obtained 
from: 
 Statistical analysis of historical data; 
 Using Fault Trees (FT) to derive or estimate probabilities, 
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 When historical data is not available, it is necessary to rely on the opinion of domain 
experts to interpret data for comparable equipment or situation in order to make a 
best estimate.  
C Methods of 1st Generation HRA 
Table  C.1 provides a list of the most known methods of 1
st
 generation HRA: 
Table  C.1: List of most known methods of 1st generation HRA 
HRA method 
Time-dependent Accident Sequence Analysis 
Simulator Data 
Expert Estimation 
HAP – Human Action Probabilities 
ORCA – Operator Reliability Calculation and Assessment 
SLIM/MAUD – Success Likelihood Index Method / Multi-Attribute Utility Decomposition 
AIPA – Accident Investigation and Progression Analysis 
Fullwood‟s Method 
TRC – Time-Reliability Correlation 
Variation Diagrams 
Tree of Causes 
Murphy Diagrams 
STAHR – Socio-Technical Assessment of Human Reliability 
Human Problem Solving 
MSFM – Multiple-Sequential Failure Model 
MAPPS – Maintenance Personnel Performance Simulation 
Licensee Event Reports 
ASEP – Accident Sequence Evaluation Procedure 
HEART – Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique 
Speed-accuracy trade-off 
SAINT – Systems Analysis of Integrated Networks of Tasks 
OAT – Operator Action Tree 
CM – Confusion Matrix 
THERP – Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction 
HCR – Human Cognitive Reliability  
SHERPA – Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach 
JHEDI –Justification of Human Error Data Information 
SHARP – Systematic Human Action Reliability Procedure 
SRM – Sandia Recovery Model 
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Example of 1
st
 generation HRA methods: 
An effective way for evaluating and identifying shortcomings of 1
st
 generation HRA 
methods is to analyse the methodological approach of a method which belongs to this 
generation. However and since the 1
st
 generation methods are more than 30, there is a 
need to focus on a representative method of this generation. The THERP method which 
is considered as well established, most famous and widely applied HRA method of this 
generation (cf. Kim (2001), pp. 1069 et seqq.) is used as a representative of 1
st
 
generation methods here. 
The Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) (Swain 1983) is basically a 
hybrid approach because it models human errors using probability trees and models of 
dependence and also considers performance shaping factors (PSFs) affecting the 
operator actions. The development of this method began in 1961 and was completed in 
the 1970s (Swain 1989). 
The technique is linked to the data base of Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) which is 
part of the THERP handbook (Swain 1983), which contains data derived from a mixture 
of objective field data and judgements by the authors of the technique. This database, 
coupled with its engineering approach and with the fact that THERP was the first 
methodology to be accepted and used in the field, accounts for its popularity.  
The THERP technique is carried out in four phases, each of which requires the 
performance of well defined steps (Cacciabue 2001): 
1. Plant familiarisation, comprising the following steps: 
 Plant visit and 
 Review information from system analyst 
2. Qualitative assessment, comprising the following steps:  
 Talk- or Walk-through 
 Task analysis and  
 Develop HRA event trees 
3. Quantitative Assessment, comprising the following steps: 
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 Assign nominal HEPs 
 Estimate the relative effects of performance shaping factors 
 Assess dependence 
 Determine success and failure probabilities and  
 Determine the effects of recovery factors 
4. Incorporation, comprising the following steps: 
 Perform a sensitivity analysis and 
 Supply information to system analysts 
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D Methods of 2nd Generation HRA 
Table  D.1 provides a list of the most known methods of 2
nd
 generation HRA as 
described in (Hollnagel 1998), (Gertman/lackman 1994), (Cooper et al. 1996) and 
(Woods et al. 1987). It is noticed from the table that unlike 1
st
 generation methods, only 
few methods of 2
nd
 generation HRA exist due to the fact that developing these methods 
started in mid 1990s and most of these methods are still under improvement and 
updating. 
Table  D.1: List of most known methods of 2nd generation HRA 
HRA method 
CES – Cognitive Environment Simulation 
INTENT – Quantification of Errors of Intention 
COGNET – Cognitive Event Tree System 
CREATE – Cognitive Reliability Assessment Techniques 
HITLINE – Human Interaction Timeline 
ATHEANA – A technique for Human Error Analysis 
CREAM – Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
 
Examples of 2
nd
 generation HRA method 
CREAM (Hollnagel 1998) 
CREAM is a HRA method that has been developed in mid-1990s and describes in detail 
a systematic and integrative approach for accident analysis as well as HRA based on the 
principles of cognitive systems engineering. It presents a consistent error classification 
system which integrates individual, technological and organisational factors and can be 
used as a stand-alone method for accident analysis and as part of a larger design method 
for interactive systems. 
According to the developer of the method (Hollnagel 1998), CREAM can be used by 
system designers and risk analysts to: 
 Identify tasks that require human cognition and depend on cognitive reliability; 
 Determine the conditions where cognitive reliability may be reduced and therefore 
constitute a source of risk, and; 
 Provide an appraisal of the consequences of human performance on system safety 
which can be used in a PSA. 
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CREAM is based on classification schemes of error modes and the various elements of 
the man, technology and organisation triad (MTO), i.e., factors related to humans (M), 
technical system (T) and organisation (O). According to the developer of CERAM, it 
can be used in a bi-directional manner, i.e., in the forward direction for prediction 
analysis (performance prediction), e.g., for validating a man-machine design or risk 
analysis and in the backward direction for a retrospective analysis (event analysis.), e.g., 
for accident investigation. However, no applications on using CREAM for predictive 
analysis are available. 
The human cognition model used in CREAM (called Contextual Control Mode or 
COCOM) assumes that the most important factor in estimating human performance or 
human failure probability is the degree of control that humans (operators) have over the 
situation (or context). In other words CREAM assumes that the degree of control is the 
core concept that defines the relation between the context and human failure probability. 
Based on that, CREAM divides the degrees of control into four categories according to 
the degree of performance reliability. These are called control modes (Hollnagel 1998) 
and listed below in an ascending order regarding degree of control: 
 Scrambled control mode 
 Opportunistic control mode 
 Tactical control mode 
 Strategic control mode 
The reliability of performance is the lowest in the scrambled control mode (lowest 
degree of control) and highest in the strategic control mode (highest degree of control). 
The prediction analysis – which is more relevant to RA than the retrospective analysis – 
of CREAM is carried out as follows (Kim 2001): 
1. Selection of the task, 
2. Detailed task analysis, e.g., using hierarchical task analysis method (HTA); 
3. Description of the context using a total of nine common performance conditions 
(CPC): adequacy of organisation, working conditions, adequacy of man-machine-
interface and operational support, availability of procedures, number of simultaneous 
goals, available time, time of day, adequacy of training and crew calibration quality, 
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4. Identification of specific demands to cognition in terms of four cognitive functions: 
observation, interpretation, planning and execution (cognitive demand profile); 
5. Determination of the probable control mode for each task element; 
6. Identifying of cognitive function failure in terms of the four cognitive functions 
mentioned under point number 4; 
7. Estimating cognitive failure probabilities for each task element and for the entire 
task. 
CREAM as the first example on 2
nd
 generation HRA methods in this research focuses 
on the basis of cognitive engineering and shows great potential for applications where 
an analysis of operator‟s cognition is of high importance. Despite its complexity, many 
safety experts consider CREAM as a more systematic method compared to ATHEANA 
(cf. Kim (2001), pp. 1069-1081 et seqq.) which is presented as next. 
ATHEANA (USNRC 2000), (Cooper et al. 1996)  
ATHEANA is a HRA method that has been developed in the mid-1990s to improve the 
ability of PSA in identifying important human-system interactions, to represent the most 
important severe accident sequences and to provide recommendations for improving 
human performance based on analysing possible causes (see steps of ATHEANA 
below). The developers of ATHEANA consider this method to have the following 
important characteristics compared to other HRA methods (Thompson et al. 1997): 
 ATHEANA is designed to be able to identify (and justify) human failure events 
(HFEs) that previously have not been included in PRA models (especially errors of 
commission). Other HRA methods do not formally address HFE identification and 
justification to the extent and in the manner that ATHEANA does. 
 The ATHEANA process for identifying HFEs and the associated unsafe actions and 
error-forcing contexts (EFCs) is similar to a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study 
in that: 
 a multidisciplinary team, lead by the HRA analyst, is required to apply the 
method; 
 an imaginative yet systematic search process is used, and; 
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 the structure of ATHEANA‟s search process is designed to assist the 
multidisciplinary team and stimulate thinking of new ways for accident 
conditions to arise. 
 
The ATHEANA method is carried out in five steps (Thompson et al. 1997): 
 
1. Preparing for the application of ATHEANA Plant familiarisation, comprising the 
following steps: 
  Select scope of analysis;  
  Assemble and train the ATHEANA team; 
  Collect background information; 
  Establish priorities for examining different initiators and event trees, and; 
  Prioritise plant functions & systems used to define candidate human failure 
events (HFE). 
2. Identifying human failure events and unsafe actions 
3. Identifying the causes of unsafe actions 
4. Quantifying Human Failure Events (HFEs) 
5. Incorporating the HFEs into the PSA by manipulating the logic models of PSA, i.e., 
event trees and fault trees. 
ATHEANA as the second representative of 2
nd
 generation HRA methods in this 
research represents a well described method which was developed to increase the degree 
to which a HRA can represent different kinds of human behaviours in accidents and 
near-miss events in different working environments (originally for nuclear power 
plants). The method provides a detailed search process for identifying important human 
actions and the contexts that can lead to their success or failure. It also provides 
guidance for quantifying human actions for integrating them into PSA in an improved 
way compared to 1
st
 generation of HRA methods. 
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E Internal survey on VR software products 
Table  E.1: List of examined products31 and their classification 
TR RA AI SM Others
Fermec Back hoe Loader VIRTALIS x Manufacturing D,Cons,Main x No x
Leyland Trucks VIRTALIS x Automotive D,Cons,Main x No x x
Gunnery (Battle) Simulator VIRTALIS x Military Op,Main x No x x

Rescue Helicopter Training) VIRTALIS x Military, Aviation Op,Main x x x
VR in the mining industry Deutsche Steinkohle x Mining, Transport Op,Main x x x
CAE Aviation Training CAE x Aviation,Military,Automotive Op,Main x No x x
the Cypersphere VR display system Uni. Of Warwick x Manufacturing Exp,D,Op,Main x x x x
VR in petrochemical industry Ufa state university x Petrochemical Exp,D,Cons,Op x x x x x
VIZCon Uni. Of Warwick x Manufacturing Exp,D,Op,Main x x x x
ASSURANCE RISOE x Chemical Op No No x
UPTUN TNO x Transport, Automotive Op No x x
ETOILE Tecnatom x Nuclear, Transport Op x No x
VRIMOR Tecnatom x Nuclear, Transport Op,Main x x x
CREATE HVRC x Nuclear D,Dec x x x x
VR-Safety STATOIL x Chemical, Petrochemical Exp,D,Op x No x x
VICHER 1 Uni. Of Illionis x Chemical, petrochemical D,Op,Main x No x
VICHER 2 Uni. Of Illionis x Chemical Op,Main x No x
Safety Uni. Of Illionis x Chemical Op,Main x No x
CIRSMA Industrial Safety Integration x
he ical,
Petrochemical Exp,Main x No x x
BAE systems submarines VIRTALIS x Military, Automotive D x No x
VDT Platform IFF x
Aviation, Automotive,
Manufacturing D,Op,Main x No x
Area of application
Product/tool/project developer/coordinator
commercial
product Project sector
phase of 
process
life cycle VR HF
 
Legend: 
 
Cons: Construction phase, D: Design phase, E: Exploration phase, Main: Maintenance phase, Op: Operation phase 
VR: Virtual Reality HF: Human Factors RA: Risk Analysis AI: Accident Investigation SM: Safety Management 
                                                 
31 For some commercial VR Products, no feedback was received from the software producers. These products have not been included here. 
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I. Target industries of the products 
 
 
 
Fig.  E.1: Target groups of the investigated products 
II. Inclusion of VR and HF 
 
 
 
Fig.  E.2: Inclusion of HF and VR components in the investigated products 
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III. Application areas of the products: 
 
 
 
Fig.  E.3: Areas of application of the investigated products 
IV. Phases of the production life cycle covered by the products: 
 
 
 
Fig.  E.4: Phases of production life cycle covered by the investigated products 
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V. Combination of analysed elements: 
 
 
 
Fig.  E.5: Effect of combining analysed elements on number of matching products 
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F Data required for creating a VR scenario 
This section provides an overview (checklist) of the data and information necessary for 
creating a VR scenario. This overview refers to the technical data and information 
which are fed into the proposed VR environment (mainly the authoring module) to 
create VR scenarios. In this context, technical data corresponds to geometry data 
(2D/3D), photos of objects, videos of technical procedures, etc. as explained below. 
Since some of this data is obtained during industrial field visit, the end users at the 
industrial site should be also informed about this checklist in advance to estimate 
whether the required information could be obtained during a visit. This is also necessary 
for arranging necessary permissions for using necessary data gathering devices on site 
when necessary. Examples of data gathering devices include: digital camera, video 
camera, audio recording devices, etc. 
The list of the required data and information is provided under the points 1-7 and a 
template with examples is provided under point 8. 
1. List of plant items 
This list should provide an overview of (all) items and components involved in the 
scenario, e.g., tanks, valves, pumps, pipes, equipment, etc. 
2. Geometry data of plant items 
Geometry data represents the 3D geometrical information of all elements of the scenario 
or ideally for all the items listed under point 1. In many cases where this 3D information 
is not available for the entire scenario, it should be at least available for the tasks or 
sequences to be focused on. 
The format in which this data exists and its compatibility with a VR system is not 
discussed here since this topic is not a focus point in the underlying research. However, 
the availability of 3D data in any format provides a good and essential start for creating 
the scenario in which case commercial conversion pipelines can be used to convert from 
one format into another to assure compatibility. 
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3. Texture and material data 
Since the textures and materials increase the value of recognising the scenario objects, 
necessary data for reflecting textures and materials should be available. The easiest way 
of recording a texture is a “photo”. 
Since it is expected that the end users do not have the required photos, making photos 
should be planned within the framework of the industrial site visit. To do that, a digital 
camera can be used to make necessary photos (as much as possible) with focus on the 
elements and components of the scenario as listed under point 1. 
The industrial end user should be aware that making photos might be necessary to 
obtain data and consequently appropriate permissions for making on-site photos should 
be prepared. This is also necessary to ensure the availability of a specific digital camera 
for making on-site photos as it is not allowed to use normal digital cameras on site of a 
chemical process plant due to ignition risk. 
4. Objects‟ properties 
This part corresponds to parameters, attributes, states and values which the object(s) can 
have in the scenario. These properties are important because their values correspond to 
specific criteria which might initiate one or more responses or reactions in the system. 
Two categories of objects‟ properties can be defined: 
 Physical properties which take certain values, e.g., temperature, pressure, humidity, 
weight, etc. (The value and states could be specific figures like 30, 40, 80%, etc or 
“ON/OFF”, “OPEN/CLOSE”, “EMPTY/FULL”) 
Example 1: If the temperatures in pipe2 > 40 °C, close valve2 Objects‟ property: 
TEMPERATURE 
 Abstract properties for which no specific value can be assigned. An example of an 
abstract property is “space” or “location” which corresponds to defining the locations 
in which the object plays a role in a certain task or procedure. 
Example 2: If the raw material reaches tank1, switch off pump2 and valve2Objects‟ 
property: SPACE/LOCATION 
5. Operational sequences 
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The operation(s) involved in the scenario should be described in a way which allows 
modelling them in the VR environment. 
Example 3: If the scenario involves a disassembly process, the disassembly steps should 
be documented, i.e., decomposing the disassembly process into working steps in which 
specific components (object) are involved in each working step. 
Start up, change over and shut down descriptions are further examples of such 
operational sequences and belong to the data which should be available. 
These sequences can be obtained by: 
6. Using available instructions provided by end users about operation, assembly, 
disassembly, maintenance, working procedures, safety instructions, etc. 
(Instruction Manuals or Catalogues). 
7. Recording the sequences using a video camera. 
It should be considered that in many cases the expected level of process detailing is not 
documented in instructions, the video camera option should be considered. Based on 
that, a video camera should be available for recording the necessary sequences. 
Similar to making on-site photos, the industrial end user should be pre-informed that 
recording some operational sequences might be necessary to obtain data and 
consequently appropriate permissions for making on-site videos should be prepared. 
 
Audio data 
Noise, spoken text, alarm and similar audio data can be supportive in solving the 
problem being addressed in the scenario. 
It might be necessary to record these “tones” on site, particularly if they have a unique 
nature or should be reproduced as heard. In other cases, where a similar tone could be 
used, available audio libraries can be used to select the corresponding audio file(s) from 
these libraries. 
It‟s also important to document any verbal interaction that affects the running scenario 
(for example communication between the operator and the control room, via radio). 
Other/additional information 
 Things to avoid when operating the plant or doing an operational sequence 
 212 
 
 Examples of dangerous states 
 Safety instructions 
 Locations of fire fighting devices 
 Locations of emergency exits and meetings points 
 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams for the plant section(s) under consideration 
Template with Examples 
Table  F.1 provides an example for a list of items and the necessary information which 
should be obtained for creating a VR scenario. The table can be used as template and 
filled in with real site data. 
2
1
3
 
 
 
 
Table  F.1: Example (template) on items and their related data to be included in a VR scenario 
Item Geometry data Texture data Objects‟ properties 
and states 
Operational sequence Audio data Other information 
Tank_111 tank_111.obj tank_111.jpg 
plant_video.mpg 
1. Full 
2. Empty 
3. Over filled 
operation_manual.pdf 
operation_video.mpg 
tank111_alarm.wav 1. Make sure to empty 
before maintenance 
2. If tank=overfilled  
alarm! 
Valve_11
1 
valve_111.wrl Not available from 
end user photos 
were taken on site 
1.Open 
2. Close 
3. Partial Close 
No instructions are 
available from end user 
 see video 
“operation_video.mpg” 
No relevance 1. The valve should not 
be closed longer than 
continuous 24 hours  
2. Inspection every 30 
days is necessary 
Pump_11
1 
Not available 
(alternative: 
photos, video 
and 2D 
sketches were 
provided from 
end user) 
Not available from 
end user  photos 
were taken on site 
1. On 
2. Off 
No instructions are 
available from end user 
 see video 
“operation_video.mpg” 
pump111_alarm.mp3 1. Pump_111 has the 
same geometry as 
Pump_222, Pump_333 
and Pump_444 
2. If Pump_111 is “Off” 
longer than 12 hours, 
Tank_111 will be 
empty  Alarm! 
Mixer_11
1 
mixer_111.3ds Texture info in the 
“3ds” file. Photos 
were taken on site. 
1.On 
2.Off 
3.Temperature 
4.Space/Location 
mixer_maintenance.pdf, 
mixer_operation.pdf 
See also video 
“operation_video.mpg” 
Alarm tone is 
necessary and not 
available from end 
user. The pump alarm 
can be used. 
1.If 
temperature>60alarm 
2.If Ammonia is close 
to mixeralarm 
3.If operator is very 
close to mixeralarm 
Item_XX
X 
      
etc.       
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